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Media usage to gather political news and the attitude of political trust are both key theoretical 
ingredients for a successful democratic state. Citizens’ political trust in the state is essential in 
ensuring that the decisions made by the political authorities on their behalf are accepted. The 
media not only fulfils a watchdog function in a democratic state but is also an important 
communication link and vessel of information between the citizens and government.  
Despite their recognised importance, however, media usage and political trust have a 
contentious relationship. Two key schools of thought exist when referring to the way in which 
media usage to gather news influences political trust, with supporting evidence found for each. 
The first is the media malaise school of thought, which argues that an increased exposure to 
political news will negatively shape the trust that citizens hold towards government and the 
state. The second school of thought is the virtuous circle, which argues that the increased 
political knowledge gained through news consumption will promote democratic learning and 
political trust. 
Studies on these schools of thought and the conclusions drawn have largely been conducted in 
advanced democratic states. This study explored the association between the frequency of 
media usage to gather political news and political trust in the South African context. South 
Africa presented an interesting case study to further explore the relationship between these 
variables and this study contributes to filling this gap in the literature. Firstly, there is a high 
rate of media usage to gather news in by South African citizens. Secondly, the South African 
political landscape has been tumultuous in recent years and various corruption and other 
scandals have been covered widely by the media. Some examples of this include the Nkandla 
scandal and the allegations of state capture involving the Gupta family.  
This study explored the way in which the frequency of media usage to gather political news 
affects political trust in South Africa. This was achieved through a quantitative approach using 
Afrobarometer data from survey Round 6 (2015) and Round 7 (2018). The methodology and 
the operationalisation of the concepts in this study drew from a large body of international 
literature that fits the context of this research. The media platforms examined in this study were 
radio, television, newspapers and the internet. Political trust was operationalised using Norris’ 
(1999) conceptual framework and included the following objects of trust: political actors, 
political institutions, regime performance and regime principles.  
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The findings reveal surprising results that run contrary to the initial expectations of this study. 
The frequency of media usage to gather news did not strongly shape citizens’ trust in the 
various political actors and institutions. Instead, the overall association between citizens’ trust 
and the frequency of media usage appears to support the virtuous circle theory for all the media 





Mediagebruik om politieke nuus te versamel en die ingesteldheid van politieke vertroue is albei 
belangrike teoretiese komponente van ’n suksesvolle demokratiese staat. Politieke vertroue in 
die staat is noodsaaklik om te sorg dat die besluite wat politieke owerhede namens burgers 
neem, aanvaar word. Die media in ’n demokratiese staat vervul nie net ’n waghondrol nie, maar 
is ook ’n belangrike kommunikasieskakel en inligtingsmiddel tussen burgers en die regering.  
Nietemin, al word albei as belangrik erken, is die verhouding tussen mediagebruik en politieke 
vertroue ook omstrede. Daar bestaan twee denkrigtings oor hoe mediagebruik vir 
nuusversameling politieke vertroue kan beïnvloed, met stawende bewyse vir elk. Die eerste is 
die denkrigting van media-malaise, wat aanvoer dat verhoogde blootstelling aan politieke nuus 
’n negatiewe impak op burgers se vertroue in die regering en die staat het. Die tweede is die 
denkrigting van die positiewe kringloop, wat beweer dat verhoogde politieke kennis as gevolg 
van nuusverbruik bevorderlik is vir demokratiese leer en politieke vertroue. 
Studies oor hierdie denkrigtings is tot dusver hoofsaaklik in gevorderde demokratiese state 
onderneem. Hierdie studie ondersoek egter die verband tussen die gereeldheid van 
mediagebruik om politieke nuus te versamel en politieke vertroue onder burgers in Suid-
Afrikaanse verband, en help vul dus ’n leemte in die literatuur. Suid-Afrika bied ’n interessante 
gevallestudie om die verwantskap tussen hierdie veranderlikes te verken: Eerstens maak Suid-
Afrikaanse burgers deeglik gebruik van die media om nuus te versamel. Tweedens is die Suid-
Afrikaanse politieke landskap die afgelope paar jaar onstuimig, en berig die media breedvoerig 
oor verskeie korrupsie- en ander skandale. ’n Paar voorbeelde hiervan is die Nkandla-skandaal, 
en die bewerings van staatskaping waarby die Gupta-familie betrek word.  
Die studie volg ’n kwantitatiewe benadering met behulp van Afrobarometer-data uit 
opnamerondte 6 (2015) en opnamerondte 7 (2018) om te bepaal watter effek gereelde 
mediagebruik vir die versameling van politieke nuus op politieke vertroue in Suid-Afrika het. 
Die metodologie en die inwerkingstelling van die konsepte in hierdie studie is gegrond op ’n 
uitgebreide versameling internasionale literatuur wat op die konteks van hierdie navorsing 
betrekking het. Die mediaplatforms wat bestudeer is, is radio, televisie, koerante en die internet. 
Politieke vertroue is aan die hand van Norris (1999) se konseptuele raamwerk in werking 





Die navorsingsbevindinge is verrassend en in lynregte teenstelling met wat aanvanklik verwag 
is. Die studie bring aan die lig dat die gereeldheid van mediagebruik om nuus te versamel nié 
’n sterk impak op burgers se vertroue in die verskillende politieke rolspelers en instellings het 
nie. In plaas daarvan, blyk die algehele verband tussen burgers se vertroue en die gereeldheid 
van mediagebruik die teorie van die positiewe kringloop te ondersteun vir alle mediaplatforms 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
Political trust and media institutions are both important factors in a democratic state, although 
the way in which these two aspects interact with each other is widely debated (Norris, 
2000:309–312; Avery, 2009:412; Aarts, Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:577–579; Fladmoe and 
Strömbäck, 2011:3).  
Political trust is largely interlinked with the notions of political legitimacy and support towards 
a democratic state and is a key indicator in showcasing the health of a democracy (Easton, 
1975:444; Inglehart, 1988:1204–1205; Mischler and Rose, 2001:55). Moreover, media 
institutions tie directly into the democratic notion of freedom and can also be considered as a 
‘check and balance’ relating to the accountability of the state and are often described as 
‘watchdogs’. Furthermore, the media represents an important channel between people and their 
political leaders and is the main vehicle through which citizens can gain political information 
(Berman and Witzner, 1997:1313–1316; McNair, 2009:238:240; Strömbäck and Shehata, 
2010:576; Aarts et al., 2011:3).  
The importance of these two aspects, namely media institutions and political trust, in a 
democratic society has resulted in considerable research into how these concepts affect each 
other, although, as mentioned above, there is considerable disagreement between different 
authors (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995:2–8; Avery, 2009:412; Strömbäck and Shehata, 
2010:577–579; Aarts et al., 2011:3). This study aims to explore the effect that media usage to 
gather political news through various media platforms, including radio, television, newspapers 
and the internet, has on South African citizens’ levels of political trust. The following five 
reasons provide the rationale for this study:  
• The uncertainty of the causal effects of the media on political trust 
• Previous literature on this topic largely focuses on a Western and industrially advanced 
states 
• The recent negative political context in South Africa that makes the country a pertinent 
case study 
• The media environment in South Africa 





1.1.1 The debate on the relationship between political trust and media usage 
There is little consensus among researchers regarding the causal relationship between the two 
– specifically how the media shapes the political trust levels of ordinary citizens. There are two 
broad schools of thought, namely the media malaise theory and the virtuous circle theory (Mutz 
and Reeves; 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:410–412; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:577–578; Ceron, 
2015:488–489). The media malaise school of thought argues that media usage will have a 
negative effect on popular levels of political trust, while the virtuous circle school of thought 
generally argues the opposite: that increased media usage can positively shape popular levels 
of political trust (Norris, 2000:309–311; Mutz and Reeves; 2005:2–3; Avery, 2009:410–412; 
Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:577; Norris, 2011:7, 99). This uncertainty about the of media 
usage on political trust has largely dominated research on this topic. Therefore, the lack of 
clarity in the literature regarding the way in which media usage to gather political news shapes 
political trust was a key motivation for this study.  
1.1.2 South Africa as a case study  
Most research on the topic of how media usage might shape political trust has been conducted 
in advanced industrial Western democracies. Furthermore, both the media malaise and the 
virtuous circle schools of thought originated from the context of these democracies (Berger, 
1998:602–603; Lin and Lim, 2002:35; Jebril et al., 2013:2; Camaj, 2014:188). Although some 
research has been conducted in developing states, this study seeks to address this gap in the 
body of literature by focusing on an African state. South Africa presents an entirely different 
socio-economic context compared to advanced industrial democracies in the global north.  
South Africa is characterised by uneven development, high levels of poverty, unemployment 
and inequality, and an enduring legacy of apartheid (Southall, 2014:1–7; 2019:12–17; Stats 
SA, 2019:21). These challenges remain despite the progress that South Africa has made 
towards addressing the legacy of apartheid that has had a long-lasting effect on the lives of 
many South Africans (Stats SA, 2019:21).  
Some examples of progress that South African has made after 1994 are the following: The 
South African economy has expanded from $80 billion to $400 billion between 1994 and 2014 
(Southall, 2019:12–17). The proportion of the South African population who live below the 
international poverty line of $1.9 per day has decreased from 25.4% in 2006 to 18.8% in 2015 
(Stats SA, 2019:21–22). Furthermore, the creation of an extensive social support system in 




support to vulnerable people. It is estimated that by 2015, 71.9% of elderly people and 92.2% 
of people classified as poor received social grants (Stats SA, 2019:26–27). 
Despite the progress made, South Africa faces great levels of unemployment, inequality, and 
poverty. Between the years 2008 and 2018, the unemployment rate (using the narrow 
definition) in South Africa increased from 21.5% to almost 28.0% (Southall, 2019:17–19; 
2014:7–10). The unemployment rate of the young people of South Africa (15 to 34 years of 
age) was particularly high and rose from 35.7% in 2010 to 38.7% in 2017. Lastly, the 
unemployment rate of youths (aged 15 to 24) was extremely high and was valued at 53.4% in 
2017 (Stats SA, 2019:119–120). South Africa’s economic performance has also slowed in 
recent years and particularly during Jacob Zuma’s first term as president (Southall, 2019:17). 
Furthermore, South Africa was named the most unequal state in the world, with the highest 
Gini coefficient (Southall, 2014:7–10; 2019:17–19). The Gini coefficient “measures the extent 
of inequalities arising from access to income from wages, salaries and social grants, while per 
capita expenditure is based on consumption” (Stats SA, 2019:21). In 2018, South Africa’s Gini 
coefficient reached 0.64 (Stats SA, 2019:21). Furthermore, this inequality is largely overlaid 
by race, gender and location (Southall, 2014:7–10; Southall, 2019:17–19; Stats SA, 2019:21). 
Therefore, high levels of poverty and inequality are still prevalent in South African society 
(Stats SA, 2019:22–23).  
The challenges that South Africa faces regarding inequality, unemployment and poverty 
provide an interesting context as well as an important perspective to explore the influence of 
media usage to gather news on popular levels of political trust. South Africa is not a developed 
state, and the majority of the research conducted on the association between political trust and 
political news gathering was in developed states. Therefore, the large extent of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment faced in South Africa provides a context for this study that is 
divergent to that of advanced western democracies.  
1.1.3 The political context of South Africa  
The third motivation for using South Africa as a research case relates to the political 
environment in the country in recent years; one largely characterised by numerous serious 
political scandals. A critique of the media malaise and the virtuous circle schools of thought is 
that the role of context is not always fully considered. The media broadcasts and reports events 
in the political arena in the context of that state (Moy, Pfau and Kahlor, 1999:139; Moy and 




489). This is emphasised by Moy et al. (1999:139), who state that “users of particular media 
tend to perceive democratic institutions as depicted by these sources”. It is therefore imperative 
to briefly outline the context in which South Africans consume their media coverage and the 
likely content of that coverage. 
The year 2014 marked South Africa’s 20th year of democratic rule by the African National 
Congress (ANC). During this year, various political scandals arose surrounding the ANC 
(Southall, 2019:14). Many of these involved then President Jacob Zuma (BBC News, 2016; 
Dludla, 2016; News 24, 2018). In 2014, Zuma was widely criticised for utilising taxpayers’ 
money to conduct overly expensive non-security-related upgrades on his private homestead, 
Nkandla. The unnecessary renovations cost the taxpayers R246 million, instead of the 
originally budgeted R26 million (BBC News, 2016; Dludla, 2016, Toyana and Macharia, 2016; 
Makatile, 2016; News 24, 2018). The Office of the Public Protector found that Zuma had 
"benefited unduly" from the supposed security updates (News 24, 2018). Zuma was ordered to 
pay back a portion of the amount but fought the order to repay the money until 2016 (BBC 
News, 2016; Dludla, 2016, Toyana and Macharia, 2016).  
There has been an increase in corruption allegations in the South African political realm in 
recent years (Southall, 2019:13–14). This includes allegations of ‘state capture’. State capture 
is a form of corruption where high level figures conspire to influence a country’s decision-
making processes to ensure their private interests are advances (Arun, 2019).  These corruption 
allegations were levelled as a consequence of Jacob Zuma’s inappropriate relationship with the 
Gupta brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh Gupta, who built a business empire in mining, media, 
technology and engineering (News 24, 2018; Arun, 2019).  
Some examples of the inappropriate relationship between the Gupta family and government 
are as follows. In 2016, the members of the Gupta family were given permission by Zuma as a 
personal favour to land their private aeroplane at the Waterkloof military air base, which is a 
privilege that is not granted to civilians in South Africa and it is illegal to do so (Business Tech, 
2016; Phakathi, 2019; Sidimba, 2019). Moreover, the Gupta family were also found to be 
implicated in former public protector Thuli Madonsela’s state capture report, as it emerged that 
members of the Gupta family had offered key government jobs to people who could further 
their business interests, including former deputy Finance minister Mcebisi Jonas (Business 
Tech, 2016; News 24, 2018; Arun, 2019). Various other industries and institutions that were 




enterprise, and several government institutions including South African Airways (SAA), 
Eskom and the South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC) (Mutize and Gossel, 2017; 
Arun, 2019). Various high-ranking public officials, such as Pravin Gordhan, have spoken about 
the looting of state-owned enterprises (SOE) from being ‘captured’ and where corruption and 
mismanagement pushed the SOEs to the brink of collapse (Mutize and Gossel, 2017; News 24, 
2018; Cohen and Vollgraaff, 2019).  
After a series of back and forth court cases the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) found 
Zuma to be liable to face prosecution of cases of corruption, money laundering, fraud and 
racketeering on around 800 counts. The counts largely dated back to an arms deal that took 
place in the 1990s when Zuma was the deputy president of South Africa (News 24, 2014; Al 
Jazeera, 2017; IOL, 2018). Zuma allegedly accepted bribes from international arms 
manufacturers to influence the choice of weaponry (News 24, 2018). 
In 2015 the African Union Summit was held in Johannesburg. Despite being wanted for war 
crimes by International Criminal Court (ICC) Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was not 
arrested while he was on South African soil (Al Jazeera, 2017; IOL, 2018). In 2016 Zuma was 
accused of acting illegally by the Supreme Court of Appeal by failing to arrest al-Bashir. 
Furthermore, the ICC ruled later in 2016 that South Africa had violated its rules by failing to 
arrest al-Bashir (Al Jazeera, 2017; IOL, 2018; News 24, 2018). 
Zuma decided to shuffle the cabinet and remove Finance minister Nhlanhla Nene and deputy 
Finance minister Mcebisi Jonas from office and replace them with unknown legislators. 
Following a huge outcry, the cabinet was reshuffled a few days later, and Pravin Gordhan was 
again placed in this position. These changes resulted in South Africa’s credit rating being 
downgraded to junk status by the credit-rating agencies Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in 2017 
(Al Jazeera, 2017; IOL, 2018). This cabinet shuffle also caused the South African markets to 
lose around 500 billion dollars (Business Tech 2016). This decision, coupled with the other 
political scandals discussed above, resulted in widespread protests across South Africa 
involving tens of thousands of people (BBC, 2017; ENCA, 2017). 
In addition to the political incumbents ushering attacks on the public protector, in response to 
the office exercising its constitutional right to conduct various checks and balances procedures 
in an effort to ensure against antimajoritarian efforts, Zuma was also accused of interfering 





The political environment in South Africa in recent years especially has been largely filled with 
political scandals. This includes an economic decline and scandals relating to state capture, 
corruption, patronage, poor service delivery, the rise of populist rhetoric and action, an overall 
blurring of the distinction between the ruling party and the state, and a general lack of 
adherence to democratic norms and values in many cases (Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 
2016:13–14; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws 2017:208–210). This is the overall context within 
which South African’s consume media. Moreover, much of the media coverage was dedicated 
to coverage of these highly negative stories.   
1.1.4 The media environment in South Africa 
One key function of media institutions is to transfer information to the public (Findlay and 
Dayile, 2019:1–2). It is clear that the South African political landscape is widely discussed by 
media institutions (Findlay and Dayile, 2019:2–3). In 2019, the top five topics that were 
covered 45% of the time in the period by the 61 media platforms examined were all politically 
related topics. These topics included political party politics, party campaigning, national 
politics, service delivery and election logistics (Findlay and Dayile, 2019:2–3). This is similarly 
true in 2014, when the ten most covered topics in the media accounted for 89% of coverage 
and were largely politically related. The topics included party campaigning, party politics, 
corruption (Nkandla especially), media, opinion polls, party manifesto analysis, protests, the 
justice system and political violence (Media Monitoring Africa, 2014:2–3). Furthermore, 
between the years 2015 and 2018, a total of 16,171 stories from 80 online media platforms 
about Zuma specifically were published. These stories had a focus of Nkandla, the Gupta 
Leaks, the ‘Zuma must fall’ campaign and Zuma’s resignation (Smith, 2018).  
When comparing the total media coverage that the political parties received, the ANC received 
the most media coverage (53%) in 2019. Following the ANC, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
received 19% and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 11% of the media coverage (Findlay 
and Dayile, 2019:6). This is similarly true in 2014, as the same three political parties received 
a similar amount of media coverage in this same order (Media Monitoring Africa, 2014:1). 
The South African media has largely played a watchdog role in the South African political 
landscape. The South African media is arguably committed to ensuring democratic norms in 
the state and exposing state corruption and other political scandals (Wasserman, 2010:573–
574; Sparks, 2011:5–6). News media institutions therefore play a role related to monitoring 




institutions also attempted to distance themselves from the state, which led to the critique that 
the news media is overly focused on the state and the actions of the state (Malila, 2013:80–81; 
Wasserman and Garman, 2014:405). South African media institutions are argued to have risen 
as another player in the political arena. These institutions were even argued to play the role of 
an opposition party to the ruling ANC to counter the large degree of political power held by 
the latter; this is in part due to the lack of a strong opposition political party to the ANC 
(Wasserman, 2010:573–574; Sparks, 2011:5–6; Malila, 2013:80–81; Wasserman and Garman, 
2014:405). 
1.1.5 The South African media users 
South African citizens are avid users of the media to gather news (see Table 1.1). The two most 
popular media platforms in South Africa to gather news are television and radio. In 2015, 82% 
of citizens used the radio to gather news at least a few times a week, with a similar figure in 
2018 (72% of citizens) (Afrobarometer, 2015; 2018). The number of citizens who used the 
television to gather news at least a few times a week was 91% in 2015 and 83% in 2018. 
Although newspapers are not utilised as extensively as radio and television to gather news, a 
large number of citizens utilise this platform. In 2015, 51% and in 2018 39% of citizens used 
newspapers to gather news at least a few times a month. Furthermore, although a fair number 
of people use the internet, it is the least utilised media platform in South Africa; in 2015, 51% 
of citizens and 48% of citizens in 2018 never used the internet to gather news (Afrobarometer, 
2015; 2018). South African citizens therefore have had a large amount of exposure to the 
political news that has been widely reported through the various media institutions. 
Table 1.1: The amount of South African citizens who gather news from various sources 
How often 






A few times 
a week (%) 







2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
Radio 67.7 55.8 14.4 16 4 6.1 2.7 3 11.3 19 
Television 80.6 69.3 9.9 12.7 2.2 4.3 1 1.9 6.3 11.8 
Newspapers 27.3 19.7 23.4 19.5 16.5 12.9 9.6 7.9 23.2 40 





The important role that the media plays in imparting political information is captured by 
Afrobarometer’s 2018 data, which found that 85% of the South African population recognised 
the media as being either very effective or somewhat effective with regard to revealing 
government’s mistakes as well as corruption in the state. The citizens of South Africa do not 
support media intervention by the state, with 61% of South African citizens believing that the 
media has a right to publish without state intervention (Afrobarometer, 2018). 
Furthermore, South African citizens also have considerable trust in the country’s media 
institutions (see Table 1.2). In 2015, 77% of citizens and 60% in 2018 stated they trust the 
government broadcasting services (SABC [the South African Broadcasting Corporation], 
television networks and radio) at least somewhat. Similarly, in 2015 and 2018, 85% and 61% 
of the population, respectively, indicated that they trust the independent broadcasting services 
(Afrobarometer, 2015; 2018). Independent Media was the only institution among 18 that were 
found to enjoy an increase in political trust, from 69% to 79% between 2011 and 2015 
(Chingwete, 2016:1–2). 
Table 1.2: South African citizens’ trust in media institutions 
 
How much do you trust 
each of the following?  
Not at all 
(%) 




A lot (%) 
2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
Government broadcasting 
services 
7.3 16.7 16.3 23.3 37.1 22 39.4 38 
Independent broadcasting 
services 
5.9 15.1 12.4 23.5 35 22.1 49.7 39.3 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
As emphasised above, numerous political scandals have dominated the political landscape 
since 2014 and have implicated many public officials across all levels of government. 
Furthermore, these political scandals have been widely reported by South Africa’s news 
outlets. Therefore, the ordinary South African citizen has been exposed to a tumultuous 
political landscape with a high degree of media exposure of widely reported negative stories of 




are also widely trusting of these news media platforms. It is therefore argued that South African 
citizens have been exposed to large volumes of negative news coverage of the political 
landscape, largely via South Africa’s traditional media platforms, including radio and 
television. 
The traditional standpoint in the literature argues that a democratic political system requires a 
deep-seated, diffuse reservoir of trust to create a supportive democratic culture. This is 
emphasised in the key works of Easton (1965; 1975) and Almond and Verba (1963). Almond 
and Verba (1963) show the importance of a supportive democratic culture with regard to the 
impact that citizens’ orientations have on the stability and performance of the democratic 
regime.  
Moreover, various studies have found empirical evidence to support this claim. Several authors 
argue that citizens are more likely to uphold the law if they consider government to be 
trustworthy, as it is considered the ‘right thing to do’ and will benefit the political community 
as a whole. As well as expending more effort and resources towards the state to attain policy 
goals, it was therefore found that the citizens were more likely to pay their taxes without 
evasion if they held a higher degree of trust in government (Easton, 1975; Scholz and Lubell, 
1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Dalton, 2004; Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Dalton, 2014).  
For these various reasons, political trust is essential for the legitimacy of a democratic political 
system. Conversely, a decline in political trust can be problematic for a state, with negative 
systematic effects. A democratic political system is unique in its ability to make decisions for 
society, and trust is required to ensure that there is a high probability that these decisions will 
be accepted (Easton, 1965:96). If the people become disillusioned or disaffected, if they are 
not pleased with the performance of the institutions or political actors, or if the actors are 
corrupt, for example, increased dissatisfaction may negatively influence the people’s long-
seated support for and trust in the political system of democracy and may result in major 
constitutional changes (Norris, 1999:15–16). Furthermore, increased dissatisfaction and trust 
could lead to dissolving the consensus between government and its citizens to follow the ‘rules 
of the game’, and basic principles of democracy, such as tolerance for minorities, may not be 
adhered to (Norris, 1999:16).  
As alluded to above, political trust is not formed in a vacuum, but is swayed by economic, 
political and historical trends (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011:1–5). It is clear that South African 




political trust (Askvik, 2010:38–40; Chingwete, 2016:1–2). Furthermore, it has become evident 
from previous research that political trust is declining over time in South Africa (Schulz-
Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223). 
Therefore, the political environment, the media landscape and the decline in political trust 
levels in South Africa raise the possibility that these factors may indeed affect one another. In 
other words, the question is whether the largely negative media coverage of the political arena, 
to which South Africans are exposed on an almost daily basis, has contributed to the decline in 
political trust witnessed in South Africa over time. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research addresses the following main research question and sub-question: 
• Does frequency of media usage by South African citizens to gather political news have 
a measurable impact on popular levels of political trust?  
o More specifically, did frequency of media usage to gather political news from 
radio, television, newspapers and the internet affect trust in four key political 
objects, namely political actors, regime institutions (specifically political 
institutions), regime performance, and regime principles in the years 2015 and 
2018? 
1.4 THEORETICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The theoretical literature on this topic is presented in four parts. The first section entails a 
review of the literature on political trust. The second section discusses political trust in South 
Africa. The third part presents the research on the effect that media usage has on political trust. 
The fourth section relates to South African media institutions and their sway on democracy. 
This section is presented in detail in Chapter 2 and emphasises the key theoretical arguments 
of the study.  
1.4.1 Political trust  
The attitude of political trust forms a key concept in this study. As such, it is essential that the 
theoretical foundations of political trust are examined and understood. The theoretical 
underpinnings of political trust were largely pioneered by David Easton (1975). Easton 
(1975:447) first conceptualised political trust as “the probability that the political system will 




a democratic system shows a belief among citizens that public goods will be provided by the 
state without citizens being required to continually ensure their provision (Easton, 1975:447; 
Levi and Stoker, 2000:476). Easton’s (1975) empirical conceptualisation of political trust is 
still widely utilised in political trust research. 
The literature demonstrates that political trust is related to other political concepts, such as 
political support and political legitimacy. This interrelationship between political support, trust 
and legitimacy can be understood in the following way, as suggested by Easton (1975:447): 
“[S]support for the political authorities or a regime will typically express itself in two forms: 
trust or confidence in them, and in the belief of the legitimacy of these objects.” Therefore, 
although trust, support and legitimacy are interrelated, they are conceptually distinct from one 
another. Political support is therefore used to operationalise political trust.  
The link between political trust and political support is further emphasised through the 
establishment of two types of political support, namely that of specific support and diffuse 
support (Easton, 1975:449–450). Specific support relates to how citizens experience the state, 
and is directly tied to the satisfaction levels of citizens with the performance of the state, policy 
outcomes, and the political actions of political authorities (Easton, 1975:437-439; Norris, 
1999:10-12; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:45; Dalton, 2014:253-254). Diffuse support refers 
to the deep-seated reservoir of political support held by citizens for the regime and the 
principles of the regime (Easton, 1975:437-439; Dalton, 2014:253-254). 
Diffuse support is not as movable as specific support, as it is not tied to political incumbents. 
A reservoir of diffuse support is necessary for the survival of a democracy (Easton, 1975:444; 
Criado and Herreros, 2007:1512–1513; Dalton, 2014:253-254). The differentiation between 
specific support and diffuse support can be explained through support for a sports team. The 
immediate dissatisfaction that is felt once a sports team loses represents specific support.  
Moreover, the longstanding support a person holds for a specific team represents diffuse 
support. Continual losses of the sports team could cause a person to become disenfranchised 
with the sports team and chose to support another team. Therefore, eroding the reservoir of 
diffuse support could have dire consequences for a political system (Dalton, 2014:253). 
Building of the differentiation of specific and diffuse support, Norris (1999) built a conceptual 
framework to operationalise political support through various targets of political trust. In 
Norris’ (1999:7–13) conceptual framework of political objects, she argues that citizens extend 




Norris’ (1999) conceptual framework consists of five levels. The first level of this framework 
relates to the political community. This level refers to citizens’ attachment to a common 
political identity that transcends various state institutions (Easton, 1975:444; Norris, 1999:7–
8). The second level refers to the principles of the regime. The values that underscore a 
democratic state are contested, as different states choose to prioritise different values, such as 
the rule of law. The third level of this framework relates to the performance of the regime. This 
level relates to citizens’ experiences with the regime’s functioning and whether or not it has 
delivered to meet their needs. The fourth level relates to the institutions of the regime and the 
confidence that citizens have in these various institutions. These institutions include, for 
example, Parliament. The fifth level measures the confidence that citizens have in the political 
incumbents that are positioned in these institutions (Norris, 1999:9–16). 
1.4.2 Political trust in South Africa 
The political attitudes, including political trust, in a population are formed against a background 
of historical, political and economic trends and not in a vacuum (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011:1–
5). In South Africa, state performance has been found to have an influence on the political trust 
levels in the country (Askvik, 2010:38–40; Chingwete, 2016:1–2). Various other factors were 
identified by authors that effected political trust in South Africa include: the existence of 
corruption, lack of service delivery, the one-party dominance of the ANC and other political 
scandals that have emerged in recent years (Mattes, 2002:23; Butler, 2005:735–736; Friedman, 
2005:757–758; Askvik, 2010:30–32; Hutchison and Johnson, 2011:739; Chingwete, 2016:1–
2; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:208; 
Mantzaris et al., 2017:81;).   
Moreover, the literature clearly points to a general decline in trust levels among South African 
citizens towards democratic actors and institutions. Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:223), 
for example, examined levels of political trust and political support in South Africa over a 10-
year period. The authors found that despite the high levels of diffuse support in the early years 
of South Africa’s democracy, there was a decrease in both diffuse support and specific support 
in the various objects of political trust, and that this decline increased greatly between the years 
2006 and 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223). A general trend of decline with 
regard to political trust was also found by other authors, including Mattes (2002:31–32), 
Catterberg and Moreno (2005:38–39), Chingwete (2016:9–10), Mantzaris et al. (2017:81). 




The relationship between political trust and media consumption by citizens in a state is a 
contentious issue between political scientists. When looking at how media usage might 
influence political trust attitudes, scholars can be divided broadly into two divergent schools 
of thought: media malaise and virtuous circle (Aarts et al., 2011:1–2; Ceron, 2015:487–489; 
Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata, 2016:89–90). Evidence has been established for both 
schools of thought. 
The first school of thought is termed ‘media malaise’, which arose from a hypothesis that was 
created by Robinson (1975), who focused on the negative influence of news consumption 
through the television on citizens’ trust levels. This thought was then transported to other media 
platforms and is now considered to be the dominant school of thought in the literature (Mutz 
and Reeves; 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:410–412; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:577–578; Ceron, 
2015:488–489). This school of thought argues that a higher frequency of media usage can have 
a negative sway on citizens’ levels of political trust. There are a variety of reasons for this, but 
the increased negativity in the news media is largely emphasised (Mutz and Reeves; 2005:2–
3; Avery, 2009:410–411; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:577). 
The second school of thought is termed the ‘virtuous circle’. It provides a counterargument to 
the media malaise school of thought and emphasises that a higher frequency of media usage 
can have a positive influence on political trust. This should be especially true of newspaper 
usage. This would occur through a circle effect, where increased political knowledge gained 
through accessing the media is emphasised as an important part of democratic learning as well 
as producing trust in democratic institutions. This school of thought emphasises that the 
citizens who are politically trusting already will only be affected positively, whereas the 
distrusting citizens will not engage with the media (Norris, 2000:309–311; Norris, 2011:99; 
Avery, 2009:412).  
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, it must be emphasised that the schools of thought and 
hypothesises that have been drawn from research findings largely relate to advanced Western 
democracies. Far less research has been conducted in states that are non-Western democracies 
(Berger, 1998:602–603; Lin and Lim, 2002:35; Jebril et al., 2013:2; Camaj, 2014:188). 
1.5 HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS 





1.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 draws from the media malaise school of thought. This hypothesis argues that a 
high frequency of media usage to gather political news will negatively influence the South 
African citizens political support and therefore, their political trust in the political actors, 
political institutions, regime performance and regime support. Following the work of Easton 
(1975) and Norris (1999), a decrease in specific support can negatively affect the deep-seated 
reservoir of diffuse support that is necessary for the survival of a democratic state.  Therefore, 
a high frequency of political news usage will promote broad and deep-seated political distrust 
amongst the citizens.  
1.5.2 Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2 draws on the virtuous circle school of thought. This hypothesis argues that a high 
frequency of media usage to gather political news will have a positive influence on citizens’ 
levels of political trust towards actors, institutions, regime performance, and the regime. This 
hypothesis builds on Norris’ (2000) argument where increased political knowledge gained 
through accessing the media is emphasised as an important part of democratic learning which, 
in turn, produces greater trust in political institutions and the democratic regime. This school 
of thought emphasises that the citizens who are politically trusting already will be affected 
positively, whereas the distrusting citizens will not engage with the media (Norris, 2000:309–
311). 
1.5.3 Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3 is the null hypothesis, namely that the frequency of media usage to gather political 
news does not influence citizens’ political trust in political actors, political institutions, regime 
performance and regime principles. The correlation between the frequency of media usage and 
political trust is null and void according to this hypothesis as political trust will not be affected 
by the citizens’ political news gathering habits. 
1.5.4 Expectations 
The two schools of thought, namely the media malaise school of thought and the virtuous circle 
school of thought, provide two alternative understandings of the way in which frequency of 
media usage might shape political trust in South Africa. Media institutions play a significant 




media, and many citizens in South Africa do engage with the numerous traditional media 
platforms on a regular basis.  
The expected results of this study are that hypothesis 1 will hold - the higher the frequency of 
media usage by citizens, the less likely they are to trust political actors, namely politicians and 
political institutions. Furthermore, these citizens are likely to hold a lower satisfaction level 
with democracy and possibly be less supportive of a democratic regime. Therefore, the study 
hypothesised that there would be an inverse relationship between political trust and the 
frequency of media usage: as media consumption increases, political trust would decline. The 
reasons for this expectation are discussed below. 
As mentioned above, many South Africans utilise various media types to gather political 
information fairly regularly. Moreover, the study respondents also showed a great deal of trust 
in South African media institutions and their ability to showcase government’s mistakes. The 
media institutions in South Africa are considered to fulfil a watchdog role in the country’s 
democracy, and therefore there has been a great deal of negative political information released 
and discussed in the news. It is therefore expected that citizens who access political information 
via the media are extensively exposed to government’s transgressions and the allegations of 
corruption levelled against the incumbent party in recent years. This high level of exposure to 
news that is largely negative in content is the result of the many political scandals and 
transgressions of democratic norms that have emerged since 2015. This is expected to 
contribute towards citizens having a low degree of political trust in the democratic actors and 
institutions because of the largely negative media coverage on the South African political 
realm. 
Furthermore, it must be emphasised that context is a theme emphasised in the political trust 
literature, especially by scholars who examine how media usage shapes political trust. The 
context of the state is emphasised as the performance and actions of the state and political elites. 
This political context effects the information reported on by the media (Mishler and Rose, 
2001; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). 
Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:18) found that South Africans do not distinguish their 
political trust judgements between the political incumbent who is currently representing a 
specific institution and the institution itself. This lack of differentiation between political actors 




will have a negative impact on citizen’s levels of political trust, when coupled with the large 
amount of negative political news that has surfaced regarding the South African government.  
Furthermore, Bratton and Mattes (2001:454–458) found that South Africans tend to understand 
democracy instrumentally as opposed to intrinsically. South African citizens largely 
understand democracy as performance-driven, and so for a democracy with instrumental 
support to survive and consolidate democratically, the state needs to “deliver the goods” 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2001:474). The political goods emphasised by these authors are most 
commonly for the state to improve the standard of living and alleviate the poverty of its citizens 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2001:448). Instrumental support for democracy is in stark contrast to 
intrinsic support, where the democratic support and consolidation are garnered off support for 
the values associated with a democratic state, such as an emphasis on political freedom as well 
as equal rights among citizens (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:448–449). It is likely that this 
democratic understanding will further support the hypothesis regarding a lessening of 
satisfaction with democracy (hypothesis 1), as citizens could interpret the largely negative 
political news about the state as a failure of the South African government to provide the 
political goods. As democratic understanding is largely instrumental, this could therefore 
negatively affect citizens’ democratic satisfaction, political support and political trust in 
political actors and institutions. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
By exploring the effect of media usage to gather political news on political trust, the research 
may assist in developing a better understanding of the role of the media in a democratic South 
Africa. Specifically, which school of thought, the media malaise or the virtuous circle, holds 
in South Africa. These two schools of thought promote alternate hypotheses on how media 
usage shapes political trust.  The media malaise school of thought has found evidence that using 
the media to gather political news has a negative influence on political trust, while the virtuous 
circle school of thought emphasises the role that political news plays in building trust. The 
significance of this study exists in the divergent conclusions that the media malaise and 
virtuous circle schools of thought promote, and the different consequences that each school of 
thought has within the context of South Africa. 
This is especially pertinent due to the turbulent political context in South African over recent 
years which has been widely reported on in the news media. Furthermore, many South African 




scandals. The significance of this study lies in a further exploration of how gathering political 
news shapes political trust, which in turn can affect the democratic state. 
A supportive political culture is pertinent to a democratic state and, in this political culture, 
political trust is vital. Without the existence of trust among citizens in the various state 
institutions, political actors and a democratic state will be unable to survive (Easton, 1975:447-
449). Citizens’ trust in the state is influenced by how they perceive the performance of 
government; the social contract of democracy, where citizens entrust politicians with political 
affairs, is therefore tested. The state of political trust in a country is a pertinent test when 
regarding the health of a democracy and is described as being the warning sign with regard to 
identifying problems in a democracy (Norris, 1999:2-5).  
Hypothesis 1 states that a high frequency of gathering political news would result in a malaise 
amongst citizens which would therefore negatively shape political trust. According to the 
works by Easton (1975) and Norris (1999), the impact of the decrease of political trust is 
dependent on the different levels or targets of trust. A decrease in political trust of the political 
authorities is not detrimental to the democratic political system as the political incumbents can 
be voted out. A continual loss of satisfaction with the political actors can erode the reservoir of 
diffuse support that is essential to a democracies functioning and could have a system-level 
effect if the citizens are not trusting of the regime principles for example (Norris, 1999:10-12; 
Dalton, 2014:253-257). Therefore, if the media malaise hypothesis holds in the South African 
context for the various targets of trust in this study, this study could potentially point to negative 
consequences for the democratic regime in South Africa.  
Hypothesis 2 refers to the virtuous circle school of thought. This school of thought emphasises 
that political news is a key aspect of democratic learning and that the members of the media 
who engage with the media are more likely to be trusting. This school of thought emphasises 
a cyclic effect, where the trusting citizens would continue to engage with the media which 
would in turn increase or enforce political trust in institutions and the democratic regime 
(Norris, 2000:309–311; Avery, 2009:412; Norris, 2011:99). Therefore, although dissatisfaction 
with the political incumbents might not be present, trust in the political institutions and regime 
principles would be present. This hypothesis would, therefore, positively shape trust and the 
system-level effects of decreasing political trust is not tied to the citizens’ political news 
gathering habits. 




This study will use a quantitative method to answer the research question and determine the 
effect of frequency of media usage on citizens’ trust in political objects such as actors, political 
institutions, regime performance and regime principles. Quantitative survey data from two 
Afrobarometer surveys, namely Round 6 in 2015 and Round 7 in 2018, will be used. This study 
is therefore a cross-sectional study using two distinct data points. The research question will 
be answered by making inferences from the appropriate statistical analysis. The same 
operationalisation, methodology and statistical analyses are performed on both data sets 
(survey rounds 6 and 7). Chapter 3 presents a detailed overview of the research design, 
methodology and operationalisation of the variables. 
A quantitative approach is best suited to analysing political attitudes and behaviour (De Vaus, 
2001:7–8; Pierce, 2011:4–5), specifically political trust in this study. Quantitative survey 
research has long been utilised by researchers in the political science discipline (Brady, 
2000:47; Clawson and Oxley, 2012:27). Although it is a minority tradition in South Africa, 
there is a history of quantitative survey research in the country (Mattes, 2013:479–480). This 
study will add to the deficit of quantitative survey research on political trust in South Africa 
specifically. 
1.7.1 The independent variable 
Frequency of media usage to gather political news forms the independent variable. This 
variable will be operationalised through the Afrobarometer survey question that asks: “How 
often do you get news from the following sources?” This question item taps the frequency of 
media usage from the following media platforms: radio, television, newspapers, the internet 
and social media. All the media platforms will be used in this study to operationalise this 
variable, except social media, as it does not fall within the scope of the study. Frequency of 
media usage will be operationalised through two iterations: Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
1.7.1.1 Phase 1  
Phase 1 consists of two media usage scales computed through the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). A compatibility analysis of the question items will be conducted before the 
scale is formulated. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. The variables in this phase will be 
formulated as follows: 
• Media Usage Variable 1: The first media usage variable will measure frequency of media 




newspapers. This media usage variable will therefore be formulated to include only 
traditional media platforms. The internet is excluded included in the scale. 
• Media Usage Variable 2: This second variable measure the frequency of media usage to 
gather political news but now includes the internet in addition to radio, TV and newspapers.  
The reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of the internet is to firstly account for the disparity 
of internet access in South Africa, and secondly, because the internet is the least utilised media 
platform to gather news out of the media platforms relevant to this study (see Table 1.1).  
1.7.1.2 Phase 2 
Phase 2 will determine the influence of each media platform separately (radio, television, 
newspapers and the internet). The primary reason for including Phase 2 is to isolate the unique 
effects of and account for differences in the way each media platform may shape political trust. 
1.7.2 The dependent variable 
Political trust is the dependent variable. Political trust will be operationalised along the axes of 
diffuse and specific support (see Easton, 1975; Norris, 1999). Levels of political support 
extended towards political objects is largely how political trust is operationalised throughout 
the literature (see Chapter 3). Specifically, Norris’ (1999) fivefold conceptual framework of 
the targets of political trust forms the basis for operationalising the dependent variable. This 
study will focus on four levels of the fivefold framework, namely political actors, regime 
institutions (political institutions), regime performance and regime principles (see Chapter 3). 
1.7.2.1 Political actors 
Trust in political actors will be operationalised into two question indices formulated from two 
different question items. Therefore, the study has two measures for political actors. The choice 
of political actors are operationalised by applying Norris’ (1999) definition of political actors 
(see Chapter 3).  
• Political Actors Trust Index: This index will form the primary measure of trust in 
political actors. This variable will be operationalised through the following question 
item: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say?” The following political actors will form part of this index: the president 
and officials in his office, and members of Parliament.  
• Political Actors Corruption Index: This index will form the secondary measure of trust 




“How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say?” The respondents were asked this question in 
relation to various actors and authorities. The following political actors are identified 
as relevant to the study: the president and officials in his office, members of Parliament, 
government officials and local government councillors. 
1.7.2.2 Political institutions 
Political institutions will be operationalised in a similar fashion using Norris’ (1999) 
framework to identify appropriate political institutions from a question item. Only one question 
item will be utilised to operationalise political institutions, namely: “How much do you trust 
each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” The identified relevant 
political institutions will be operationalised through one index and two question items.  
• Government Institutions Trust Index: This index will include the political institutions 
that form part of the umbrella term ‘government institutions’: Parliament and local 
government councils. 
• Political parties’ variables: The political parties variables will include the ruling ANC 
party and opposition political parties. The trust in these two variables will be measured 
separately and not combined into a Political Parties Index.  
1.7.2.3 Regime performance and regime principles 
Regime performance and regime principles form the next two levels of Norris’ (1999) 
framework. These two targets will be operationalised through one question item each and no 
constructed indices. Regime performance is measured through a question item that asks 
respondents to identify their satisfaction with democracy. Regime principles is measured by 
asking respondents about their support for democracy.  
1.8 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FORTHCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2: The literature review: This chapter will outline the existing literature on political 
trust research and the relationship between media usage and political trust. It will do so under 
the topics of an exploration of political trust, political trust in South Africa, the mass media and 
political trust, and South African media institutions and their relation to democracy. 
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology: This chapter will discuss in detail the research 




operationalisation of the research question based on literature. The ethical considerations and 
limitations of the study will also be discussed. 
Chapter 4: Exposure to political news via the media and trust in political actors: This chapter 
reports on the findings concerning the relationship between media consumption and the 
political trust in the identified political actors. 
Chapter 5: Exposure to political news via the media and trust in political institutions: This 
chapter reports on the findings concerning the relationship between media consumption and 
political trust in the identified political institutions. 
Chapter 6: Exposure to political news via the media and trust in regime performance and 
regime principles: This chapter reports on the findings concerning the relationship between 
media consumption and satisfaction with regime performance and support for regime 
principles. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion: This chapter will present the final conclusions of the study. In this 
chapter, a synopsis of the study is given, and the results are used to answer the research 






CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on political trust and media consumption. The 
review is divided into four main sections. The first section relates to political trust. The concept 
of political trust plays a key role in this study and forms the theoretical underpinning of this 
research. It is therefore necessary to first discuss the concept of political trust to better 
understand how political trust relates to media consumption. To explore political trust, one 
must also examine the related concepts of political support and political legitimacy. All three 
concepts are theoretically distinct, but related. As such, political support was used as a proxy 
for measuring levels of political trust in various political objects.  
The second section discusses political trust in South Africa, including recent findings and 
trends. The third section draws upon research that has been conducted on the effect that media 
usage has on political trust and the various schools of thought on the relationship between these 
two variables. It also focuses on research on media usage in less developed democracies, 
despite its under researched status. The fourth section focuses on South Africa and examines 
the influence that media usage has on political attitudes as well as how the media institutions 
are perceived by the South African public. 
2.2 AN EXPLORATION OF POLITICAL TRUST 
2.2.1 Political trust as a concept 
A supportive democratic culture is vitally important in a democratic state. A political culture 
that is conducive to a climate of political trust by citizens has long been recognised by political 
scientists as essential to a democracy (Inglehart, 1988:1204–1205). The importance of a 
supportive democratic culture was largely emphasised by the key work of Almond and Verba 
(1963). It is recognised that for a democracy to continue to function successfully, the legitimacy 
of the system provided by the political trust of the citizens in political institutions and actors is 
necessary. Almond and Verba (1963) argue that a supportive civic culture is crucial to the 
stability of a democratic regime.  
The theoretical underpinnings of political trust were largely pioneered by David Easton (1975). 
Easton’s (1975) description of political trust is a key work in the literature. Easton (1975:447) 
first conceptualised political trust as “the probability that the political system will produce 




system shows a belief created by citizens that their judgements of a state is that public goods 
will be provided by the state without citizens being required to act as a ‘watchdog’ towards the 
state (Easton, 1975:447; Levi and Stoker, 2000:476). Easton’s (1975) empirical 
conceptualisation of political trust is still widely utilised in political trust research (Dalton, 
1998:1-2; Norris, 1999:1-2; Dalton, 2014:257-258).  
Political trust is a concept that is interlinked with other political concepts, such as political 
support and political legitimacy, although these concepts are all distinct from one another 
(Easton, 1975:447-449; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:45). To understand political trust, it is 
therefore imperative to examine the linkage between political trust and political support and 
legitimacy. Political support for political authorities or the regime will likely manifest in two 
different ways, the first being trust and the second being a belief in their validity or legitimacy 
(Easton, 1975:447; 1976:431–432). Political authorities in a democratic state would not be able 
to implement decisions except under the conditions of trust from the members of the population 
they are governing (Easton. 1975:448; Norris 1999:15-16). Political trust in political actors and 
institutions depends on the extent to which citizens support these actors and institutions 
(Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:45). 
Easton’s (1965; 1975) empirical framework is considered to be of high importance by various 
authors and is still widely utilised in political trust and support research, and has been long 
regarded as a key framework of political support (Muller and Jukam, 1977:1561; Dalton, 
1998:1–2; Norris, 1999:1-3; Marien, 2011:1-4). Easton (1975:436) defines political support for 
a state as consisting of two different categories, namely specific and diffuse support. The key 
differentiating factor between these two types of support, is that specific support represents 
content or discontent with the political incumbents, whereas diffuse support represents 
satisfaction of dissatisfaction with the political regime itself (Easton, 1975:436-437). 
Specific support is object specific support. Specific support is therefore directly related to the 
satisfaction of citizens with the performance and decision making of political authorities, as 
well as the outcomes of state initiatives such as policy directives, executive decisions and 
actions by political actors (Easton, 1975:437-438; Norris, 1999: 10-12; Catterberg and Moreno, 
2005:45; Criado and Herreros, 2007:1512–1513; Dalton, 2014:257-258). Specific support 
exists under the assumption that the citizens are able to identify political authorities or that they 




that the political authorities are responsible for ensuring their political satisfaction (Easton, 
1975:437-438). 
The second type of political support identified by Easton (1975:444) is diffuse support. This is 
defined as a deep-seated reservoir of political support held by the citizens for the regime and 
the principles that it stands for, as well as for the political community. Diffuse support is hard-
wearing in comparison to specific support. Moreover, diffuse support is essential for a 
democracy’s survival, as it is needed to tolerate and overcome periods where low amounts of 
specific support exist (Easton, 1975:444; Norris, 1999:10-12; Criado and Herreros, 
2007:1512–1513; Dalton, 2014:257-258). Diffuse support is essential to a democratic state 
(Dalton, 2014:257-258). Easton (1975:448) states that “normally the authorities must be able 
to count on the freedom to commit a society without, in each instance, having to obtain the 
prior consent of those who control the necessary resources.” Therefore, without diffuse support, 
coercion would be the only way to govern the state (Easton, 1975:448).   
Furthermore, political trust is largely considered in literature to consist of various objects 
towards the attitude of support and trust can be held by the citizens. The recognition of the 
object of political trust was first emphasised by Easton (1976) and the objects were tied into 
the specific and diffuse support dimensions explored by Easton (1975). These objects include 
the political authorities, the regime and the political community (Easton, 1975:435). The 
political authorities refer to the political elites who are holding office; this object of support 
focuses on specific individuals. Support for the regime includes support for state institutions, 
processes and the principles of the state. Lastly, support for the political community refers to 
attachment to the state that extends beyond the political actors or regime and is described as 
identifying as being South African, for example. The presence of political trust within a 
population would mean that its members feel like their own interests are being attended to by 
the political authorities. Trust in the regime would manifest through the people’s satisfaction 
in the various processes that help to run the state (Easton, 1975:447; Dalton, 2014:257). 
The distinction between the different objects of political support is important because of the 
different effects that low levels of political support can have (Muller and Jukam, 1977:1563). 
The regime and political community are described as objects of diffuse support, while political 
actors are objects of specific support (Criado and Herreros, 2007:1512–1513; Dalton, 
2014:257-258). The objects of diffuse support are essential to the functioning of a democracy. 




structures of the regime, its principles and the political community is difficult to regain once 
lost, in comparison to specific support (Dalton 2004:157–159; Dalton, 2014:257-258). Dalton 
(1998:1–2) emphasises that distrust of political incumbents is healthy and normal in a 
democratic system, but that political distrust of democratic institutions will have negative 
implications in such a system.  
Despite the wide use of Easton’s (1975) framework, there are some critiques of the framework, 
which relate to the measurement of the distinction of the objects of political support (Muller 
and Jukam, 1977:1563). The criticism largely relates to the measurement indicators of the 
various objects, and how, in literature, it is evident that not all citizens operationalise the objects 
of support in the same way, with various authors focusing on different indicators (Loewenberg, 
1971:183–185; Easton, 1975:439–444; Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and Sniderman:1975:14–
15). 
Another criticism refers to how citizens understand the conceptual distinction of objects of 
political trust. In Easton’s (1975) framework, the objects of political support are argued to be 
conceptually distinct, although it cannot be known whether the objects of political support are 
conceptually distinct in the minds of survey respondents (Citrin et al., 1975:14–15; Muller and 
Jukam, 1977:1563). Furthermore, it is emphasised that even if citizens view the various objects 
of political support as conceptually distinct, there is a high correlation between the two 
interrelated dimensions of diffuse and specific support, as well as the fact that indicators of the 
objects of political support can overlap, which will negatively influence the results of the 
statistical tests run on the survey data (Loewenberg, 1971:183–185; Easton, 1975:439–444; 
Citrin et al., 1975:14–15; Muller and Jukam, 1977:1563). 
2.2.2 A revision of Easton’s conceptual framework 
The use of political objects to measure political support and trust is widespread in the literature. 
Although, a wide variety of indicators have been utilised with regards to the operationalisation 
of political trust. Some examples of the diverse range of survey item indicators include support 
for various policies, evaluations of political actors, as well as trust in the regime and institutions 
which has created measurement inconsistencies within the literature (Marien, 2011:10-13). 
One key example of this is the Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) debate, the authors debated what 
political object was conceptually measured, whether the results showcased a loss of specific 




In response to Easton’s (1975) longstanding political trust conceptualisation, Norris (1999) 
offers an alternative conceptual framework of political trust, which nevertheless utilises 
Easton’s work as a foundation. Norris (1999) emphasises various critiques of Easton’s (1975) 
conceptual development of political trust. It is argued by Norris (1999) that the citizens of a 
state do not adequately distinguish between the various objects of political trust that were 
previously identified by Easton. The main critique presented by Norris (1999) is that citizens 
distinguish between more objects of political trust than those identified by Easton (1975). 
Norris (1999) suggests that citizens distinguish between their national identity, the way in 
which the regime functions, democratic values and the regime’s principles as well as political 
actions. This implies that Easton’s (1975) conceptualisation of diffuse support involves more 
layers than those previously envisaged.  
This distinction made by Norris (1999) results in citizens having varying layers of political 
trust, where citizens are able to hold critical attitudes towards political incumbents and the way 
in which the state is functioning, but are still able to hold a trusting attitude towards democratic 
values (Norris, 1999:10-12). Building on this link between measuring political support and 
political trust, the current research was based on a conceptual framework of political trust that 
consisted of five levels.  
In Norris’ (1999:7–13) expansion on Easton’s framework, the first level relates to the political 
community. This level refers to citizens’ attachment to a common political identity that 
transcends the various state institutions that are currently present in the country (Easton, 
1975:444; Norris, 1999:7–8). An example of this is ‘feeling South African’. The second level 
refers to the principles of the regime and the values that underscore a democratic state. These 
are sometimes contested, as different states choose to prioritise different values, but, overall, 
the basic values that have been emphasised consist of political tolerance, participation and 
respect for state institutions and the rule of law. Both objects measure diffuse support towards 
the political system. The third level of Norris’ framework relates to the performance of the 
regime. This level relates to citizens’ experiences with the regime’s functioning and whether 
the regime has delivered to meet their needs. This level also measures an aspect of specific 
support.  
The fourth level relates to democratic institutions and the confidence that citizens hold in these 
various institutions, which include Parliament, the executive, legal institutions, political parties 




incumbents that are positioned in these institutions (Easton, 1975:444–445; Norris, 1999:9–
16).  
Norris’ (1999) framework has been critiqued by authors. Levi and Stoker (2000:497–498) 
emphasise interpretation challenges in the fivefold framework, mainly relating to how one 
would understand the findings if political trust in a political institution declines although there 
is still a high degree of support for the regime. Furthermore, it is possible that citizens do not 
view the five levels as conceptually distinct; they might blur the categories, and judgement of 
one category might be interlinked with another. It is also arguable whether all the identified 
categories in the framework are objects. According to Levi and Stoker (2000:497–498), trust 
can only be considered to be relevant if the object is an actual object, such as a political 
institution.  
In recent years, there has been a documented continual decrease in political trust in advanced 
democracies and an increase in citizens who hold a degree of scepticism towards the state. This 
decline in political trust has raised the question of what can be considered ‘enough’ trust within 
a democratic state (Levi and Stoker, 2000:497–498). These sceptical citizens have been termed 
‘critical citizens’ by Norris (1999). Critical citizens are those citizens who, while they are still 
committed to the values of democracy, are underwhelmed by and dissatisfied with the 
performance of the regime; they are more likely to challenge the actions of the state and do not 
have an unquestionable allegiance to it (Norris, 1999:14–17). The decrease in political trust 
can therefore not be considered its totality, but rather as new dynamic in a democratic state 
related to the modern era, where although there is a decrease in political trust, there is still a 
large commitment to democratic norms and values (Norris, 1999:269; Dalton, 2014:252–255).  
2.2.3 The causes and consequences of political trust 
The concept of political trust is argued to be a central value in a democratic state and is 
responsible for demonstrating the support that the citizens hold for the democratic system as 
well as motivating citizens to accept the choices of the state, even when these choices are 
considered to be unpopular (Easton, 1975:447-448). Political trust can demonstrate the political 
support that citizens hold for a political system; furthermore, this support for the political 
system forms the basis of the state’s legitimacy (Hetherington, 1998:803–804; Levi and Stoker, 
2000:501). 
The citizens of a democratic political system can be considered more likely to obey the 




legitimate. Moreover, when citizens are distrustful of the political actors and institutions, this 
can be argued to undermine their perception of the state’s legitimacy (Muller and Jukam, 
1977:1563; Hetherington, 1998:803-804; Norris, 1999:263–264; Dalton, 2004:165–169). The 
environment of distrust can create an environment where difficulties are created with regard to 
the ability of political incumbents to govern the democratic state (Hetherington, 1998:803–
804; Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–270). 
Increased levels of political distrust could therefore hold negative implications for the 
democratic system in its entirety, as a democracy gains its legitimacy indirectly through 
political trust (Norris, 1999:2; Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447; Rose, 2007:124; Fukuyama, 
2015:12). Political trust that citizens could have in a government implies a type of social 
contract that is conducive to democracy, where democratic leaders are chosen, and can be 
removed, through popular sovereignty. Therefore, the expectations and experiences of the 
citizens regarding government are central aspects of a democratic system. How the citizens 
perceive government and its actions could therefore influence the trust that the citizens have in 
government; some examples of this include citizens perceiving a government to be corrupt or 
service delivery to be of a low quality (Hetherington, 1998:803–804; Bratton and Mattes, 
2001:447–449; Mishler and Rose, 2001:56). 
With regard to the formation of political trust, two key schools of thought exist. These are the 
cultural and the institutional schools of thought, both based on the premise that democratic 
values are required to be socialised into citizens (Mishler and Rose 2001:30–31). 
The cultural school of thought emphasises that political trust beliefs are socialised over a long 
period outside of the political realm and become the democratic norm over time. This creation 
of trust is socialised, and citizens will be taught it from a young age and then project it onto 
democratic institutions (Easton, 1975:448; Mishler and Rose 2001:30–31). The institutional 
school of thought, meanwhile, emphasises the performance of the various political institutions 
with regard to the formation of political trust. The better the institutions and actors perform, 
the higher the degree of trust that is offered towards them. Political trust or distrust is therefore 
a consequence of their performance (Mishler and Rose 2001:30–31). The performance of 
government has largely emerged as a key factor that sways political trust and has been 
emphasised by various authors (e.g. Inglehart, 1999; Klingemann, 1999; McAllister, 1999; 




The vast majority of research relating to the factors that influence political trust consists of case 
studies of a single country (Criado and Herreros, 2007:1513). This focus on case studies and 
country-specific factors has led to Criado and Herreros (2007:1513–1515) questioning the 
conclusions that have been drawn about the variables that have been identified as shaping 
political support and political trust, and their comparability to other factors in other states. 
Although, Criado and Herreros (2007:1513–1515) emphasise that the limited amount of cross-
national studies can, in part, be attributed to the absence of comparable data. Furthermore, it 
must be emphasised that political trust is swayed largely by country-specific factors, such as 
the history and the political and economic environment in the state (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). 
Furthermore, in recent years there has been a documented decrease of political trust in 
advanced democracies and an increase of citizens who hold a degree of scepticism towards the 
state. An example is data collected from the Harris poll, in 1966 29% of Americans thought 
that the ‘government does not care about you’ and in 2011 a total of 72% of Americans shared 
this opinion (Dalton, 2014:260-261). Furthermore, a decline in trust in political institutions was 
witnessed over that same time period as well as support for the democratic regime (Dalton, 
2014:260-265). This decline of political trust has caused the question to be raised with regard 
to what can be considered as ‘enough’ trust within a democratic state as well as further 
expanded political trust research (Miller, 1974:971; Mishler and Rose, 1997:419; Newton and 
Norris, 2000:11; Levi and Stoker, 2000:475–476). However, this largely accepted decline in 
political trust is challenged by authors such as Marien (2011:25–26), who found in a study that 
there was no measurable decrease in political trust in European states. 
The visible decrease in political trust across advanced democracies has resulted in two 
divergent schools of thought. The first school argues that the decrease in political trust is cause 
for concern and can be considered to be a crisis of democracy (Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–
269). It is argued by authors that the decrease in political trust has not only formed with regard 
to political actors such as politicians, but also towards basic democratic institutions and 
procedures. The rise of political distrust has therefore penetrated the deep-seated reservoir of 
democratic support that is considered necessary for the survival of democracy (Easton, 
1975:444; Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–269). Scholars whose research supports this school 
and who therefore emphasise that the decreasing levels of political trust can be considered a 




The second school of thought is not as widely emphasised as the first. This school of thought 
argues that the decreasing levels of political trust can offer various benefits to a democratic 
state, and therefore underlines a divergent interpretation (Norris, 1999:1–4; Cook and Gronke, 
2005:801; Hardin, 2006:159–160; Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–269). Norris (1999) is a key 
scholar in this school of thought and has coined the concept of sceptical citizens as ‘critical 
citizens’. The rise of critical citizens can offer advancement of the democratic political system, 
as it forces the various political actors to respond to the demands of the population with a higher 
degree of receptiveness (Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–269). Furthermore, it can be argued 
that critical citizens instigate a level of quality control with regard to democratic governance, 
as the distrust held by the citizens towards the state may cause the state to be more reactive to 
public demands and may play a role in keeping political actors accountable (Norris, 1999; 
Inglehart, 1999:233–258; Cook and Gronke, 2005:800–802; Hardin, 2006:158–162; Marien 
and Hooghe, 2011:268–269). The primary benefits caused by sceptical citizens, therefore, 
relate to increasing the quality of democracy and instigating reforms in the democratic state. 
There is an important distinction that should be noted in the second school of thought. This 
distinction relates to the objects of political trust, as highlighted by Easton (1965; 1975). The 
long-seated reservoir of diffuse support for a democratic regime on a systematic level relates 
to democratic institutions, principles and the community and must therefore remain, but the 
support and trust in political actors are what is considered to be beneficial for the democratic 
state (Easton, 1965; 1975; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995:2–4; Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004:158–
160; Marien and Hooghe, 2011:269–271).  
Although some level of political mistrust may be essential to democracy (Muller and Jukam, 
1977:1563; Hetherington, 1998:803–804), the debate between the above mentioned two 
schools of thought is also connected to another debate in literature regarding how high the 
levels of political trust must be within a democratic state to ensure its success and stability. The 
traditional view of this largely ties into the first school of thought. In this situation, a decrease 
in the levels of political trust causes negative consequences for a democratic political system. 
The core assumption of the traditional school of thought relates to the hypothesised difficulty 
that political incumbents are likely to have in implementing regulations with a distrustful 
citizenry (Easton, 1965:96–99; Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–270). 
The traditional standpoint in literature relates to political trust requiring a deep-seated diffuse 




democratic culture for a democratic state to survive. This is emphasised in the key works of 
Easton (1965; 1975) and Almond and Verba (1963). Almond and Verba (1963) show the 
importance of a supportive democratic culture with regard to the impact of citizens’ 
orientations on the stability and performance of the democratic regime. Moreover, various 
studies have found empirical evidence to support this claim. It is emphasised by several authors 
that citizens are more likely to regard the requirements of the state if they consider the 
government to be trustworthy, as it is considered the ‘right thing to do’ and will benefit the 
political community as a whole. As well as expending more effort and resources towards the 
state to attain policy goals, it was therefore found that the citizens were more likely to pay their 
taxes without evasion if they held a higher degree of trust in government (Scholz and Lubell, 
1998; Chanley et al., 2000; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Dalton, 2004; Grimes, 2008; Marien and 
Hooghe, 2011). 
The debate relating to the absence of political trust is critiqued by Marien and Hooghe 
(2011:268–269). These authors argue that this debate is being conducted without the existence 
of reliable information and knowledge about the potential consequences of decreased levels of 
political trust and that it is not yet known whether decreasing levels of political trust will have 
a negative effect on a democratic political system (Marien and Hooghe, 2011:268–270). 
Despite the view of decreased political trust playing a beneficial role in a democratic state, 
there is empirical research that emphasises the consequences of decreasing political trust within 
a democratic political system (Marien and Hooghe, 2011:272).  
The link between political trust, diffuse support and political legitimacy must be further 
explored and emphasised. Political trust and political legitimacy are distinct, yet interwoven 
concepts (Easton, 1975:499-450). Political legitimacy is defined as “when people believe it is 
right and proper to accept and obey the authorities and abide by the requirements of the regime” 
(Easton, 1975:451). The interrelation of political trust and legitimacy can be emphasised, as 
citizens would most likely not consider a democratic regime to be legitimate if they held 
attitudes of distrust of the regime (Easton, 1975:451-452). 
2.3 POLITICAL TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As emphasised above, the political context of a country plays a significant role in shaping 
political trust. This context arises from the economic and political landscape and happenings 
in a state, as well as the historical trajectory (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011:1–5). Mattes (2002:28–




a background of economic and political trends and developments that public opinion about a 
democratic regime, a political system, and citizenship must be assessed and understood”. The 
political context in South Africa has been largely explored amongst the political trust research 
in South Africa. 
Factors relating to political trust and democratic attitudes in South Africa were explored and 
emphasised by a variety of authors (e.g. Gire, 1999; Friedman, 2005; Lane and Ersson, 2007; 
Askvik, 2008; 2010; Chingwete, 2016; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016; Schulz-
Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017; Mantzaris et al., 2017). Mattes (2002:22) identified three broad 
factors, through a cross analysis of literature, that are instrumental in ensuring democratic 
consolidation. These include an economy in a state that is growing as well as aiding in reducing 
the poverty in the state, political institutions that are stable and predictable, and a supportive 
political culture (Mattes, 2002:22–23). This author argues that South Africa, as a democracy, 
showed aspects of ill-health in the state due to all three of these identified broad factors being 
undermined or absent (Mattes, 2002:22–23). Following Easton’s (1975) political support 
framework of diffuse and specific support, Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:203) 
identified a variety of factors that play a role in shaping political support in South Africa. 
With regard to diffuse support, the ANC has held political power in South Africa since the 
transition to a democratic state in 1994. The ANC has gathered a large majority of the vote in 
all national elections and in many provincial elections, as well as policy domination. The 
political landscape in South Africa has been characterised as a dominant party system. It is 
argued that in a dominant party system, there is less division between the incumbent political 
actors and party and the democratic values and political institutions that uphold a democratic 
state; therefore, the lines dividing the ‘replaceable’ political actors and the foundations of the 
democratic state can become blurred in the eyes of citizens. The South African state is 
characterised by one-party dominance through the ANC as well as challenges with regard to 
state accountability (Gire, 1999:1–4; Mattes, 2002:23; Butler, 2005:735–736; Friedman, 
2005:757–758; Lane and Ersson, 2007:219; Askvik, 2010:30–32; Chingwete, 2016:1–2; 
Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:208; 
Mantzaris et al., 2017:81;). 
Authors, such as Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:14–15) also emphasise the existence of 
various factors that could affect diffuse support for the South African government, such as 




ways, including the social and economic growth of the state. The relationship between 
President Zuma and the Gupta family was emphasised as an example of state corruption, as 
state income was drawn towards the Gupta family. Some other examples of corruption include 
the embezzling of state funds and rigging of tenders. Furthermore, with regard to service 
delivery in South Africa, it is clear that citizens do not feel that it is adequate; between 2008 
and 2013, for example, there was an estimated total of over 3 000 service delivery protests in 
South Africa (Askvik, 2010:30–32; Hutchison and Johnson, 2011:739; Gouws and Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:208; Mantzaris et al., 
2017:81).  
Another contextual matter relating to diffuse support in South Africa is the state’s perceived 
disregard for the Chapter 9 institutions and processes recommended to government. An 
example of this was the disregard of the report of the former public protector, Thuli Madonsela, 
which found that the upgrades at former President Zuma’s private residence at Nkandla were 
a wasteful spend of taxpayers’ money as well as a disregard for procurement processes. The 
findings of the report were made in spite of Zuma’s denial of the overspending. The costs of 
the upgrade were R246 million. Furthermore, the committee appointed by Zuma to investigate 
the report found that there was no wrongdoing on his part. This disregard for Chapter 9 
institutions, according to Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:209), could reflect a shift 
towards a state where the rights of minorities may be overlooked, which undermines the 
effectiveness of a democratic state, as it is essential that minorities believe that their rights are 
protected and respected (Chingwete, 2016:1–2; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; 
Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:209). 
Furthermore, South Africa is a deeply divided society in terms of race and class (Bratton and 
Mattes, 2001:455). Apartheid in South Africa resulted in the political, social and economic 
exclusion of the vast majority of South Africans and has had long-lasting effects on the state. 
The consequences of apartheid include a negative effect on South Africa’s democratic 
transition as well as the creation of a supportive political culture, as a democratic political 
culture in South Africa had to be built from the foundation up (Gibson, 2003:796–797). 
Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:209) also emphasise the rise of populism and racial 
polarisation in shaping diffuse support, such as the rise of the EFF in the South African political 
landscape. The EFF has been accused of inciting racial divergence in South Africa. The 




function and necessitated police involvement with regard to the removal of some party 
members. The emergence of this political party can be regarded as a reaction to elite politics 
and to the marginalisation of the poor, because economically South Africa has suffered from 
high unemployment rates, inequality and low economic growth rates (Mattes, 2002:23; Gouws 
and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:209). 
With regard to specific support towards the political leaders in South Africa, Schulz-
Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:209–210) emphasise a variety of instances, within the 10-year 
period of their study, where the actions of political incumbents may have affected the attitude 
of political support. The authors emphasise how specific support became more important in the 
political landscape after Nelson Mandela’s presidency, due to his undisputed role as a struggle 
icon (Friedman, 1999:837; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:209–210). Mbeki was viewed 
as aloof and removed from African citizens; moreover, his denial of the link between HIV and 
AIDS led to a higher death toll and a shortage of antiretrovirals in South Africa. Zuma ascended 
to power in South Africa after Mbeki was recalled as president. Zuma’s presidency introduced 
a populist dynamic into politics as well as an emphasis on party loyalty, even over democratic 
values in some instances (Mattes, 2002:31–32; Askvik, 2010:26–27; Gouws and Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2016:14–15; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:209–210). 
Lane and Ersson (2007:234–235) emphasise two main processes in South Africa that contribute 
towards a supportive democratic culture despite the various factors that negatively influence 
political trust. The first is the existence of vibrant and active civil society organisations that 
exist as a check and balance towards the dominant political party. The civil society 
organisations in existence in South Africa include trade unions, grassroots organisations and 
non-governmental organisations (Mattes, 2002:23; Lane and Ersson, 2007:234–235). The 
second is the existence of a democratic institutional framework that would work to protect and 
act as a check and balance regarding the democratic processes in South Africa.   
Askvik (2010:38–40) aimed to further explore the dynamics of political trust within South 
Africa and whether this political trust is formed through performance-based or identity-based 
evaluations. The author argues that both these hypotheses regarding the influence of political 
trust within South Africa are relevant at all points in time. Regarding the performance 
hypothesis, the author argues that citizens’ perceptions of the regime shape their attitudes 
towards political institutions. The performance of the regime was found to largely sway the 




state to a democratic state (Askvik, 2010:38–40). Chingwete (2016:1–2) also found supporting 
evidence that political trust levels were interrelated with state performance; citizens who 
trusted government were more likely to identify that government was performing well, whereas 
citizens who viewed government as corrupt were less likely to trust the state (Chingwete, 
2016:1–2). This was evident, for example, in 2015, when there were several political scandals 
in South Africa, such as the Nkandla inquiry. The political trust held by citizens towards then 
President Zuma decreased significantly from 62% to 34% – a significant decrease with regard 
to the citizens’ confidence in the president (Chingwete, 2016:1–2). 
Evidence was also found to support the identity hypothesis regarding the attitudes of political 
trust and support; both partisanship and racial identity played a large role in influencing and 
explaining the attitude of political trust within South Africa. It is emphasised that the influence 
of identity on political trust is indicative of South Africa’s history and is learnt through 
socialisation. The ANC, for example, is seen as an anti-apartheid struggle icon in the South 
African political landscape as well as a symbol of success relating to the resistance movement 
against apartheid. Askvik (2008:536; 2010:38–40) argues that this provides the South African 
political system and its institution with an undercurrent of diffuse support. Furthermore, Gibson 
(2003:796–797) found that, in South Africa, the social identity of citizens was the best 
determinant of political support towards democratic processes and institutions; this was 
especially true with regard to the racial groups in South Africa. Due to the supporting evidence 
of the two schools of thought relating to influencing political trust, it is argued that the two 
hypotheses should be viewed as complementing each other in the South African political 
landscape (Askvik, 2008:536). 
Furthermore, economic conditions and personal financial situations were also found to shape 
the political trust attitudes of South African citizens (Askvik, 2008:536–537; 2010:38–40). 
Many South Africans are not satisfied with the economic state of the country, which in turn 
effects political trust (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:458; Askvik, 2008:536–537; 2010:38–40). 
Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:223) investigated levels of political trust and support in 
South Africa over a 10-year period. The authors found that, despite the high levels of diffuse 
support in the early years of South Africa’s democracy, there was a decrease in both diffuse 
support and specific support in the country. Moreover, this decline worsened greatly between 
the years 2006 and 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223–224). The authors utilised 




decrease in political support in objects relating to diffuse support. The authors argue that this 
decline in diffuse support may have a negative effect on a democratic state, especially a newly 
democratic state such as South Africa, which is still in the process of consolidating its 
democracy (Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223). 
Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:223–224) also researched the link between 
reconciliation and political trust within South Africa. Reconciliation is an especially relevant 
topic in the South African political landscape after apartheid (Friedman, 1999:841; Schulz-
Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223–224). Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:223–224) 
emphasise that the decrease in diffuse political support within all the objects of political support 
identified by Norris (1999) should be concerning with regard to reconciliation. Furthermore, 
Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017:223–224) show that this is especially true with regard to 
the political community, as this object emphasises an attachment to nation building and 
reconciliation. This decrease in political trust regarding the political community contrasts with 
what was found by Mattes (2002:29), whose study was conducted many years before. Schulz-
Herzenberg and Gouws (2017) found that the object of trust, the political community, is largely 
supported in South Africa, with 90% of South Africans identifying as proud to be considered 
South African.  
Trust in political institutions in South Africa has been researched by various authors and it was 
mainly found that political trust in political institutions in the country had declined over the 
years since democratisation (Mattes, 2002:31–32; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:38–39; 
Chingwete, 2016:9–10; Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws, 2017:223–224; Mantzaris et al., 
2017:81). Catterberg and Moreno (2005:38–39) found that the decrease in citizens’ confidence 
in the political institutions in South Africa was a pattern that was shared with other new 
democracies, such as Turkey and South Korea. 
Furthermore, it was found by Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:25–26) and Chingwete 
(2016:1–2) that South African citizens have a greater attitude of trust in political institutions 
that are considered to be non-partisan and independent, such as the Public Protector’s Office, 
the courts, the South African Revenue Services (SARS) and the NPA. Independent Media in 
South Africa was the only institution among 18 to have shown a large increase in the attitude 
of political trust, as political trust in the media increased from 69% in 2011 to 79% in 2015. 
The media is also widely trusted, with 75% of citizens recognising an attitude of political trust 




Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:25–26) also found little evidence that citizens 
differentiate their judgements regarding the political institutions and the political incumbents 
who currently hold office. Citizens’ attitude of political trust in political institutions is therefore 
influenced by their support of the political incumbent. The authors emphasise that this lack of 
distinction between the various objects of political support shows a prolonged attitude of 
distrust and discontent towards political actors and their actions, and that this prolonged 
discontent has begun to erode support for other objects of political trust. The trust evaluations 
relating to the ANC were also largely linked to the evaluations of institutions; this is argued to 
be caused by the prolonged stay of the ANC in power in South Africa and the existence of a 
dominant party system (Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:25–26). 
Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:25–26) suggest that there is a high proportion of citizens, 
approximately two-thirds of their sample, who are critical citizens in South Africa and offer 
conditional support to the majority of political institutions. It is argued by the authors that the 
overall South African population is therefore largely led by performance evaluations and 
instrumental reasoning with regard to the political actors in terms of forming an attitude of 
political support or trust. This is likely to play a role in strengthening democracy (Gouws and 
Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:25–27).  
Furthermore, Gibson (2003:796) found that the political culture in South Africa is not highly 
supportive of democratic values and that there is a low amount of political support in the 
democratic processes and institutions in the country. There are many civil society organisations 
in existence, such as trade unions, grassroots organisations and non-governmental 
organisations; despite this, South Africans are not entirely supportive of democratic rule in the 
state and there are low levels of political participation (Mattes, 2002:23).  
Gibson (2003:796–797) found that the influence of education on support for democratic values 
and processes is divergent to that of other developing states, such as those in eastern Europe, 
where education has been positively associated with increased democratic support. In South 
Africa, education has not been associated with support for democratic values among all races, 
except for white people. The author emphasises the long-lasting impact of the dismal apartheid 
education system on democratic learning among South African citizens. Historically, white 
students were prioritised compared to students of other races, and this is argued to potentially 




Compared to other states in Africa, South Africans were less satisfied regarding democracy 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2001:458). Furthermore, it was found that South African citizens largely 
view democracy materialistically rather than intrinsically in comparison to other African states. 
Where the citizens ask what democracy can provide economically rather than be supportive of 
democracy because of the values that are inherently attached to a democratic state, such as 
freedom of speech for example. This understanding of democracy can result in less satisfaction 
with the political system if it does not provide enough political goods and services for citizens. 
This democratic understanding implies a more conditional support allocated towards a 
democratic state (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:461). Furthermore, support for and commitment to 
democratic values in South Africa were found to be the lowest in comparison to other states in 
Africa. More than half of South African citizens emphasised that they would give up 
democracy if a political leader could, in return, reduce unemployment and provide housing 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2001:458). 
It should be noted that Bratton and Mattes (2001:461) emphasise that the wording of questions 
could play a role in manipulating the results tapped with regard to South Africans’ support for 
democracy. Where the question that probed this attitude did not have a neutral option, once the 
neutral option was added, it was found that many citizens chose this option in comparison to 
being unsatisfied with democracy. 
2.4 THE MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL TRUST  
2.4.1 The theorised role of the media in a democratic state 
In recent years, there has been a great expansion of mass media in democratic societies, 
resulting in the various forms of mass media becoming readily accessible to large portions of 
the citizenry (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995:2–8; Curran, 2002:4–7; Aarts et al., 2011:3). This 
increase in media was long theorised to play an important role in strengthening democracy 
(Curran, 2002:4–5; Avery, 2009:410). In literature, the role of the media in a democratic state 
can be largely divided into two themes, namely the role of the media in developed Western 
states and the role of the media in democratically transitioning and consolidating states. This 
section explores the role of the media in democratic states and in democratising states to be.  
Regarding advanced democratic political systems, theoretically it is agreed upon in literature 
that a democratic state requires a free and functioning mass media sector (Sparks, 2011:5–6). 
The mass media in a democratic state ties into two key democratic values, namely the freedom 




causes of the individual modernisation of citizenry, in conjunction with other forces, such as 
that of technology and the economic sector in a state (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995:2–8; Aarts 
et al., 2011:3). It is argued that the media has a variety of influential functions to fulfil in a 
democratic state (Berman and Witzner, 1997; Curran, 2002; McQuail, 2005; McNair, 2009). 
The mass media in a state acts as a check and balance towards the state. The media is therefore 
considered to have a watchdog function, where the political elites’ actions are examined with 
regard to curbing power excesses. The mass media monitors the state’s actions and therefore 
plays a role in exposing corruption or power excesses to the citizens of the democratic state. 
This role of the media also emphasises the necessary separation of the media and the state in a 
democratic political system, where private and state forms of mass media are recognised as 
important (Curran, 2002:217–218; McNair, 2009:238:240). 
One of the primary and most important functions of the mass media in a democratic state relates 
to knowledge and information diffusion from the state towards citizens (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972:176; Berman and Witzner, 1997:1313–1316; McNair, 2009:238:240; Aarts et al., 
2011:3). Furthermore, the media can also act as a two-way stream of information, not only 
from the political elites towards citizens, but also in showcasing the assertions of the public 
and therefore providing an avenue for citizens to reach the state regarding various issues 
(Berman and Witzner, 1997:1313–1316; McNair, 2009:238:240; Aarts et al., 2011:3). The 
mass media assists in “providing a voice for those who cannot normally be heard in public” 
(Randall, 2000:3). The mass media can therefore contribute to the well-being of citizens in a 
democratic state by advocating on various issues deemed to be important by the latter (McNair, 
2009:239:244). 
Due to the consistent stream of information towards the citizenry, the mass media in a 
democratic state is recognised as playing a role in shaping the political attitudes and beliefs of 
citizens (Moy et al., 1999:139; Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000:23–25; Chen and Shi, 2001:85; 
Mattes, 2012:136; Chen and Guo, 2013:136). This function of the media is articulated by Moy 
et al. (1999:139), who state that the “users of particular media tend to perceive democratic 
institutions as depicted by these sources and make their judgments accordingly”. The mass 
media is argued to effect the satisfaction and confidence that citizens hold towards the state; it 
can therefore form the foundation of the judgements that citizens place on the state and its 
various institutions, actors and actions (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000:23–25; Chen and Shi, 




Furthermore, mass media institutions are theoretically emphasised to promote and inspire a 
supportive democratic culture in a state, as they form an information link between the political 
elites and the citizens of a state. The productions of mass media institutions are regarded as 
critical in informing citizens’ judgements of the state (Ceron, 2015:488). Therefore, the mass 
media can be described as a democratic socialising agent (Ndlovu, 2008:70). The media is 
argued to play a role in promoting democratic norms and values in a state through consistent 
news coverage of the political events and aspects in the political system, such as the national 
elections (Gans, 2002:2–4). Dalton (2006:20–21) describes television as playing an important 
role in the cognitive mobilisation of citizens.  
The mass media also provides intellectual stimulation to the members of a democratic society. 
The media provides a base to stimulate debate and a platform where debate among journalists 
and various news agencies can take place, which could then influence public opinion (Curran, 
2002:17–18). The media is often considered to play an important role in the development of 
citizens’ political and civic engagement with the state (Wasserman and Garman, 2014:392). 
The mass media in a democratic state is largely theoretically emphasised to play a positive role 
in a state transitioning towards a democratic regime (White, 1994:250–255; Suarez, 1996:49; 
Berger, 1998:602–604; Jebril et al., 2013:2–3;), although it is emphasised that the role of the 
media in democratically transitioning and consolidating states is less clearly defined that that 
of the media in advanced democracies. Literature on the media and its role in states that are 
transitioning towards or consolidating democracy is mostly from a Western perspective. 
Moreover, the actual impact of the media in these states is contested (Sparks, 2011:10–12; 
Jebril et al., 2013:2). 
It is argued by some authors that the mass media in a state plays an integral role in providing a 
platform that allows for the spread of new ideas and attitudes, as well as a connection to the 
worldwide communications system. Furthermore, exposure to mass media in developing states 
can play a role in showcasing new technology that is available in more developed states (White, 
1994:250–255; Berger, 1998:602–604). 
Moreover, the issue of media penetration must be emphasised, as not everyone has equal access 
to the various forms of mass media that are present. In Western states, for example, access to 
various media platforms is largely equal among members of society, whereas in developing 




platforms available (Ansah, 1994:231–233; Berger, 1998:602–603). This limited access could 
therefore dilute the effect of the media in a democratic state. 
The role of the transitioned media in a newly democratic state to allow for larger degrees of 
freedom of expression and a higher quality of information sources cannot be considered to be 
simple or always positive (Jebril et al., 2013:2–3). The mass media in a newly democratic state 
or transitioning state is said to be interrelated with the advancements and fall-backs of the state 
(Suarez, 1996:49; Jebril et al., 2013:2–3). Furthermore, Jebril, Stetka and Loveless (2013:2–3) 
state that “it is often difficult to separate what is being claimed about the impact of media on 
the institution-building process from broader assessments of their democratic qualities or 
contribution to democratisation in general”. A gap in the literature was identified by these 
authors, who argue that there is little research relating to how the mass media fulfils its 
prescribed role in a democratic state consolidating its democratic regime (Jebril et al., 2013:2–
3).  
Jebril, Stetka and Loveless (2013:2–3) found that there are inconsistent results on the effect of 
the media in enforcing political accountability through ‘watchdog’ journalism in states 
transitioning to democracy (Suarez, 1996:49; Jebril et al., 2013:2–3). Jebril et al. (2013:2–3) 
also found evidence of the mass media’s link to democratisation in Latin America and Arabic 
states, where the media positively shaped the democratic transitioning of states. However, the 
mass media has been argued to have had a significant influence in shaping as well as 
consolidating democratic processes in Africa (Tettey, 2001:5). This sentiment is also shared by 
Berger (1998:600–603) in his research into the mass media and its effect on democratisation 
in southern African states. 
Sparks (2011:10–12) emphasises the role of context in the media in transitional states; for 
example, in some states, the media has pushed the state in a democratic direction, but in other 
states, it has not. Factors such as the national context and who controls the media are important 
to consider in terms of the role of the media in a democratic transition. 
2.4.2 The effect of the media on political trust 
Literature on the effect of media usage on political trust is characterised by two divergent 
schools of thought (Avery, 2009:424; Aarts et al., 2011:1–2; Ceron, 2015:487–489; Strömbäck 
et al., 2016:89–90). Therefore, the literature is not in agreement about the sway that media 
usage has on political trust and is split between two counter-viewpoints with regard to the 




literature that political trust can be shaped by media consumption, but the direction of this 
influence is hotly debated (Brosius, Van Elsas and De Vreese, 2019:450).  
Hypothesis 1 was that a high frequency of media usage will have a negative effect on citizens’ 
levels of political trust. This school of thought is termed ‘media malaise’. Hypothesis 2 states 
that a high frequency of media usage will have a positive sway on political trust, and this school 
of thought is termed the ‘virtuous circle’ (Elenbaas and De Vreese, 2008:551–552; Avery, 
2009:411–412; Aarts et al., 2011:1–2; Ceron, 2015:487–489; Strömbäck et al., 2016:89–90). 
Empirical evidence appears to support both schools of thought in various national contexts. 
However, the importance of different national contexts must be emphasised, as this influences 
what is reported in the mass media (Aarts et al., 2011:1–2; Strömbäck et al., 2016:89–90). 
Furthermore, it must be stated that the majority of the empirical research is based in the United 
States of America (USA) or advanced European democracies. Therefore, the ability of these 
schools of thought to be transferred to other national contexts, as well as their relevance in 
these contexts, is questioned (Aarts et al., 2011:4). 
Regarding the media malaise school of thought, scholars have argued that a political malaise 
exists towards the political system in Western states (Ceron, 2015:487). Political news reported 
by the mass media plays a role in the development of this malaise in Western states (Robinson 
and Appel, 1979; Ranney, 1983; Moy et al., 1999; Scheufele and Moy, 1999; Newton, 1999; 
Pinkleton and Austin, 2001; Avery, 2009; Tworzecki and Semetko, 2012; Hanitzsch and 
Berganza, 2012; Ceron and Memoli, 2015; Brosius et al., 2019). This political malaise has 
promoted a renewed interest in researching the effect that the mass media has on a democratic 
culture. This school of thought argues that increased media engagement and consumption by 
citizens have a negative influence on the political trust held by citizens (Avery, 2009:411–412; 
Aarts et al., 2011:1–2). Despite the emphasis on media malaise in general, the negative impact 
of television news on political trust has been singled out by a variety of authors (e.g. Patterson, 
1993; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Mutz and Reeves, 2005; Avery, 2009).  
A key starting point of the media malaise school of thought was developed by Robinson (1975; 
1976), who argued that an increase in exposure to television news broadcasts, specifically in 
the USA, caused an increase in cynicism towards political actors by citizens. This school of 
thought was then termed the ‘video malaise school of thought’ by Robinson (1975; 1976) and, 
although the author did not specifically research the concept of political trust, this hypothesis 




researchers since Robinson have also researched the video malaise school of thought and found 
evidence supporting this school of thought (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411–
412; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3; Norris, 2011:1–4; Ceron, 2015:487–489). The video malaise school 
of thought emphasises that increased exposure to and consumption of television news would 
shape political confidence (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411-412; Aarts et al., 
2011:1–3) Although there was a large amount of evidence in support of the video malaise 
school of thought, some studies have found that television news was associated with a positive 
increase in political trust. For example, Gross, Aday and Brewer (2005:65) found that 
television news consumption after the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 in the USA was 
positively associated with an increase in political trust. 
In the video malaise school of thought there are two main interlinked hypotheses about the 
causes of the decrease in political trust through exposure to and consumption of television. 
They relate to what is being reported and what aspects of the news citizens choose to focus on. 
This school of thought identifies a negative focus of the citizenry and the media broadcasts as 
causing the hypothesised relationship (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Elenbaas and De Vreese, 
2008:551–552; Avery, 2009:411–412; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3). 
The negative focus of the media in news broadcasts is a key emphasis in this school of thought 
(Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411–412; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3) It is argued in the 
video malaise hypothesis that what is being broadcast on television is highly selective and that 
there is a significant focus on the negative aspects in political systems, such as scandals, 
violence, conflict and sensational personal matters. This negative focus that is broadcast to the 
public causes apathy to arise among the citizenry (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 
2009:427; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3) This argument was first presented by Robinson (1975; 1976), 
who suggested that the news media’s focus on negative aspects in the political system as well 
as an increased focus on conflict negatively shapes the political confidence that citizens hold 
in the state, especially during election periods.  
Moreover, this negative focus in the television news is further exacerbated by an increase in 
incivility in the political realm (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995:147; Mutz and Reeves, 
2005:1–2; Avery, 2009:411–413; Aarts et al., 2011:2–5). Mutz and Reeves (2005) found that 
the higher the incivility showcased in a political debate on television, the less trusting the 




It is argued in this school of thought that citizens themselves also place more focus on the 
negative aspects of the political system. News consumption or exposure that is associated with 
negative aspects of the political system has a negative influence on political attitudes (Aarts et 
al., 2011:1–3). Political psychology has emphasised the more dominant role that negative 
information plays in forming an opinion or attitude (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
1960:554–556; Easton, 1965:182–185; Lau, 1985:353–357; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3). Moreover, 
this is argued to be true even if citizens are exposed to and engage with a completely unbiased 
media report. Citizens will tend to place a higher focus on the negative aspects in the political 
realm. This thought process, therefore, emphasises that media usage will more likely cause a 
decrease in the attitude of political trust of citizens (Easton, 1965:182–188). Elenbaas and De 
Vreese (2008:550) termed the negativity focus by the citizens and the media the ‘circle of 
cynicism’, which emphasises the negativity focus in the media malaise school of thought. 
Regarding the linkage between the other types of media platforms and television news, it is 
emphasised that due to the easy nature of accessing political news through television, other 
types of media have had to change and, in a sense, copy what could be copied from the 
television style of reporting political news (Sigelman and Bullock, 1991:5–10; Newton, 
1999:579–580; Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4).  
The media malaise school of thought was further researched and tested empirically by various 
authors following its development by Robinson (1975; 1976) and it was also applied to other 
types of mass media. The video malaise school of thought heavily emphasises the lessening of 
quality with regard to television quality, an overall negative bias by the media and an increased 
focus on the flaws of political actors and electoral candidates. This school of thought 
emphasises how journalists and television news media broadcasts have changed the general 
way in which political news has been delivered to the public, where a higher degree of 
interpretation by journalists is observable as opposed to the plain presentation of political news 
(Hallin, 1992:5–10; Jamieson, 1992; Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson, 2004; Mutz and Reeves, 
2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411–412; Aarts et al., 2011:1–3).  
Despite the focus on television, specifically, in literature, a few scholars have emphasised that 
television affects the political trust of the citizenry in a completely unique style (Mutz and 
Reeves, 2005:2–4). An example of this would be Gould (1972:21), who highlights the human 
experience that is portrayed in television, which the citizenry would be unable to experience 




heavily on television for news consumption were less likely to be able to answer factual 
questions relating to the political realm in comparison to citizens who relied on newspapers for 
their political news. Furthermore, Druckman (2003) and Keeter (1987) both argue that 
television plays a significant role in allowing the citizenry to judge the personal characteristics 
of a political elite, which then influences their opinion of such person.  
Various authors have stressed the role that journalists and reporters of mass media broadcasts 
have played in negatively shaping political trust. Hallin (1992) argues that the increase in 
journalistic interpretation has negatively swayed the confidence that the citizenry has held in 
the political elites around election periods from 1968 until 1988 in the USA. Patterson (1993) 
argues that the negative portrayal and reporting of political actors by journalists through all 
types of media negatively affect the confidence that citizens have in these political actors as 
well as in the democratic system. Similar sentiments relating to the negative effect of the 
professionals who produce media broadcasts and publications on political trust are emphasised 
by various authors (e.g. Capella and Jamieson, 1997; Newton, 1999:578–579; Aarts et al., 
2011:1–3). 
Some evidence with regard to the changed media landscape with increased focus on journalistic 
interpretation includes the following emphasised by the media malaise school of thought: It 
was found by Hallin (1992:5–8) that through the period of 1968–1988, with each presidential 
election in the USA, the average soundbite become shorter and shorter, declining from 43 to 
just 9 seconds. Hallin (1992) argues that this change shows a general change with regard to a 
different strand of television news, where the journalist is placed at the centre of information 
transferal; moreover, the author argues that this change is in response to the declining 
confidence held by citizens towards the state. Patterson (1993) also found that there was a 
decrease in the number of quotes by candidates in written news articles.  
Mutz and Reeves (2005:2–3) criticise the media malaise school of thought, arguing that the 
school of thought, developed by Robinson (1975; 1976), was then applied to all types of media 
without sufficient evidence. These authors argue that there is not enough causal evidence to 
sufficiently link television news to an attitude of decreasing political trust among the citizenry. 
Mutz and Reeves (2005:3) state that “schools of thought about video malaise have broadened 
into more general claims about political journalism, claims that transcend television, 
newspapers, and virtually all political media”. The authors emphasise that there is not enough 




thought was broadened to encompass various other forms of mass media without sufficient 
reason. Furthermore, the authors argue that the video malaise school of thought moved away 
from researching the link between political trust and television news to the influence that the 
journalist producing the publications or broadcasts had on the confidence or political trust 
within a state (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:3). 
Much of the research on the link between mass media usage for news and political trust 
supports the media malaise school of thought. Authors have highlighted various themes, 
namely the media’s conflict as well as its negativity and strategy. Furthermore, there is an 
increased focus on the role of television news broadcasts in negatively shaping the political 
trust of the citizenry (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411–413; Aarts et al., 2011:1–
3; Ceron, 2015:487–489; Ceron and Memoli, 2015:351; Brosius et al., 2019:450–455). 
The virtuous circle school of thought was proposed in response to the focus that was placed on 
the media malaise hypothesis (Mutz and Reeves, 2005:2–4; Avery, 2009:411–412; Aarts et al., 
2011:1–3; Ceron, 2015:487–489). The virtuous circle school of thought was proposed by 
Norris (2000:309–215) and argues that increased media engagement can have the opposite 
effect to what was previously emphasised by literature by instead increasing the political trust 
of the citizenry. This school of thought states that citizens who are already politically aware, 
engaged, interested and trusting are more likely to engage with and consume the various forms 
of media available. As implied in its name, the virtuous circle school of thought emphasises a 
cyclic approach to the relationship between political trust and media consumption and 
engagement. Therefore, the attitudes of increased interest already held by the citizens cause 
them to engage with the media, and this increased engagement promotes greater knowledge 
and political learning, which in turn will increase political trust within a state, and this political 
trust will then have a positive influence with regard to the enhancement of democratic norms 
(Norris, 2000:309–217).  
Furthermore, the citizenry who have low levels of political interest will most likely not be 
swayed greatly by political news, according to Norris (2000:314–317), and if the politically 
disinterested are exposed to political news through the various forms of mass media, it is likely 
that they will not engage with the media in a meaningful way and therefore will not pay 
attention to the media to which they are exposed. This is not likely to have an impact on their 
attitude and levels of political trust (Norris, 2000:309–315). Avery (2009:428) also argues that 




who use newspapers to engage with the media. Pinkleton and Austin (2001:30) similarly found 
in their study that newspapers increased political knowledge as well as trust among users. 
Various studies provide evidence to support the virtuous circle school of thought, both in 
Europe and in the USA. Norris (2000:309–320), for example, found that there was an increase 
in political trust that was associated with the increase in political news engagement and 
consumption during the 1997 election in Britain. Norris (2000:309–320) also found that there 
was a higher degree of political knowledge, interest as well as social trust among the citizenry 
who were polled through public opinion data to have a higher degree of political trust; the 
author found this supporting evidence in the USA as well as in European states. The findings 
by Aarts et al. (2011:17) also support the virtuous circle school of though. Strömbäck et al. 
(2016:105–106) also find a weak, albeit positive association between political trust and media 
usage. 
Avery (2009:424–426) found that, in the USA, citizens who read more newspapers, in 
particular, were more likely to have a positive attitude of political trust. This finding is 
consistent with the virtuous circle school of thought, as this form of mass media is specifically 
emphasised by Norris (2000:58–63) to increase the political trust attitude of citizens. However, 
this argument regarding the specific effect of newspapers has not been found in all studies. 
Cappella and Jamieson (1997:189–194) found in their study that the usage of newspapers did 
not increase political trust among the citizens surveyed.  
Literature on the sway of media usage on political trust is split into two streams of thought 
(Elenbaas and De Vreese, 2008:551–552; Avery, 2009:424; Aarts et al., 2011:1–2; Ceron, 
2015:487–489). As shown above, literature is largely mixed about the influence of media 
consumption and engagement on political trust within a state. This has caused other authors to 
argue that the effect of the media on the attitude of political trust is not entirely dependent on 
the binaries of the media malaise or the virtuous circle schools of thought. It is emphasised that 
there is a large spectrum of factors that can shape the political trust attitude of the citizenry. 
The causal effect of the impact of media usage on political trust is therefore likely to be 
influenced by a variety of factors and is not entirely determined by the causes of the school of 
thought (De Vreese, 2005:293; Avery, 2009; Aarts et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, the stringent separation of the way in which the media is argued to shape political 
trust is additionally challenged by the results of some studies, such as those by Moy et al. 




consumption of media usage and political trust, but rather emphasised other factors as being 
responsible in manipulating political trust, such as education and the political ideology of 
citizens.  
Avery (2009:424–426) argues that despite the focus of literature on either the virtuous circle 
school of thought or the media malaise school of thought, specifically the video malaise school 
of thought, these schools of thought must not be viewed as an ‘either-or’ mindset and cannot 
necessarily be considered as ‘competing’ with each other. Rather, the conditions under which 
media exposure or consumption occurs must be considered and it must be recognised that these 
conditions can vary greatly from state to state or from one situation to another (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972:176; De Vreese, 2005:293; Avery, 2009:424–426). 
It is argued by Avery (2009:426–427) that the positive influence on the attitude of political 
trust through media consumption that is emphasised by the virtuous circle school of thought is 
largely due to the national context of a state as well as the characteristics of the news coverage. 
The author argues that the relationship between the media and political trust is dependent on 
the source and the characteristics of the news gathered. Furthermore, differences among the 
citizenry must also be emphasised, as citizens in a state do not all consume the same level and 
the same sources of political news; this varies from person to person and therefore could also 
shape what the citizen is being exposed to through the mass media (Cappella and Jamieson, 
1997:168). 
The characteristics of citizens that could also sway the relationship between political trust and 
media consumption are also emphasised. These include individuals’ political interest, 
awareness and partisan values (McCombs and Shaw, 1972:176–177; De Vreese, 2005:293; 
Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:89–90 Aarts et al., 2011:6). In particular, political interest and 
political awareness were found to have a causal and reciprocal relationship with political trust 
and media consumption (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010:593–594). Pre-existing levels of 
political trust and the way in which this affects the relationship between political trust and 
media consumption are also highlighted in literature (Aarts et al., 2011:6). Avery (2009:426) 
states that citizens with higher levels of political trust are more likely to engage with the media 
in comparison to those with lower levels of political trust. 
The quality of what is reported in the news is crucial to how political trust will be shaped 
through media usage (De Vreese, 2005:293; Ceron, 2015:495). Aarts et al. (2011:17) argue 




virtuous circle school of thought is dependent on the type of audience, the type of media as 
well as the media system in the state. 
Furthermore, Strömbäck et al. (2016:89–90) critique the assumption in literature that the 
relationship between media usage and political trust will remain stable over time. The authors 
emphasise that theirs was the first longitudinal study in researching this relationship. They 
emphasise that this variable of time could pay a role in explaining the fluctuating findings in 
literature relating to the relationship between media consumption and political trust. Their 
findings show a weak positive effect between media consumption and political trust 
(Strömbäck et al., 2016:89–90). 
The rise of the internet has added another dimension to the influence of news on political trust. 
Since the rise of the internet in the mid-1990s, it has largely been viewed as an open space that 
could foster democratisation and a supportive political culture (Bailard, 2012:185; Curran, 
Coen, Aalberg, Hayashi, Jones, Splendore, Papathanassopoulos, Rowe and Tiffen, 2013:891–
892; Stoycheff and Nisbett, 2014:642; Ceron, 2015:495), although this view has been 
challenged. It is also emphasised that the structure of the internet with regard to the 
consumption of online news sources cannot be considered to be that different from that of 
traditional news platforms (Ceron, 2015:494; Lu, Qi and Yu, 2019:7). The elite-driven and 
‘top-down’ approach of online news websites mimics the traditional media in slanting news to 
support the democratic political system in advanced Western democracies (Ceron, 2015:495). 
Furthermore, the impact of gathering news from the internet has been argued to have a 
divergent effect on political trust (Lu et al., 2019:1-3). Various studies have found that political 
trust is negatively shaped by the frequency of media usage, just as was largely argued for the 
traditional media platforms. Despite this it has also been found that the internet played a 
positive role on forming political trust (Im, Cho, Porumbescu and Park, 2014:757-758; Ceron, 
2015:495-496; Lu et al., 2019:5-7; Cheng, 2020:2008-2009). The political context of a state 
was seen as playing a role in determining how political trust is influenced by the media usage 
regarding internet usage. The states where there is a large amount of government control of the 
traditional media, such as China, the internet political distrust amongst the citizenry (Zhou, 
Deng and Wu, 2014:13-14; Ceron, 2015:495-496; Lu et al., 2019:5-7; You and Wang, 
2020:68-69). 




In general, literature is overly focused on advanced Western democracies. The majority of the 
schools of thought relating to the role of the media in a democracy have emerged from Western 
countries, as has much of the research relating to the influence of media usage on political trust 
(Berger, 1998:602–603; Lin and Lim, 2002:35; Jebril et al., 2013:2; Camaj, 2014:188). This 
section discusses the research that has been conducted on the effect of the media on political 
trust in less developed democracies and also non democracies.  
The most significant amount of research on the above relationship has been conducted in the 
People’s Republic of China (Chen and Shi, 2001; Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005; Yang and Tang, 
2010; Shen and Guo, 2013; Wu, 2014). In the media malaise school of thought that is 
predominantly emphasised in Western literature, studies relating to the sway of media usage 
on political trust emphasise another dynamic, namely that many countries that are not 
democratic or have elements of a non-democratic tendencies utilise the media to grow public 
confidence and trust within the state, such as China, which can be considered to be an 
authoritarian state (Berger, 1998:602–603; Chen and Shi, 2001:86; Yang and Tang, 2010:422–
424; Wu, 2014:96-97). 
Chen and Shi (2001:106–107), who examined the political trust levels of citizens in China and 
how this was shaped by being exposed to the media sharing information about the performance 
of the state, found that increased media consumption after the Tiananmen Square incident 
caused a decline in political trust among Chinese citizens (Chen and Shi, 2001:106–107). These 
results were also found by Shi (2001:412) and Wu (2014:97–98), who found a non-significant 
relationship between media consumption through television, newspapers and the internet and 
political trust in the institutions of the legal courts and the police, as well as a decrease in 
political trust in the Chinese state in general. 
In contrast to this negative relationship, others found that increased exposure to political news 
in China was directly related to an increase in political trust as well as an increase in national 
pride (Yang and Tang, 2010:422–427; Shen and Guo, 2013:146–147). Furthermore, Shen and 
Guo (2013:146–147) found that print media was less successful in influencing the political 
trust attitudes of citizens in comparison to broadcast media. However, they emphasise that once 
the variable of national pride was controlled for, the relationship between political trust and 
media consumption was found to be less significant (Shen and Guo, 2013:146–147). 
Furthermore, in China’s post-communist period, the ability of the Chinese state to control what 




completely, and propaganda in the Chinese state still exists and is consumed by citizens through 
some portions of the media. In addition, the rise of the internet has lessened political control 
over the media, where despite attempts by the state to control the content allowed on the 
internet, the internet has largely found a way to circumvent state controls (Chen and Shi, 
2001:86; Wang, 2005:160; Yang and Tang, 2010:429; Shen and Guo, 2013:146–147).  
Researching the link between political trust and the media in China is therefore made more 
complicated due to the state’s influence over the media. Shen and Guo (2013:146–147) argue 
that this relationship has been manufactured through testing and once the variable of national 
pride is controlled for, the relationship between political trust and news media is not significant. 
This finding is suggested to be a result of propaganda in China being successful in building a 
united national identity among citizens (Shen and Guo, 2013:148). Chen and Shi (2001:107), 
Wang (2005:160) and Wu (2014:96–97) all found that the state’s propaganda caused a decrease 
in political trust due to citizens distrusting the media based on their evaluations of the media 
as being largely propaganda.   
The relationship between political trust and media consumption was also found to be a negative 
in Taiwan (Shi, 2001:412; Wu, 2014:97). Wu (2014:97–98) found that media usage through 
the media platforms of television, newspapers and the internet did not have a significant impact 
on Taiwanese citizens’ trust in the police and the legal system. Shi (2001:412), however, found 
evidence that consumption of media negatively shaped political trust in Taiwan.  
Lin and Lim (2002:36–37) researched the relationship between political cynicism and media 
usage through the radio and newspapers in South Korea among young people. The authors 
found similar results to Shi (2001) and Wu (2014) - media consumption negatively shaped 
political trust. Moreover, the authors also found that higher levels of distrust towards media 
institutions resulted in higher their political cynicism (Lin and Lim, 2002:36–37). 
The relationship between media consumption and political trust in Africa is under researched, 
and the studies that have explored this relationship have done so on a continental level, not 
within specific states. Furthermore, these studies were often part of broader research relating 
to exploring the factors that influence political trust in Africa. Hutchison and Johnson 
(2011:446; 478–749) found that, in African states, increased usage of media tended to decrease 
political trust.  
Although the relationship between political trust and media consumption was not tested 




Russian media in Latvia. The author found that both political trust and media consumption in 
Latvia are increasing. The positive trends for each of these two variables has led the author to 
suggest that they have an effect on each other and that further research is needed to test the 
relationship empirically (Berzina, 2018:5–7).  
In Kosovo, however, Camaj (2014:201–202), largely finds a mixed relationship, where both 
the virtuous circle and the media malaise schools of thought were supported, depending on the 
citizen as well as the type of media. Moreover, the author emphasises the role of the radio and 
newspapers in creating a positive relationship between political trust and media consumption, 
while the internet resulted in a negative relationship between these variables (Camaj, 
2014:201–202). Camaj (2014:201–202) also emphasises the agenda-setting function of the 
mass media in transitional democratic societies. 
2.5 SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO 
DEMOCRACY 
The influence of mass media consumption on political trust in South Africa is another under 
researched area. While there is some research relating to the effect of the mass media on 
democratic attitudes in South Africa political trust specifically is not explored. In addition, the 
majority of the research relating to the linkage between media usage and democracy in South 
Africa cannot be generalised to the entire South African citizenry due to limitations in the 
researchers’ methodology and sample sizes, such as those of Pepler (2003), Ndlovu (2008; 
2010), Friedman (2010), Malila (2013), Duncan, Meijer, Drok, Garman, Strelitz, Steenveld, 
Bosch, Ndlovu and Media Tenor (2013), Wasserman and Garman (2014), Malila and Oelofsen 
(2016) and Malila (2016). 
After the end of apartheid, the South African media had to reposition itself in a newly 
democratic society, where large portions of the media had previously played the role of 
continually supporting the apartheid state. Portions of the media that were critical of the 
apartheid state were forced to operate from underground headquarters. The post-apartheid era 
witnessed an expanding mass media institution as well as an emphasis on independence from 
the state (Wasserman, 2010:570–571, 595; Paterson and Malila, 2013:2–4; Wasserman and 
Garman, 2014:393–395). Freedom of expression with regard to the media is enshrined in the 
South African Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well as the role of the media as a source 
of knowledge for citizens (Wasserman, 2010:595–596; Sparks, 2011:12–14; Wasserman and 




sector in South Africa would be focused on supporting democratic norms, the Press Council 
was founded (Wasserman and Garman, 2014:394).   
The ownership of mass media institutions in South Africa was largely transferred from white 
owners during apartheid to black owners after apartheid, as well as to foreign investors. There 
was also an expansion of community-based radio stations (Berger, 2001:151–154; Wasserman, 
2010:571–572). The increased expansion and independence of the South Africa media resulted 
in the media emerging as another player in the political realm in South Africa (Voltmer, 2006:6; 
Wasserman, 2010:573). 
The South African media can arguably be regarded as playing the role emphasised by Western 
scholars, namely an essential, democratically supportive watchdog of the state. Moreover, 
many of the media editors after apartheid have placed a large amount of energy into ensuring 
that South African media institutions are separated from the state. This monitoring role of the 
South African media has caused the publications and broadcasts produced by the media to be 
largely focused on the political realm, state processes and the various political actors in the 
political realm (Wasserman, 2010:595–571; Malila, 2013:82; Wasserman and Garman, 
2014:404–405). Moreover, a content analysis of South African media institutions shows that 
the more crises the South African political realm experienced, the more problem-focused and 
watchdog-centred the role of the South African media became (Malila, 2013:82). 
The South African media emphasises and positions itself within the largely Western-developed 
theoretical role of the media as an independent and free supporter and promoter of democratic 
values (Ndlovu, 2008:64–66; Sparks, 2011:12–14; Wasserman and Garman, 2014:393). This 
self-proclaimed narrative by South African media institutions has been called into question by 
various scholars (Sparks, 2011:12–14; Wasserman and Garman, 2014:393). Some South 
African media institutions, for example, have been implicated in scandals relating to state 
intervention and accused of focusing more on commercialism and tabloid-focused information 
(Wasserman, 2010:571). An example of the state intervention mentioned above is the state’s 
threat to remove state advertising from the media if a certain request was not met (Wasserman, 
2010:573). Moreover, the media institutions in South Africa are a largely self-regulatory body; 
it was therefore proposed by the ANC that a media tribunal be established to serve as a 
regulatory body. This proposal was met with fierce criticism from journalists, who stated that 
it would be a form of state intervention and control that would violate the freedom of expression 




Much of the literature in the South African context relating to the influence of the media and 
the political realm specifically relates to the youth (Booysen, 1991; Claassen, 2001; Du Plooy-
Cilliers and Bezuidenhout 2003; Pepler, 2003; Ndlovu, 2008; Ndlovu, 2010; Friedman, 2010; 
Sparks, 2011; Mattes, 2012; Duncan et al., 2013; Malila, 2013; Wasserman and Garman, 2014; 
Malila, 2016; Malila and Oelofsen, 2016). The attitudes of other sub-groups in the population 
remain under researched. Moreover, even with regard to the focus on youths, the sample 
population that has been utilised was critiqued by Ndlovu (2014:95) as not being representative 
enough of the various races and classes in South Africa, as the sample was often made up 
mostly of university students. This proportional imbalance therefore does not reflect the 
broader South African context (Ndlovu, 2014:95). 
Malila (2013:36–37) and Ndlovu (2014:94–95) recognise the media as playing an integral role 
in creating a more politically informed and knowledgeable citizenry but emphasise the 
changing media habits of young people. The authors highlight that the mass media in South 
Africa has largely characterised the youth as being disengaged from politics (Malila, 2013:36–
37; Ndlovu, 2014:94–95). Moreover, young people do not recognise the function of the media 
in informing civic action (Malila, 2013:84–85). The youth in South Africa are identified as 
utilising both traditional news media, such as radio, television and newspapers, and the internet 
and social media to access political news (Malila, 2013:83–84). Malila (2013:80–81) and 
Ndlovu (2008:70–71; 2014:95) also emphasise that the youth are consuming less and less 
media. This concern relating to the changing media habits of the youth is also emphasised by 
Pepler (2003:2–3), who highlights a lack of interest by the youth in the political realm. It was 
found in a nationally representative longitudinal study from 2006 to 2012 that the youth of 
South Africa are utilising less television, in particular, to access political news (Ndlovu, 
2014:103). 
This view on the low media usage habits of the youth is not accepted by all authors, for example 
Strelitz (2002:324–325), who emphasises a high consumption rate of newspapers among white 
Afrikaans students. Ndlovu (2014:94–95) highlights that despite the interest in literature 
relating to the youth’s media habits and the effect that this could have on democratic values, 
there is no definitive conclusion about the changing media habits of the youth, as various 





This chapter explored literature on political trust and the possible effect of media usage on 
trust. Firstly, the concept of political trust is examined, along with its theoretical underpinnings. 
Norris’ conceptual framework of political trust, the causes and the consequences of political 
trust, as well as the interrelationship of political trust, legitimacy and a democratic culture are 
also discussed. Secondly, the political trust environment in South Africa is detailed. Thirdly, 
the relationship between media institutions and political trust is examined; this section first 
emphasised the theorised role of the media in a democratic state and then analysed the research 
that has been conducted relating to media consumption and political trust. Moreover, it was 
deemed necessary to explore the relationship between these variables in states that are not 
advanced Western democracies. Finally, this chapter examines South African media 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research question (see Chapter 1) of this study asks whether the frequency of media usage 
to gather political news by South African citizens has an effect on popular levels of political 
trust. Specifically, where media usage shapes trust that citizens extend towards key objects in 
the political system such as: political actors, political institutions, regime performance and 
regime principles. To address this research question, nationally representative survey data is 
utilised from the Afrobarometer (rounds 6 and 7) survey series. Statistical tests are conducted 
to determine the relationship between the independent variable (frequency of media usage) and 
the dependent variable (political trust in the three above specific political objects) in the South 
African context.  
This chapter sets out the methodology that is employed to investigate the relationship between 
these variables. It starts with an overview of the research design and a discussion of the 
quantitative methodology and questionnaire surveys in general, the secondary data analysis 
and the Afrobarometer data sets that were used for this study. Following this, the next section 
explores how the dependent and independent variables have been operationalised and measured 
in other established research. Subsequently, the operationalisation of this study’s variables is 
compared and was found to be in line with global applications. The various statistical tests 
conducted in this study are then discussed. Finally, important ethical considerations as well as 
the limitations of this study are outlined. 
3.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN: CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY WITH A 
LONGITUDINAL ASPECT 
This is primarily a cross-sectional study, because it explores the relationship between political 
trust and media usage using two cross-sectional surveys conducted at two different points in 
time, namely 2015 and 2018. However, the data results from the two surveys were compared.  
While it should be emphasised that this study does not claim to be a longitudinal study (robust 
longitudinal studies require at least several time points), the inclusion of two points in time 
does introduce a longitudinal aspect to the study. The inclusion of only two time points allows 
for the data from both years to be examined sufficiently and within the technical requirements 




The aim of a longitudinal study is to measure changes over time, in comparison to a cross-
sectional methodology, where the aim is to measure a phenomenon at a single point in time 
(Burnham, Gilland Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry, 2008:61; Pierce, 2011:10; Barakso, Sabet 
and Schaffner, 2014:88). A single survey measures the various attitudes, behaviours and 
opinions at that point in time. In contrast, it is only possible to measure and generalise changes 
in attitudes, behaviours and opinions over time when continuously measuring and analysing 
the results of the same questions over time in a longitudinal study (Burnham et al., 2008:61; 
Pierce, 2011:10).  
Two key disadvantages of cross-sectional design exist. Firstly, the inability to draw confident 
causal conclusions due to the lack of time-based aspects in the research design, where a 
precedence of how the variables manipulate each over a period of time can be examined. 
Secondly, that common method variance might arise between various different researchers 
(Spector, 2019:125). Despite the disadvantages, a cross-sectional research design has been well 
utilised in research and has played an essential role in establishing the associations between 
various variables even without discovering causal conclusions. The associations discovered in 
a cross-sectional research design help to understand and theorise about various phenomena 
(Spector, 2019:136). 
The inclusion of two data sets provides a longitudinal aspect to the extent that the researcher 
was able to compare very similar variables across two consecutive points in time that follow 
each other to observe similarities and differences. The longitudinal aspect in this study helps 
to overcome the disadvantages of a cross-sectional research design (Spector, 2019:125). 
3.3 A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
This study utilises a quantitative research approach to examine the effect of media usage on 
political trust levels among South African citizens towards key political objects in the political 
system: political actors, political institutions, regime satisfaction and regime performance in 
both 2015 and 2018. The quantitative data is drawn from the Afrobarometer questionnaires.  
A quantitative approach was deemed highly appropriate to examine this topic (which consists 
of examining mass attitudes and behaviour) and was in line with the research methodology 
previously applied by other researchers, as outlined in Section 3.6 below. A quantitative 
approach is largely focused on testing the relationship between variables. Surveys using 




2005:593). The benefits and limitations of the quantitative approach in general and survey 
questionnaires more specifically are now discussed. 
One key advantage of survey research is that the sampling methods can be used in a manner to 
ensure that the entire population is represented through the data (Hox and Boeije, 2005:593; 
Clawson and Oxley, 2012:30). A quantitative methodology allows the results to be 
generalisable to a broader population. This is due to the large representative sample sizes that 
are often employed (De Vaus, 2001:7–8; Burnham et al., 2008:40; Pierce, 2011:3–4; Barakso 
et al., 2014:88;). A quantitative methodology would therefore allow causal inferences to be 
made that are applicable to the broader South African population.  
Quantitative survey questionnaire data are defined by the ability to assign a numerical value to 
the answer categories represented through the survey questions; quantitative survey 
questionnaire data can therefore be statistically coded (Hox and Boeije, 2005:594). This adds 
to the reliable and objective nature of quantitative survey questionnaires, as the numerical 
coding allows other researchers to check the trustworthiness of the results (Pennings, Kemen 
and Kleinnijenhuis, 2006:12; Burnham et al., 2008:51; Pierce, 2011:3; Barakso et al., 2014:88).  
Survey research is the most common data collection method of public opinion data and the use 
of survey research has had a great impact on social science research (Brady, 2000:47; Clawson 
and Oxley, 2012:27). Survey research has long been used in the political science discipline to 
measure the attitudes, opinions and behaviours of citizens in states (Weisberg, Krosnick and 
Bowen, 1996:20–21; De Vaus, 2001:7–8; Burnham et al., 2008:166; Pierce, 2011:3; Clawson 
and Oxley, 2012:29). This systematic, rational and logical nature of a quantitative survey 
methodology offers the best method of examining and analysing respondents with regard to 
various political phenomena, such as partisanship or voting behaviour (De Vaus, 2001:7–8; 
Pierce, 2011:4–5). Therefore, survey research has been used to measure a range of different 
political concepts, and therefore allows political science researchers to test, confirm or deny a 
variety of political schools of thought (Brady, 2000:48–49). Since the emergence of large-scale 
political science quantitative survey research in the USA in the 1950s, survey research has been 
well documented as a vehicle to test the political science schools of thought in existence (Brady, 
2000:49–51). In addition, survey research has forced political scientists to clarify their concepts 
and modify them into questions prior to conducting research, to allow for accurate coding of 




Surveys are utilised to portray descriptive data, but can also be useful in making inferences and 
in pertaining to the causes and the influence of variables on one another. Surveys are therefore 
used with inferential statistics to determine the causal effect of a variety of variables (Brady, 
2000:47). Norris (2011:8) describes the importance of surveys capturing the attitudes and 
opinions of citizens as “the canary in the coal mine where signs point toward pervasive doubts 
about the role and powers of government, sentiments which, it feared, can slide into deep rooted 
popular aversion and hostility toward all things political”. Hence, the importance of political 
research through surveys is emphasised. 
Furthermore, each respondent that is involved in a quantitative survey questionnaire is asked 
the same questions in the same manner. There is a greater challenge in garnering objective 
results due to the way in which the data are gathered in a qualitative methodology with regard 
to interviews or field notes, for example. This adds to the reliable nature of a quantitative 
methodology (Burnham et al., 2008:51; Pierce, 2011:5).  
Another advantage of surveys is that they aid data collection, although they can be time-
consuming and expensive for the researcher. The collection of public opinion data in the 
quantitative tradition is largely done through closed-ended questions, because quantifiable data 
need to be collected. The respondent is able to answer many questions faster and is not 
overburdened (Brady, 2000:47; Clawson and Oxley, 2012:30). 
There are a variety of ways in which survey responses can be collected. Face-to-face interviews 
are regarded as the best method of data collection, despite being costly and time-consuming.  
However, there are also weaknesses to using a quantitative research method. It has been argued 
that a quantitative method does not capture all the complexities of the political realm. In 
contrast, a qualitative study provides a deeper analysis of a smaller number of case studies that 
would be collected, whereas quantitative data can be viewed as too detached and remote. 
However, a qualitative approach would not provide results that are generalisable to the broader 
population, as the sample sizes used in qualitative research are often small (Burnham et al., 
2008:40, 166; Pierce, 2011:4–5).  
Another drawback involves respondents themselves. Respondents to a survey could influence 
the validity of the survey instrument by interpreting the survey questions slightly differently 
(Brady, 2000:48–49; Vogt, 2007:87; Pierce, 2011:5). For example, when looking at the 
answers on the Likert scale, “strongly object” and “object” could be interpreted to be different 




their answers and exaggerate or lie in response to various survey questions; this is especially 
true with sensitive topics (Weisberg et al., 1996:20–21; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski, 
2000:269–271; Vogt, 2007:87; Pierce, 2011:5).  
Finally, some question the validity of various concepts used in political science quantitative 
research. As not all concepts are agreed upon, some question whether the survey questions are 
representative of the underlying concept are being measuring (Tourangeau et al., 2000:318–
320; Pierce, 2011:5). The validity question also relates to who has collected the statistics that 
will be analysed. Many quantitative surveys have large sample sizes that require multiple 
people to collect the data, and therefore the researcher or organisation does not always have 
complete control over the data collection process (Vogt, 2007:87; Burnham et al., 2008:166; 
Pierce, 2011:5).  
Quantitative survey research in the political science field in South Africa is not used as widely 
as various qualitative approaches, although there is a consistent tradition of researchers utilising 
this research method and design. This research tradition has contributed positively to the 
understanding of politics, democracy and society (Mattes, 2013:479–480). However, it is 
important to emphasise that the survey research tradition in developing countries faces a variety 
of challenges; some of these include high costs, the lack of infrastructure development in 
various areas and low or uneven telephone ownership levels (Donsbach and Traugott, 
2008:115–117). 
3.4 SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS  
This study analysed secondary data produced by the Afrobarometer survey series. Secondary 
data differs from primary data, as secondary data are not compiled by the researcher, but instead 
collected from a secondary source. Primary data, therefore, refer to data that researchers 
acquired themselves for a study (Rabianski, 2003:43–46). 
There are five different reasons for the use of secondary data, namely teaching and learning, 
methodological advancement, comparative research or replication of the original analysis, a 
description of contemporary or historical trajectories, and reanalysis of the data where new 
research questions that were not previously addressed will be attested to (Hox and Boeije, 
2005:593). Moreover, organisations often play the role of collecting a large amount of data and 




Disadvantages of secondary data include the inability to design and operationalise one’s own 
variables and theoretical constructs, and the data collection process and the research design are 
not tailored first-hand. However, this concern did not apply to this study, because the surveys 
in question were designed specifically to explore the study’s research questions. 
This study benefits from the use of secondary data in the following ways: the financial costs 
were hugely diminished in comparison to undertaking an entire data collection process from 
start to finish; the necessary variables for the research topic were available and operationalised 
in line with globally accepted methods; and the use of the Afrobarometer survey data provided 
the researcher with a sufficiently large sample to be able to answer the research question while 
extrapolating to the wider South African population. 
3.5 THE AFROBAROMETER DATA SETS  
The survey data sets used in the study were sourced from the South African Afrobarometer 
survey series from the most recent rounds held in 2015 (Round 6) and 2018 (Round 7). The 
Afrobarometer is a research institution that identifies as non-partisan as well as pan-Africanist 
and that is responsible for fielding public attitude surveys in over 30 African states on the topics 
of governance, democracy, society, and the economy. In 2019, Afrobarometer celebrated its 
20th year of existence, with the first round of surveys being completed in 2001 (Afrobarometer, 
2020). Furthermore, after a short embargo period, the data are available to the public on its 
website to download freely from www.afrobarometer.org. 
Afrobarometer forms part of the internationally renowned barometer series focusing on 
different areas of the world. For example, there is the Arabbarometer, the Asianbarometer, the 
Eurobarometer and the Latinbarometer. Despite forming part of the international series, the 
survey is implemented independently in each state through the work of a national research 
team. Moreover, Afrobarometer has internationally acclaimed core associates, including 
Michigan State University, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Centre for 
Democratic Development in Ghana (Chingwete, 2016:1–2; Afrobarometer, 2020). 
The sample sizes used in an Afrobarometer survey are nationally representative of the country’s 
voting-age citizen population. Each sample is specifically designed to be representative of the 
broader population and of all population groups. The sample size usually consists of 
somewhere between 2,100 and 2,400 randomly selected respondents. In South Africa, the 
sample size consists of 2,400 respondents for both the round 6 and 7 surveys. A sample of this 




results (Chingwete, 2016:1–2; Afrobarometer, 2020). The interviewers in the Afrobarometer 
surveys receive training in quantitative data collection and are dispatched in groups of four. 
Each group of four is overseen by one supervisor to ensure the validity of the surveys 
(Chingwete, 2016:1–2; Afrobarometer, 2020).  
Afrobarometer is therefore considered a reliable source of secondary data for various reasons. 
In addition, the organisation conducts fieldwork with trained interviewers and the reliability of 
the data is further safeguarded by the guarantee of supervision of the interviewers. The use of 
secondary quantitative data from Afrobarometer safeguards against some of the above-
mentioned disadvantages of secondary quantitative data. 
3.6 THE OPERATIONALISATION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES: A 
GLOBAL REVIEW  
This section explores the ways in which international scholarly research has operationalised 
and measured the two key variables in this study, namely political trust and the frequency of 
media usage. 
3.6.1 Political trust 
Quantitative surveys are widely used to measure political trust globally, such as those by 
Loewenberg (1971), Citrin et al. (1975), Muller and Jukam (1977), Inglehart (1988), Mischler 
and Rose (1997), Dalton (1998), Hetherington (1998), Scholz and Lubell (1998), Newton and 
Norris (2000), Mischler and Rose (2001), Catterberg and Moreno (2005), Rose (2007), Criado 
and Herreros (2007) and Marien and Hooghe (2011). Although political trust is not an 
extensively researched concept in South Africa, quantitative surveys have also been relied on 
as a research method in scholarly works by Askvik (2008; 2010), Chingwete (2016), Gouws 
and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016), and Schulz-Herzenberg and Gouws (2017). 
Despite surveys being a common research method, the operationalisation and measurement of 
political trust are still debated (Dalton, 1998:1–3; Norris, 1999:9–11; Levi and Stoker, 
2000:496; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:33–34; Seyd, 2015:3–5; Schneider, 2017:964). 
However, there is agreement in the literature that trust must be measured through various 
objects or levels of trust (Norris, 1999:10–17; Levi and Stoker, 2000:497). Nevertheless, there 
is some disagreement with regard to how best to differentiate between these different objects 
or levels of trust (Dalton, 1998:1–3; Levi and Stoker, 2000:497). The variety of approaches to 




However, despite the differentiation of trust objects to operationalise this concept, the standard 
approach is to operationalise political trust using the concept of political support. This is 
specifically done through Easton’s (1975) and later Norris’ (1999) differentiation of diffuse 
and specific support. Norris’ (1999) framework has been used by various authors to 
operationalise political trust, including by Crête, Pelletier and Couture (2006:3), Zmerli and 
Castillo (2015:181) and Norris (2019:6–7). In the South African context, Norris’ (1999) work 
was also adopted by Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016:14–15) to operationalise political 
trust.  
Key scholars Easton (1975) and later Norris (1999) both built their frameworks through 
emphasis on the importance of identifying objects of support when measuring political trust. 
Easton (1975:435–436) identifies three different objects: political authorities, the regime and 
the political community. Norris (1999:9) built on this foundation to create a conceptual 
framework with greater distinctions between the objects of support. The levels of this 
framework were expanded to five, namely the political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political actors. Norris (1999:9) argues that the public is 
able to make greater distinctions between the levels of support than allowed for in Easton’s 
(1975) framework. For example, in Easton’s (1975) framework, people were not able to choose 
between different elements of the regime, where Norris (1999:9) states that in practice, people 
do make distinctions between regime principles and regime performance. The fivefold 
framework of Norris (1999) is further supported through the statistical analysis of factor 
analysis that shows that the public does make distinctions along these levels of support. 
Norris (1999:10–12) proposes measurement and operationalisation techniques of each level of 
the framework (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the levels in greater detail). The political 
community is understood as an attachment to the nation that exists beyond the present 
institutions, actors and government (Norris, 1999:10–11). This level is generally measured 
through survey items assessing “a sense of belonging to the community, national pride, and 
national identity” (Norris, 1999:11). The respondents’ emotional attachment is therefore 
emphasised. 
The second and third levels of regime principles and performance have been argued to be 
largely intertwined and it can be difficult to gauge differences between these levels (Norris, 
1999:11–12). The second level of regime principles is measured though the support for values 




values are operationalised in a democratic system: The first and most common method is to 
determine the level of agreement from the respondents that democracy is the best form of 
governance (Norris, 1999:11). The second measurement technique is to determine the level of 
agreement with the values that are generally understood as the basic principles of democracy, 
such as freedom, tolerance and the rule of law (Norris, 1999:11). The third level of regime 
performance is operationalised through the support of how the political system functions in 
practice. This target of trust is commonly measured through determining the respondents’ 
satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 1999:11). This measure is used widely in international 
literature, although it is sometimes critiqued as being too ambiguous, where it could be seen to 
be measure both regime principles and performance (Norris, 1999:18). Furthermore, the use of 
this measure in a newer democratic state is questioned, and another measure that compares the 
old regime against the new democratic regime is suggested (Norris, 1999:11). 
The measurement of regime institutions and political actors has most commonly been 
determined through trust perception question items on a variety of regime institutions and 
political actors (Mishler and Rose, 1997:421–422; Norris, 1999:11–12; Marien, 2011:4–5; 
Seyd, 2015:5–6). Therefore, both levels are operationalised though determining the attitude of 
support towards the various regime institutions and political actors (Norris, 1999:11–12). 
However, the division between these fourth and fifth levels is also recognised as somewhat 
ambiguous in instances where the distinction between the office and the incumbent official 
who occupies that office is difficult to recognise for respondents in practice (Norris, 1999:12). 
Levi and Stoker (2000:497–500) make a similar point when they argue that citizens cannot 
distinguish institutions from incumbents, which could affect the interpretation of the results of 
such research. An example of this would be interpreting low trust in political actors, but a 
higher degree of trust in institutions. The differentiation of levels is also questioned, especially 
whether respondents are able to judge an institution without taking the incumbent into account 
(Marien, 2011:4).  
Another criticism relates to the objects of political trust that have been identified by Norris’ 
framework (1999). It is argued that political trust can only be said to exist towards political 
actors or institution, and not towards principles, for example, where not every assessment of 
trust can be considered an object of trust (Levi and Stoker, 2000:497–500). 
Norris’ (1999:12) framework is based on measures that have been widely used in political trust 




questions in the USA.1 These measures have been widely utilised in determining trust in 
various targets in quantitative survey research (Mishler and Rose, 1997:422; Norris, 1999:12; 
Levi and Stoker, 2000:497–500). The NES measures are underlined by the conception of 
trustworthiness of government (Levi and Stoker, 2000:498). However, the original NES 
question items are critiqued as ignoring other potential indicators of political trust and it is 
questioned how well these items actually measure political trust (Levi and Stoker, 2000:497–
500; Norris, 1999:12; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005:33–34; Seyd, 2015:2–3). Furthermore, the 
interpretation of decrease in trust found through the NES measures resulted in a longstanding 
debate on whether the decrease was incumbent-focused or system-focused (Citrin, 1974:974–
976; Mishler and Rose, 1997:422; Norris, 1999:12; Levi and Stoker, 2000:498; Marien, 
2011:3).  
While the conceptual frameworks of Norris (1999) and Easton (1975) and their measures are 
widely accepted, political trust has also been operationalised through various other means. In 
practice, this has resulted in measurement problems, as the various concepts are used 
interchangeably, resulting in the same indicators being utilised to measure different concepts, 
thereby causing confusion (Dalton, 1998:1–3; Levi and Stoker, 2000:497–499; Marien, 
2011:3). Some examples of the diverse range of survey item indicators include support for 
various policies, evaluations of political actors and trust in the regime and institutions (Hooghe, 
2011:272; Marien, 2011:3–4; Seyd, 2015:9–10). The confidence of the public in various 
institutions and actors has also been used as a measure of political trust (Catterberg and 
Moreno, 2005:33–34). 
Corruption perceptions of political actors are also utilised to empirically measure political trust 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003:101–102). This corruption measure involves respondents being 
asked specifically whether they evaluate a particular political actor to be corrupt. The argument 
is that citizens will not trust the political elite if actors are perceived as corrupt (Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003:101–102; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:21). In the South African 
context, this measure has been used by Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2016). The authors 
found that if a respondent evaluates a political actor as corrupt, it is highly likely that the 
respondent also distrusts the same political authority. 
 
1 Paraphrased NES question items: “Do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right; 
does the government waste a lot of money; is the government run by a few big interests looking out for themselves; 




3.6.2 Frequency of media usage 
A second body of literature explores the sway of media usage on political trust. This research 
draws on political trust variables that focus mainly on including political institutions and actors 
(Aarts et al., 2011:11–12; Strömbäck et al., 2016:95–96). 
As noted in the literature review, media usage has been found to have an inconsistent effect on 
political trust, as captured by the media malaise and virtuous circle schools of thought. The 
contradictory findings may arise due to the use of different methodologies to explore the 
relationship between these two variables, namely the experimental methodology and 
quantitative survey methodology (Avery, 2009:427; Strömbäck et al., 2016:105). The 
experimental methodology was used by Cappella and Jamieson (1997), Mutz and Reeves 
(2005) and Shehata (2014). In these studies, media usage was found to have a more negative 
influence on the attitude of political trust compared to the findings from survey research. In 
contrast, studies that use survey research showed both positive or negative relationships 
between the variables, and these relationships tended to be weaker compared to those in 
experimental studies (Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000; Aarts et al., 2012). 
In survey research, there is a difference between media usage and media exposure. The 
difference between these two conceptualisations relates to the active attention the citizen pays 
to the media. Some argue that attention is a more appropriate measure of media usage, as 
citizens are actively and consciously engaging with the media. On the other hand, it is possible 
for citizens to be exposed to various media sources, but they are not necessarily actively 
choosing to engage with the source. Exposure relates to how often respondents consume media 
reports, while attention refers to how often respondents pay attention to the variety of news 
types in existence (Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986;76–79; Chan, 1997:287; Strömbäck and 
Shehata, 2010:579–580; Aarts et al., 2012). This distinction has caused some authors to 
measure the impact of political trust through the lens of exposure and attention separately 
(Avery, 2009:416–417; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010; Aarts et al., 2012). 
3.7 THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
FREQUENCY OF NEWS MEDIA USAGE TO GATHER POLITICAL NEWS 
This section now draws on the global practises outlined above to discuss how this study’s 
variables are operationalised. The independent variable, frequency of usage of media for 
political news question asks how often the respondents gather news from various media 




The Likert response categories were ‘every day’, ‘a few times a week’, ‘a few times a month’, 
‘less than once a month’ and ‘never’. Therefore, the Afrobarometer’s question focuses 
specifically on asking the respondents how frequently they obtain political news from a variety 
of platforms. This study therefore looked at frequency of exposure to political news via these 
media platforms. However, the questions were also designed to tap more than just exposure to 
media, but also the active seeking of information, as attention is a preferable measure in 
comparison to exposure, as discussed earlier (Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986:76–79; Strömbäck 
and Shehata, 2010:579–580; Aarts et al., 2012). It is therefore the frequency aspect of the 
survey question that allows for the differentiation between ‘exposure’ and ‘attention’ to the 
media, as the media usage of the citizens is intentional. The independent variable, frequency 
media usage to gather political news, was operationalised in two phases using the 
Afrobarometer survey questionnaire rounds 6 and 7 (see the Appendix). 
3.7.1 Phase 1 
The first step taken to operationalise the independent variable dealt with the construction of 
question indices. SPSS allows for question items to be computed into a single index where a 
single concept can be measured (Field, 2009:629). The frequency of media usage was 
computed into two new indices through SPSS using Likert scales of media usage. The first 
media usage variable (Media Usage Variable 1) computed consisted of all the media platforms, 
except internet usage. Therefore, this variable consisted of radio, television and newspaper 
media platforms (see Figure 3.1). The second media usage variable (Media Usage Variable 2) 
included internet usage, hence all four news platforms (radio, television, newspapers and the 
internet) (see Figure 3.2). Both Media Usage Variable 1 and Media Usage Variable 2 were 























Figure 3.2: Independent variable: Frequency of Media Usage Variable 2 
There are reasons for excluding the internet in the first set of tests. Radio, television and 
newspapers are widely and regularly used by South African citizens, while the internet is less 
equitability spread among the citizenry (refer to Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Two media usage 
variables therefore guard against the possibility of respondents potentially being avid news 
consumers but not having access to the internet.  
To ensure compatibility of the question items, necessary statistical analyses were conducted 
prior to the construction of the two media usage indices. These analyses included factor 
analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test, the statistical significance of the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity, Kaiser’s criterion, and Cronbach’s alpha reliability analysis. Factor analysis was 
conducted to identify clusters of attitudes and to determine the extent to which question items 
were measuring a concept, as recommend by Field (2009:628–629). The KMO test determines 
sampling adequacy, as the reliability of factor analysis results is also dependent on satisfactory 
sampling (Field, 2009:645–647). Kaiser’s criterion is the rule that only components with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1 are retained and constructed into a question index (Field, 2009:640). 
Cronbach’s alpha is the most common measure of reliability of the constructed index following 
the factor analysis results. Although the value of Cronbach’s alpha must be interpreted with 
caution, the value of 0.7 has been stated as the cut-off value, but it has been proven that the 
higher the number of question items in the constructed index, the more likely the constructed 
index will have a Cronbach’s alpha value of above 0.7 (Field, 2009:674–675). Moreover, the 
statistical significance of the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was determined.  
The construction of the index of Media Usage Variable 1 in rounds 6 and 7 was reviewed. It 
was revealed that the KMO measure was 0.605 in the Round 6 data set and 0.603 in the Round 
7 data set. The results of this measure revealed that satisfactory sampling occurred, as the 
values were above the recommended value of 0.5 (Field, 2009:647). In addition, the Bartlett’s 














A total of three components were exposed in both Round 6 and Round 7 data sets; one of these 
components in each survey round had an eigenvalue greater than 1. In Round 6, the eigenvalue 
greater than 1 was valued at 1.488, and this component explained 49.603% of variance; in 
Round 7, the eigenvalue greater than 1 was valued at 1.518 and explained 50.604% of variance. 
Moreover, the component matrix revealed strong factor loadings during factor analysis in 
rounds 6 and 7 (see Table 3.1). Following factor analysis, the reliability measure of Cronbach’s 
alpha was tested: In Round 6, the value was 0.485 and in Round 7, the value was 0.509. After 
performing the above statistical analysis on Media Usage Variable 1 in both Round 6 and 
Round 7 of the data sets, it was concluded that the question item variables are related and 
allowed for the formation of a scale. 
Table 3.1: Factor analysis: Media Usage Variable 1 
Question index Factor loadings: Round 6 Factor loadings: Round 7 
Radio 0.707 0.756 
Television 0.68 0.688 
Newspapers 0.726 0.687 
 
Media Usage Variable 2 was then inspected relating to the creation of this index. The KMO 
measure was valued at 0.626 in Round 6 and in Round 7 it was determined to be 0.621. The 
results of the KMO measure showed that adequate sampling had occurred, as the values were 
above the recommended value of 0.5 (Field, 2009:647). In addition, the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity showed a p-value of 0.000 in both Round 6 and Round 7 data sets. This value was 
highly statistically significant. Both Round 6 and Round 7 data sets revealed four components 
in each: In Round 6, one of the components had an eigenvalue greater than 1, valued at 1 758, 
which accounted for 43.932% of variance; and in Round 7, one component had an eigenvalue 
greater than 1, valued at 1.651, which explained 41.286% of variance. Furthermore, the 
component matrix determined strong factor loadings during factor analysis in the Round 6 and 
Round 7 data sets (see Table 3.2). The reliability measure of Cronbach’s alpha was then tested. 
In Round 6, Cronbach’s alpha was valued at 0.566 and in Round 7, it was valued at 0.513. 
Following the results of these statistical measures, Media Usage Variable 2 was computed in 





Table 3.2: Factor analysis: Media Usage Variable 2 
Question index Factor loadings: Round 6 Factor loadings: Round 7 
Radio 0.572 0.69 
Television 0.593 0.616 
Newspapers 0.777 0.719 
Internet 0.690 0.529 
 
To compute Phase 1 of the independent variable, question items pertaining to the frequency of 
media usage (radio, television, newspapers and the internet) were computed into two different 
variables, Media Usage Variable 1 and 2. These two variables were renamed and the same 
response categories and coding as the original variables were kept. The more detailed the 
response categories can be kept the better, as collapsing response categories can result in a loss 
of important information (De Vaus, 2001:259). The response categories are, therefore, as 
follows: ‘every day’, ‘a few times a week’, ‘a few times a month’, ‘less than once a month’ and 
‘never’. Both media usage variables had the same recoded response categories.  
3.7.2 Phase 2 
Phase 2 tested the effect of each individual media platform. Separate tests were, therefore, 
performed for all four media platforms: the frequency of exposure to political news via radio, 
television, newspapers and the internet. Therefore, in this phase, the media platforms were not 
constructed into indices. The response categories and the coding categories of the response 
categories remained unchanged in Phase 2.  
The reason for the inclusion of Phase 2 was to account for the lower-than-recommended 
Cronbach’s alpha values for the computed scale media usage variables discussed above in 
Section 3.7.1. Phase 2 served the purpose of ensuring a deeper and more well-rounded analysis 
of the correlation between frequency of media usage in South Africa and political trust. 
Moreover, Phase 2 highlighted any divergences between the influence of each media platform. 
3.8 THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POLITICAL 
TRUST 
The operationalisation of the dependent variable built initially on Easton’s (1975) and then 
Norris’ (1999) conceptual frameworks of the objects of political trust. This study focused on 




trust objects proposed by Norris (1999:9–10). The dependent variable in this study was 
therefore divided into four different objects of political trust: the political actors, regime 
institutions (political institutions), regime performance and regime principles, from Norris’ 
(1999:10) framework. The political community is therefore the only level in Norris’ (1999) 
framework that was not examined in this study and is largely due to length limitations. 
3.8.1 Political actors 
Norris (1999:7) identified political actors as objects of specific support held by citizens in the 
various political authorities and their evaluations of political incumbents. Political actors were 
operationalised through two survey questions (see the Appendix). The question items used 
were as follows: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say?”2 and “How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?”3 The first question was used to 
access the amount of trust held towards various actors and institutions and the second question 
to gauge political trust in political actors from perceptions of whether a political actor is corrupt 
or not. The corruption perception item was utilised to include some actors that were not tapped 
by the original trust perception items. The use of corruption perceptions to measure political 
trust is recognised as a secondary measure as mentioned above, and its use has been established 
internationally (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003:101–102) and within South Africa (Gouws and 
Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016:21). The specific political actors were identified as the president and 
the provincial premiers. In the corruption perception question, the following four actors were 
identified: the president and officials in his office, members of Parliament, government 
officials and local government councillors.  
Two indices of political actors were constructed utilising these actors. The indices included the 
Political Actors Corruption Index (see Figure 3.3) and the Political Actors Trust Index (see 
Figure 3.4). The recoded response categories in both the political actors’ indices are the same 




2 Response categories and coding: not at all (0), just a little (1), somewhat (2), a lot (3). 












Figure 3.4: Dependent variable: Political Actors Trust Index 
When constructing indices in SPSS, various statistical analyses must take place to ensure the 
compatibility of the question items in the index and the reliability of the constructed index 
(Field, 2009:629). The statistical analysis was conducted on both political actor indices: The 
Political Actors Trust Index and the Political Actors Corruption Index, and included factor 
analysis, the KMO test, the Cronbach’s alpha reliability analysis and the statistical significance 
of Bartlett’s test of sphericity.  
The statistical analysis revealed the following results for the Political Actors Corruption Index. 
The KMO test revealed that reliable and satisfactory sampling took place in both survey 
rounds: in Round 6 the value was 0.82 and in Round 7 the value was 0.819. The KMO test 
results were well above the recommended value of 0.5 (Field 2009:647). The Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 in each survey round. In addition, 
the question items from survey rounds 6 and 7 both revealed one component with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1. The eigenvalue was 2.905 on the component greater than 1 in Round 6, and this 
component explained 72.637% of the variance. Furthermore, the eigenvalue was 2.857 on the 
component greater than 1 in Round 7, and this component explained 71.421% of the variance. 
The component matrix revealed very strong factor loadings during factor analysis in rounds 6 
and 7 on each question item (see Table 3.3). The reliability analysis of each question index in 
survey rounds 6 and 7 revealed two highly reliable indices. The Cronbach’s alpha value was 
0.872 and 0.865 in survey rounds 6 and 7, respectively. It can therefore be concluded that the 
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question indices were well suited to the formulation of the dependent variable of political 
actors.  
Table 3.3: Factor analysis: Political Actors Corruption Index  
Question item  Survey Round 6 Survey Round 7 
The president and officials in his office  0.840 0.826 
Members of Parliament 0.873 0.864 
Government officials 0.892 0.874 
Local government councillors 0.801 0.815 
 
The Political Actors Trust Index was also statistically analysed to test the compatibility of the 
index. The KMO values were 0.5 in both survey rounds. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 in each survey round of 6 and 7. This index 
presented one eigenvalue each that was above the value of 1; in survey Round 6, this value was 
1.562 and accounted for 78.11% of variance and in survey Round 7, the value was 1.466 and 
accounted for 73.284% of variance. The component matrix showed very strong factor loadings 
during factor analysis on the index in each survey round (see Table 3.4). Lastly, the reliability 
analysis of Cronbach’s alpha revealed values of 0.719 in survey Round 6 and 0.635 in survey 
Round 7. It can therefore be concluded that the question items were well suited to the 
construction of this index.  
Table 3.4: Factor analysis: Political Actors Trust Index 
Question item  Survey Round 6 Survey Round 7 
The president  0.884 0.856 
Provincial premiers 0.884 0.856 
 
3.8.2 Political institutions 
Political institutions were operationalised in a similar manner to political actors. The question 
item used to operationalise political institutions was the same trust question used to create the 
Political Actors Trust Index (see the Appendix) but using institutions and not actors.4 Norris 
(1999:7) conceptualises regime institutions as “governments, Parliaments, the executive, the 
 




legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties, and the military”, although for 
the purpose of this study specifically, only political institutions were utilised. The political 
institutions used to operationalise this variable therefore fit Norris’ (1999:7) definition of 
political institutions and include national Parliament, the ruling ANC party, opposition political 
parties, and local government councils. 
To operationalise the identified political institutions, one question index was formulated: The 
Government Institutions Trust Index (see Figure 3.5). A third Political Parties Index was 
considered for the question items for the ruling ANC party and the opposition political parties. 
However, the question items did not lend themselves to creating a reliable index and the 
question items were then tested individually. The response coding of the indices and the 
political parties remained the same as the original question item.5  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Government Institutions Trust Index 
Various statistical analyses were conducted on the question index to show the compatibility of 
question items in the index. The statistical tests included factor analysis, the KMO test, the 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability analysis and the statistical significance of Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity.  
The Government Institutions Trust Index in survey rounds 6 and 7 can also be concluded a 
reliable index due to the results of the statistical analyses. The KMO measure was valued at 
0.5 and 0.5 in survey rounds 6 and 7, respectively. A p-value of 0.000 was established in each 
survey round with Bartlett’s test of sphericity; therefore, this measure was statistically 
significant. The Government Institutions Trust Index in each survey round also revealed one 
component each with an eigenvalue greater than 1. This eigenvalue was valued 1.482 in survey 
Round 6 and 1.441 in survey Round 7. The component in Round 6 accounted for 74.11% of 
variance and the component in Round 7 attributed 72.037% of variance. Furthermore, the 
component matrix revealed strong factor loadings in each survey round (see Table 3.6). The 
 













Cronbach’s alpha reliability measure was dependably valued at 0.651 in survey Round 6 and 
0.612 in survey Round 7. 
Table 3.5: Factor analysis: Government Institutions Trust Index  
Question item  Survey Round 6 Survey Round 7 
Parliament 0.861 0.849 
Local government councils 0.861 0.849 
 
3.8.3 Regime performance and regime principles 
Regime principles and regime performance constitute the third and fourth levels of Norris’ 
(1999) conceptual framework. Regime principles refer to the “values of the political system” 
(Norris, 1999:11). South Africa is a democratic state; therefore, regime principles were 
operationalised through determining the level of agreement with the idea that democracy is the 
preferential option to govern a country. The item asked the respondents to identify which 
statement was closest to their own beliefs. The statements were as follows: “Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government”, “In some circumstances, a non-democratic 
government can be preferable” and “For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have.” This operationalisation of regime principles was in line with Norris’ 
framework (1999:11). The response categories and coding of this question remained 
unchanged.6 
Regime performance is defined by Norris (1999:11) as “support for how authoritarian or 
democratic political systems function in practice”. Regime performance was operationalised 
through a widely accepted measure of satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 1999:11). The 
questions asked the respondents to identify how satisfied they were with the way democracy 
works in South Africa. The response categories remain the same and are ‘very satisfied’, ‘fairly 
satisfied’, ‘not very satisfied’, ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘South Africa is not a democracy’.7 
3.9 STATISTICAL TESTS 
 
6 The coding of statements: Statement 1: “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” (3); 
Statement 2: “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable” (2); Statement 3: “For 
someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have” (1). 
7 Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? The response categories and their 





SPSS was used to determine the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. 
The independent variable was frequency of media usage (phases 1 and 2) and the dependent 
variable was the various objects of political trust. The Media Usage Variable 1 and 2 (see 
Section 3.7.1) were each statistically tested against each specified object of political support in 
both Afrobarometer survey rounds 6 and 7, as follows: 
1. Political actors: Political Actors Corruption Index and Political Actors Trust Index 
2. Political institutions: Government Institutions Trust Index and the two political parties’ 
variables 
3. Regime performance and regime principles: Democratic support and democratic 
satisfaction. 
There are two umbrella types of statistical analysis in existence to determine the level of 
association between variables, namely the chi-square-based and the proportional reduction of 
error (PRE) measures (De Vaus, 2001:254). In this study, PRE measures (summary statistics 
or measures of association) are employed to determine the correlation between the independent 
and dependent variables. PRE measures indicate “how much better we can predict a person’s 
score on a variable given the knowledge of another variable” (De Vaus, 2001:257). The PRE 
measures reveal a result between the values of 0 and 1: the closer the value is to 1, the stronger 
the correlation is between the two variables. For example, a value of 0.8 improves the accuracy 
of the prediction by 80%, in comparison to a value of 0.1, which improves the accuracy of the 
prediction by 10% (De Vaus, 2001:257). The PRE measures thus determine the strength and 
direction of the association between two variables (De Vaus, 2001:257–258). 
The level of measurement determines the statistical tests that are conducted for PRE measures 
(De Vaus, 2001:257). The level of measurement in this study are ordinal variables. Ordinal 
variables are categorical variables in the sense that the question item’s response categories are 
formulated into logical, ordered groupings (Field, 2009:8–10). All the variables within the 
independent and dependent variables in this study were ordinal variables. As demonstrated in 
sections 3.7, 3.8.1, 3.8.2 and 3.8.3, the constructed indices used to operationalise political 
actors and institutions, and the relevant question items used to operationalise democratic 
satisfaction, had ordered response categories.  
There were two summary statistics considered for this study, Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s 
Rho. Both correlation coefficients are suitable to use for ordinal by ordinal variables with many 




when one variable has a lot of categories. Spearman’s rho is the preferred correlation 
coefficient for variables with a lot of categories (De Vaus, 2001:259). Therefore, Spearman’s 
Rho is the most appropriate correlation coefficients for this study.  
Furthermore, to establish the significance of the results, a Significance Test is conducted (p-
value). The p-value is between one and zero, and the lower the p-value the greater the chance 
that the association determined by the measure of association did not occur by chance (De 
Vaus, 2001:269-270). The guideline is that summary statistics are significant at the 0.05 level, 
therefore the chance that the correlation coefficients occurred by chance is less than 5% (Field, 
2009:51).   
3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research was conducted in full compliance with Stellenbosch University’s ethical code. 
The research proposal was submitted to the relevant authorities, the Departmental Ethics 
Screening Committee (DESC), to gain ethical approval prior to the commencement of the 
research. The purpose of submitting a proposal for ethical review is “to contribute to 
safeguarding the dignity, rights, safety, and well-being of all actual or potential participants in 
social, behavioural, economic and educational research conducted at Stellenbosch University” 
(Stellenbosch University, 2019).  
Afrobarometer data is secondary, publicly available data. The data has already been collected, 
has undergone rigorous ethical clearance procedures and is publicly available on the 
Afrobarometer website. The survey respondents for the Afrobarometer data sets are 
anonymous, and have a minimum risk of revealing the identity of the respondents. It was 
therefore highly unlikely that ethical problems would arise with regard to conducting this 
research, as the probability of harm or discomfort experienced by respondents was not greater 
than that to which they would be exposed in daily life.  
3.11 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was primarily a cross-sectional study, although there was a longitudinal element 
because of the inclusion of two data sets. Without a longer series of data sets, it is difficult to 
establish an ongoing pattern in attitudes and behaviour over time. It can also be argued that 
there is an element of bias in this study regarding the importance of context. The study sought 
to better understand the relationship between media usage and political trust in the South 




was a time in South Africa when many political trust violations occurred and were likely to 
have negatively shaped public trust. However, the researcher has little control over the external 
context. In fact, the high level of corruption allegations may instead have provided an ideal 
environment for the study by accentuating the public role that the media plays in revealing 
misdemeanours in government.  
3.12 CONCLUSION  
The method adopted for this study was a quantitative methodology using social scientific 
survey analysis and closely reflected the research methods and design of other similar studies 
in the global literature. This study utilised survey data from the most recent Afrobarometer 
survey rounds 6 and 7 to examine the correlation between the independent and dependent 
variables. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the key variables were based on 
Norris’ (1999) conceptual framework regarding political trust. The independent variable 
consisted of two iterations. Phase 1 tested a constructed index for frequency of media usage 
(all media platforms) and a more limited index with only traditional media sources (excluding 
the internet). Phase 2 tests all four individual media platforms separately. The three levels of 
Norris’ (1999) framework that made up the dependent variables were operationalised as 
follows: political actors were operationalised through a Political Actors Corruption Index and 
Political Actors Trust Index, while political institutions were operationalised through a 
Government Institutions Trust Index and two distinct political parties question items. Regime 
performance and principles were operationalised using the demand for democracy item and the 
democratic satisfaction item. The relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables were tested using the appropriate statistical tests of correlation and Spearman’s rho 






CHAPTER 4: EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL NEWS VIA THE MEDIA 
AND TRUST IN POLITICAL ACTORS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines the influence of frequency of media usage to gather news on political 
trust in political actors. The following chapters explore the effect of news usage on the other 
objects of political trust, namely political institutions and regime performance and principles. 
This chapter first discusses corruption and political trust perceptions of South African citizens 
using descriptive statistics. The next two sections focus on answering the research question 
specifically focused on political trust in political actors with the relevant indexes and question 
items.8 
4.2 TRUST ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL ACTORS 
As explained above, political actors are operationalised into two question indices: Political 
Actors Corruption Index (president and officials in his office, members of Parliament, 
government officials and local government councillors) and the Political Actors Trust Index 
(president and the provincial premiers). The latter is the primary measure for measuring 
political trust in political actors. Due to the limited number of political actors in this question 
item, the Political Actors Corruption Index is treated as a secondary measure of political trust.  
The frequency percentages of trust in political actors is shown in Table 4.1. Political trust in 
the president increased slightly between 2015 and 2018, even after the confidence interval is 
taken into account.9 The number of citizens who held no trust in the president in 2015 was 39% 
and in 2018 this number decreased to 29%. Furthermore, the number of people who trusted the 
president a lot increased from 15% in 2015 to 23% in 2018. The trust in the provincial premiers 
decreased between 2015 and 2018, although this decrease was slight. The number of people 
who did not trust the provincial premiers in 2015 was 21%; this then increased to 33% in 2018. 
 
8 Coding of Media Usage Variable 1 and 2 and the media platforms (radio, television, newspapers and 
internet): never (0); less than once a month (1); a few times a month (2); a few times a week (3); every day (4). 
Coding of the Political Actors Trust Index and its individual actors (the president and the provincial premiers): 
not at all (0); just a little (1); somewhat (2); a lot (3). 
Coding of the Political Actors Corruption Index and its individual actors (the president and officials in office, 
members of Parliament, government officials and local government councillors): none of them are corrupt (0); 
some of them are corrupt (1); most of them are corrupt (2); all of them are corrupt (3). 
9 The confidence interval of the Afrobarometer data is 2%. The margin to determine changes in trust must be 




Therefore, an increase in distrust is visible when the confidence intervals are taken into 
account.  
Table 4.1: Political trust in political actors in South Africa 
How much do you trust 
each of the following?  
Not at all 
(%) 




A lot (%) 
2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
The president 
2015: n = 2370 
2018: n = 1750 
39.3 28.5 26.9 31.6 18.8 17.2 15 22.7 
The provincial premiers 
2015: n = 2255 
2018: n = 1650 
21.4 33.2 28.6 28.5 28.9 20.4 21 17.9 
n = the number of respondents in the statistic 
 
Citizen perceptions of corruption are in Table 4.2. Between the years 2015 and 2018, the 
citizens’ corruption perceptions of the political actors did not change drastically when the 
confidence intervals were taken into consideration. The frequencies in each response category 
between 2015 and 2018 remained relatively similar and the citizens perceived the political 
actors to be similarly corrupt. However, it is evident that the majority of citizens held negative 
corruption perceptions towards all the political actors in this study. In 2018, the number of 
citizens who perceived none of the political actors corrupt was as follows: the office of the 
president: 11%, members of Parliament: 5%, government officials: 6% and local government 
councillors: 6%. Therefore, the majority of the citizens perceived that the political actors were 
corrupt to some extent. 
Table 4.2: Perceptions of corruption of political actors in South Africa 
How many of the following 
people do you think are 







All of them 
(%) 
2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
The office of the president  
2015: n = 2335 
2018: n = 1674 
5.2 10.9 47.4 47.1 27.6 23.1 19.8 18.9 
Members of Parliament 
2015: n = 2350 
2018: n = 1694 





2015: n = 2350 
2018: n = 1717 
3.8 5.8 46.2 47.5 35.5 28.7 14.5 17.9 
Local government councillors 
2015: n = 2352 
2018: n = 1707 
3.8 6.3 47.7 45.6 32.9 27.1 15.5 21 
n = the number of respondents in the statistic 
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows the summary statistics for the correlations between the individual 
media platforms and the various political actors that make up both indices. This ensures the 
association between the variables is not obscured through the use of indexes in the following 
sections. 










the test (n) 
Radio The President  2015 0.029  2268 
2018 0.079**  1709 
Provincial Premiers 2015 0.011 2159 
2018 -.026 1604 
Television The President  2015 -0.013 2268 
2018 0.084**  1711 
Provincial Premiers 2015 -0.015 2159 
2018 0.014 1606 
Newspaper The President  2015 -0.033  2266 
2018 0.019  1702 
Provincial Premiers 2015 -0.035 2157 
2018 -0.006 1597 
Internet The President  2015 -0.115**  2259 
2018 -.059*   1683 
Provincial Premiers 2015 -0.047*  2152 
2018 -.058* 1578 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 





Table 4.3 does not reveal a large amount of statistically significant correlations. Out of the 
traditional media platforms only the radio (correlation = 0.079; p-value = 0.001) and television 
(correlation = 0.084; p-value = 0.001) have a statistically significant association with trust in 
the President in 2018. An increased usage of radio and television to gather political news in 
2018 is associated with higher levels of trust in the President. 
The internet has the opposite association to the traditional media platforms. An increased 
frequency of internet usage to political gather news is associated with less trust in the President 
and the Provincial Premiers in both years. In 2015 the summary statistic between the frequency 
of internet usage to gather news and trust in the President was -0.0115 (p-value = 0.000) and 
trust in the Provincial Premiers was -0.047 (p-value =0.030). This was similarly true in 2018 
for trust in the President (correlation = -0.059; p-value = 0.015) and the Provincial Premiers 
(correlation = -0.058; p-value= 0.021). The correlations between these variables suggest an 
inverse relationship. 









the test (n) 
Radio The President and 
Officials in Office 
2015 -0.065**  2233 
2018 -0.021  1634 
Members of 
Parliament 
2015 -0.055**  2247 
2018 0.007  1653 
Government officials 2015 -0.029  2248 
2018 0.005  1674 
Local government 
councillors 
2015 0.016 2249 




The President and 
Officials in Office 
2015 0.019  2233 
2018 -0.052*  1634 
Members of 
Parliament 
2015 0.008  2247 
2018 -0.018  1655 
Government officials 2015 0.021  2248 






2015 -0.028 2249 




The President and 
Officials in Office 
2015 0.068** 2231 
2018 -0.048*  1625 
Members of 
Parliament 
2015 0.057**  2245 
2018 -0.045  1649 
Government officials 2015 0.068**  2246 
2018 -0.036  1670 
Local government 
councillors 
2015 0.072** 2247 




The President and 
Officials in Office 
2015 0.124**  2224 
2018 0.039  1605 
Members of 
Parliament 
2015 0.051*  2238 
2018 0.024  1628 
Government officials 2015 0.069**  2239 
2018 0.036  1649 
Local government 
councillors 
2015 0.037 2240 
2018 0.037 1639 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The traditional media platforms largely suggest an inverse relationship between the frequency 
of media usage to gather political news and the perceptions of corruption of the political actors. 
A higher frequency of political news gathering through the radio is associated with lower 
perceptions of corruption in the President (correlation = -0.065; p-value = 0.002) and members 
of Parliament (correlation = -0.055; p-value = 0.009) in 2015. This was similarly true for 
television usage and perceptions of President (correlation = -0.052; p-value = 0.035) in 2018.  
Using newspapers to gather political news has a mixed relationship with corruption 
perceptions. Newspaper usage is associated with  higher corruption perceptions for the 
President (correlation = 0.068; p-value = 0.001), members of Parliament (correlation = 0.057; 
p-value = 0.007), government officials (correlation = 0.068; p-value = 0.001), and local 
government councillors (correlation = 0.072; p-value = 0.001) in 2015. However, in 2018 an 




In contrast to the traditional platforms, internet usage is associated with higher corruption 
perceptions. This includes the president (correlation = 0.124; p-value = 0.000), members of 
Parliament (correlation = 0.051; p-value = 0.015), and government officials (correlation = 
0.069; p-value = 0.001) in 2015. 
4.3 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST OF POLITICAL 
ACTORS: PHASE 1 
This section comprises phase 1. As such, it examines the association between the two media 
usage variables (variable 1 includes radio, television and newspapers and variable 2 includes 
the internet) and the two constructed indices: the Political Actors Corruption Index and the 
Political Actors Trust Index (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5: Correlations: Media usage variables and the political actor indices 
Independent 
variables 











2015 0.017 2207 
2018 -0.070** 1559 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 -0.008  2148 





2015 0.053* 2200 
2018 -0.023  1539 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 -0.051* 2143 
2018 -0.006 1545 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Media Usage Variable 1 only produces one statistically significant correlation and this 
correlation is with the Political Actors Corruption Index and reveals an inverse association. In 
2018, an increased exposure to political news is associated with citizens being less likely to 
perceive the political actors to be corrupt (correlation = -0.070; p-value = 0.006).  
Media Usage Variable 2 reveals a different association between the variables in comparison to 
Media Usage Variable 1. In 2015 the correlations between Media Usage Variable 2 and both 




associated with higher corruption perceptions among political actors (correlation = 0.053; p-
value= 0.014) and were similarly more likely to distrust the political actors (correlation= -
0.051; p-value= 0.017). Therefore, the inclusion of the internet as a political news source into 
Media Usage Variable 2 resulted in a change in the direction of the relationship. 
4.4 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST OF POLITICAL 
ACTORS: PHASE 2 
Phase 2 examines the independent and separate effects of the individual media platforms (radio, 
television, newspapers and the internet) on political trust towards actors. The tests again use 
the Political Actors Corruption Index and the Political Actors Trust Index (see Table 4.6).  
Table 4.6: Correlations: Individual media platforms and the political actor indices 
Independent 
variable 





the test (n) 
Radio  Political Actors 
Corruption Index 
2015 -0.029 2209 
2018 0.004  1567 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 0.024  2150 
2018 0.020 1575 
Television Political Actors 
Corruption Index 
2015 -0.004 2209 
2018 -0.057*   1567 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 -0.015  2150 
2018 0.050*  1577 
Newspapers Political Actors 
Corruption Index 
2015 0.064**  2207 
2018 -0.063*  1561 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 -0.036  2148 
2018 0.005 1568 
Internet Political Actors 
Corruption Index 
2015 0.077**  2200 
2018 0.060*  1541 
Political Actors Trust 
Index 
2015 -0.085**  2143 
2018 -0.065*  1549 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 





Gathering political news from the television revealed a limited number of statistically 
significant correlations. The correlations between the Political Actors Corruption Index and the 
television variable were statistically significant in 2018 (correlation = -.057; p-value = 0.025). 
It was not a strong association and showed an inverse relationship between the variables. 
Therefore, the citizens who used the television to gather political news were more likely to 
perceive the political actors to be less corrupt in 2018. A similar association is visible between 
the Political Actors Trust Index and the television variable (correlation = 0.050; p-value= 
0.048). Therefore, a high exposure of political news via the television is associated with higher 
levels of trust towards the political actors.  
For newspapers, the correlations with the Political Actors Corruption Index showed that in 
2015, a higher frequency of news gathering from newspapers was associated with higher 
perceptions of corruption among political actors (correlation =0.064; p-value = 0.002). And yet 
in 2018, the citizens were less likely to perceive the political actors as corrupt if they had a 
higher frequency of gathering news from newspapers (correlation = -0.063; p-value = 0.013). 
Internet usage had the most noticeable effect on the Political Actors Corruption Index and the 
Political Actors Trust Index. The correlations with the Political Actors Trust Index and the 
internet usage were statistically significant in 2015 and 2018. The correlations were as follows: 
correlation was valued at -0.085 (p-value = 0.000) in 2015 and -0.065 (p-value = 0.011) in 
2018. These correlations showed an inverse relationship. Therefore, an increase in frequency 
of internet usage to gather political news was associated with less political trust in political 
actors. The correlations between these variables remained as an inverse relationship in both 
survey rounds.  
The correlations between frequency of internet usage and the Political Actors Corruption Index 
revealed a similar association to the internet usage variable and the Political Actors Trust Index. 
Citizens who frequently used the internet to gather news were more likely to perceive the 
political actors to be corrupt in 2015 and 2018, seen in the correlation statistics: 0.077 (p-value 
= 0.000) in 2015 and 0.060 (p-value = 0.018) in 2018. Therefore, frequency of internet usage 
to gather political news negatively shaped both citizens’ trust and citizens’ corruption 
perceptions and supported the media malaise hypothesis.  
4.5 DISCUSSION  
The correlations between the independent and the dependent variable within this chapter is 




dependent and independent variables show that frequent media usage to gather political news 
does not have a very strong effect on popular levels of trust in political actors. Nevertheless, 
some key findings emerge. In Phase 1, there is most support for Hypothesis 3, the null 
hypothesis, that the frequency of media usage to gather political news does not affect citizen’s 
political trust in political actors or corruption perceptions. However, where the summary 
statistics were statistically significant, the level of association between the variables revealed 
divergent and interesting correlations. In Phase 1 gathering political news from the traditional 
media platforms (Media Usage Variable 1) was associated with higher levels of trust amongst 
the citizens towards political actors. Yet, when internet usage to gather political news was 
included into the media usage variable (Media Usage Variable 2) the citizens were more likely 
to distrust the political actors. Therefore, traditional media usage has a positive association with 
political trust and supports the virtuous circle hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) while the associations 
between the variables and Media Usage Variable 2 supports the media malaise hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 1). The only difference between Media Usage Variable 1 and Media Usage 
Variable 2 is the inclusion and exclusion of the internet as a political news source. Thus, its 
inclusion or exclusion as a source of political news influenced support for two divergent 
hypotheses.  
Phase 2 showcases similar results to phase 1. Most correlations are not statistically significant 
giving support again to hypothesis 3. However, a few interesting associations emerge.  Firstly, 
traditional media platforms are least likely to affect trust in political actors. The statistically 
significant correlations were mostly supportive of the virtuous circle hypothesis (Hypothesis 
2). This finding confirms the phase 1 results. Secondly, the internet was the only media 
platform in this chapter to produce statistically significant results with both political actor 
indices in 2015 and 2018. Using the internet as a political news source was associated with 
lower levels of trust towards the political actors, therefore, this association is supportive of the 
media malaise hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), again supporting phase 1 findings. Gathering 
political news from the internet also produced the strongest correlations of all the individual 
media platforms.  
4.6 CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES 
While many South Africans are distrustful of their political actors, an increase in the frequency 
of media usage has a varied influence on political trust. Political support that is associated to 




judgements that the citizens hold towards the political actors. In the case of political actors, the 
erosion of specific support for this object is not detrimental to the democratic political system. 
It is not abnormal for support for political actors to ebb during the course of democratic politics. 
Therefore, the distrust in political actors visible in South Africa is not directly tied to a failing 
democracy but is rather seen as a natural democratic process (see Norris, 1999:25). 
Therefore, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that frequency of media usage to 
gather political news has shaped the specific support or trust that citizens extend to political 
actors in a very significant manner. Instead, its affect is varied depending on the media 
platforms. Interestingly, while the internet is the least utilised media platform in South Africa 
it appears to generate the most distrust in political actors and suggests some media malaise 
effects. In summary, although a large number of South Africans distrust their political actors, 
the frequency of media usage is not a factor that significantly shapes distrust, and the distrust 





CHAPTER 5: EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL NEWS VIA THE MEDIA 
AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines the association between frequency of media usage (to gather political 
news) on trust in political institutions. As discussed in Chapter 3, Norris’ (1999) conceptual 
framework provided the conceptual base for determining the objects of support used to 
operationalise political trust in institutions. The political institutions examined were as follows: 
Parliament, local government councils, the ruling political party (the ANC) and opposition 
political parties. This chapter starts with a descriptive view of the attitudes towards these 
institutions and then determines the level of association between the relevant variables.10  
5.2 TRUST TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS  
Political trust in institutions is shown in Table 5.1. A fair amount of distrust is observable in 
Parliament, local government councils, the ANC and the opposition political parties. 
Furthermore, mistrust in political institutions (not at all) increased slightly for all the political 
institutions between 2015 and 2018 after confidence intervals are considered. For Parliament, 
this increased from 27% to 34% of the citizens between 2015 and 2018. Between 2015 and 
2018, the number of citizens increased from 32% to 44%. The number of citizens who held no 
trust in the ANC increased from 32% to 37%. And lastly, distrust in the opposition political 
parties increased from 30% to 43% between 2015 and 2018. Only a minority expressed trust 
in political institutions, and this remains static across the two surveys after confidence intervals 
are considered. In 2018, 16% of citizens held a lot of trust in Parliament and 15% towards local 
government councils. Between 21% and 24% expressed a lot of trust in the ANC; in 2018, 





10 Coding of Media Usage Variable 1 and 2 and the media platforms (radio, television, newspapers and 
internet): never (0); less than once a month (1); a few times a month (2); a few times a week (3); every day (4). 
Coding of the Government Institutions Trust Index and the individual institutions (Parliament, Local 
government councils, The ANC party and Opposition political parties): not at all (0); just a little (1); somewhat 




Table 5.1: Political trust in political institutions in South Africa  
How much do you trust 
each of the following?  
Not at all 
(%) 




A lot (%) 
2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
Parliament 
2015: n = 2361 
2018: n = 1765 
26.5 34.1 32 32.7 26.6 17.7 15 15.5 
Local government councils 
2015: n = 2331 
2018: n = 1711 
32 43.5 31.9 26 23.6 15.5 12.5 15 
The ANC party 
2015: n = 2365 
2018: n = 1786 
32.0 36.9 24.6 24.1 22.3 14.6 21.0 24.4 
Opposition political parties 
2015: n = 2311 
2018: n = 1765 
30.4 42.7 32.4 29.8 24.7 16.0 12.5 11.5 
n = the number of respondents in the statistic 
 
Table 5.2 shows the correlations between trust and political institutions across individual media 
platforms. The objective of this table is to test each institution separately. Immediately it is 
clear that Parliament is most affected by media usage. 
Table 5.2: Correlations: Individual media platforms, Parliament and local councils 
Independent 
variable 





the test (n) 
Radio Parliament 2015 0.044* 2261 
2018 -0.012  1718 
Local government 
council 
2015 0.006 2230 
2018 0.010 1663 
Television Parliament  2015 -0.020  2261 
2018 0.072** 1720 
Local government 
council 
2015 0.018 2230 
2018 0.039 1665 
Newspaper Parliament 2015 -0.025  2260 






2015 0.008 2228 
2018 0.036 1657 
Internet Parliament 2015 -0.064**  2254 
2018 -0.057* 1691 
Local government 
council 
2015 -0.029 2221 
2018 -0.059*  1635 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
Generally, frequency of news gathering through traditional media platforms does have an 
association with institutional trust. The few significant correlation shows increased frequency 
of news gathering is associated with higher trust levels. An increased frequency of radio usage 
and television respectively to gather news the is associated with the citizens to being likely to 
trust the Parliament in 2015 (correlation= 0.044; p-value= 0.037) and Parliament in 2018 
(correlation= 0.072; p-value= 0.003).   
In contrast, as table 5.2 shows, internet is clearly associated with lower institutional trust in the 
Parliament in 2015 (correlation = -0.064; p-value = 0.002) and 2018 (correlation = -0.057; p-
value = 0.019), and trust in the local government councils in 2018 (correlation = -0.059; p-
value = 0.017).  
Trust in the Parliament is the institution most affected by political news gathering. All the 
media platforms, except newspapers, shape trust in Parliament in some form. The Parliament 
finds statistical significance the most. Trust in local government councils was only influenced 
by internet usage as opposed to that of the Parliament. 
5.3 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS: PHASE 1 
The correlations between frequency of media usage and Media Usage Variable 1 (radio, 
television and newspapers) and Media Usage Variable 2 (radio, television, newspapers and the 







Table 5.3: Correlations: Media usage variables and trust in political institutions 
Independent 
variable 









Institutions Trust Index 
2015 0.008  2210 
2018 0.031  1619 
The ruling ANC party 2015 -0.038  2261 
2018 0.010  1729 
Opposition political 
parties 
2015 0.050* 2206 




Institutions Trust Index 
2015 -0.028  2203 
2018 -0.004  1599 
The ruling ANC party 2015 -0.081** 2254 
2018 -0.059*  1707 
Opposition political 
parties 
2015 0.053* 2200 
2018 0.080** 1691 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The Government Institutions Trust Index is not statistically significant. However, both indices 
showed statistically significant relationships with the political parties. Exposure to political 
news is associated with greater trust in opposition parties. In 2015, the correlation between 
Media Usage Variable 1 and the opposition political parties was 0.050 and the p-value was 
0.020; a similar, albeit slightly stronger, association was detected in 2018 (correlation = 0.070; 
p-value = 0.004). The correlations between Media Usage Variable 2 and the opposition parties 
were also statistically significant in 2015 and 2018. The correlation coefficients between these 
variables were 0.053 (p-value = 0.012) in 2015 and 0.080 (p-value = 0.001) in 2018. These 
positive correlations demonstrated again that citizens were more likely to trust the opposition 
parties when they gathered political news more frequently. Furthermore, these correlations had 
gained strength between 2015 and 2018; the correlation in 2018 was highly statistically 
significant.  
The correlations between Media Usage Variable 2 and trust in the ANC are statistically 




and in 2018 this value was -0.059 (p-value = 0.014). The negative values showed an inverse 
relationship between the variables, therefore the higher the frequency of media usage, the more 
likely the citizens will distrust the ANC. This correlation between the variables also grew 
slightly stronger between the years 2015 and 2018.  
Therefore, the relationship between frequency of media usage and trust in political parties 
appears to be the most important of all the political institutions, with trust travelling in different 
directions depending on incumbency or not. 
5.4 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS: PHASE 2 
Recall that phase 2 tests the dependent variables on individual media platforms, as shown in 
table 5.4. 
5.4: Correlations: Individual media platforms and trust in political institutions 
Independent 
variable 





in the test (n) 
Radio Government 
Institutions Trust Index 
2015 0.030  2211 
2018 0.004  1629 
The ruling ANC party 2015 0.020  2263 
2018 0.000  1739 
Opposition political 
parties 
2015 0.047* 2208 
2018 0.028 1723 
Television Government 
Institutions Trust Index 
2015 -0.005  2211 
2018 0.052*  1631 
The ruling ANC party 2015 -0.044*  2263 
2018 0.054*  1741 
Opposition political 
parties 
2015 0.043* 2208 
2018 0.063**  1725 
Newspapers Government 
Institutions Trust Index 
2015 -0.006  2210 
2018 0.034  1623 
The ruling ANC party 2015 -0.071** 2261 
2018 -0.032  1733 






2018 0.061*  1718 
Internet Government 
Institutions Trust Index 
2015 -0.045* 2203 
2018 -0.064*  1603 
The ruling ANC party 2015 -0.111**  2254 
2018 -0.173**  1711 
Opposition political 
parties 
2015 0.032 2200 
2018 0.019 1695 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The correlations show that an increase in radio usage to gather political news is associated with 
greater trust the opposition political parties in 2015 (correlation = 0.047; p-value = 0.026). 
However, television usage shows mixed results. It is associated with higher levels of trust in 
government institutions in 2018 (correlation = 0.052; p-value = 0.036) and trust in the 
opposition political parties in 2015 (correlation = 0.043; p-value = 0.042) and 2018 (correlation 
= 0.063; p-value= 0.009). is negatively associated with trust in the ANC in 2015 (correlation = 
-0.044; p-value = 0.038) but positively in 2018 (correlation = 0.054; p-value = 0.025).  
Political news gathering from newspapers have a varied relationship with political parties. 
Newspaper usage is negatively associated the ANC Party (correlation = -0.071; p-value = 
0.001) but is associated with higher levels of trust in opposition political parties in 2015 
(correlation = 0.059; p-value = 0.006) and in 2018 (correlation = 0.061; p-value = 0.011). 
Finally, frequent internet usage is associated with greater distrust in government institutions 
and the ANC, in 2015 and in 2018. 
5.5 DISCUSSION  
Trust in political institutions, including government institutions, the ANC party and opposition 
political parties, decreased between the years 2015 and 2018. Furthermore, the majority (over 
50%) of citizens distrusted political institutions in 2018. This confirms similar decreases in 
political trust in South Africa identified by other scholars (Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg 
2016).  
The statistically significant findings revealed interesting results. It appears that opposition 
parties have benefitted from increased trust perceptions among citizens who gather news 




ANC, as citizens were more likely to distrust this institution if they regularly gathered political 
news (Hypothesis 3). 
However, and overall, frequent exposure to political news has a weak and mixed effects on 
trust levels towards other political institutions. Sourcing political news from the traditional 
media platforms, radio, television, and newspapers, had the weakest sway on trust in 
institutions. Furthermore, the correlations were largely supportive of the virtuous circle 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). On the other hand, gathering political news from the internet 
influenced political trust in a negative manner (Hypothesis 1) in all institutions in Phase 2 
except for the opposition political parties. The correlations between gathering political news 
from the internet and trust in political institutions also showcase the strongest associations 
between the variables.  
5.6 CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES 
Political distrust in South African political institutions has increased. Support of government 
institutions is characterised as specific support (Norris, 1999:25–26). However, the 
consequences of declining support in these institutions are more severe compared to that of 
political actors. An increase in disillusionment with the institutions can negatively affect the 
democratic state. Political institutions are not able to be voted out as actors are. Increased 
dissatisfaction with the political institutions can negatively shape the reservoir of diffuse 
support that is essential to the survival of a democracy (Norris, 1999:25–26). The key findings 
in this section are that the internet had the strongest influence on the trust in the political 
institutions, and it influenced the citizens to be less trusting of the political institutions. 
Moreover, there were differences in how the trust in the political parties’ variables was affected 
by the frequency of media usage to gather political news. An increased frequency of media 
usage to gather political news through all the platforms increased the citizens’ trust in the 




CHAPTER 6: EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL NEWS VIA THE MEDIA 
AND TRUST IN REGIME PERFORMANCE AND REGIME 
PRINCIPLES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines associations between trust in regime performance and regime principles 
and frequency of media usage to gather political news. Regime performance and regime 
principles form part of Norris’ (1999) conceptual framework for operationalising political trust. 
Political trust in these objects is vital for the survival of a democracy (Norris 1999:16-20). 
Regime performance was measured though the South African citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy item. Support for regime principles was measured through the citizens’ demand for 
a democratic government. A descriptive view of democratic satisfaction and democratic 
support in South Africa is followed by correlations between frequency of media usage and 
demand for and satisfaction with democracy.11 A discussion of the findings and their support 
of the various hypotheses follows. 
6.2 TRUST ATTITUDES TOWARDS REGIME PERFORMANCE AND PRINCIPLES 
Table 6.1 shows a decrease in democratic satisfaction between 2015 and 2018. The number of 
citizens ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘not very satisfied’ increased from 51% in 2015 to 57% in 
2018. Similarly, the number of citizens who were either ‘fairly satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ 
decreased from 49% to 43% between 2015 and 2018.  
Table 6.1: Democratic satisfaction is South Africa  
Response category  2015 (%) 
n = 2345 
2018 (%) 
n = 1814 
South Africa is not a democracy 0.5 0.4 
Not at all satisfied 23.8 30.9 
Not very satisfied 26.7 26.2 
 
11 Coding of Media Usage Variable 1 and 2 and the media platforms (radio, television, newspapers and 
internet): never (0); less than once a month (1); a few times a month (2); a few times a week (3); every day (4). 
Coding of regime performance variable (democratic satisfaction): South Africa is not a democracy (0); not at 
all satisfied (1); not very satisfied (2); fairly satisfied (3); very satisfied (4). 
Coding of regime principles variable (support for democracy): Statement 3: Doesn’t matter (1); Statement 2: 




Fairly satisfied 37.7 30.7 
Very satisfied 11.3 11.8 
n = the number of respondents in the statistic 
 
Similarly, demand for democracy declined between 2015 and 2018. In 2015, 66% of citizens 
identified that democracy was the preferable form of governance; in 2018, this figure had 
declined to 55% of citizens (see table 6.2). This decrease in democratic support resulted a large 
increase among citizens stating that it ‘doesn’t matter’ what type of political system is in place.  
Table 6.2: Support for democracy in South Africa  
Response category  2015 (%) 
n = 2306 
2018 (%) 
n = 1786 
Statement 3: Doesn’t matter 15.9 26.0 
Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable 18.0 18.9 
Statement 1: Democracy preferable 66.1 55.1 
n = the number of respondents in the statistic 
 
6.3 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST IN REGIME 
PERFORMANCE AND REGIME PRINCIPLES: PHASE 1 
The frequency of media usage to gather political news, measured through Media Usage 
Variable 1 and 2 does not show many statistically significant associations with democratic 
satisfaction or democratic demand (Table 6.3). The only significant correlation was between 
Media Usage Variable 1 and democratic satisfaction in 2015 (correlation= 0.040; p-value = 
0.056). Therefore, in 2015, those who frequently used traditional media platforms were more 
likely to be satisfied with democracy.  
Table 6.3: Correlations: Media usage variables, regime performance and regime support 
Independent 
variables 





in the test (n) 
Media usage 
variable 1 
Regime performance 2015 0.040*  2243 
2018 0.017  1757 
Regime principles 2015 -0.004 2284 






Regime performance 2015 0.030  2236 
2018 0.015  1734 
Regime principles 2015 -0.007 2277 
2018 0.016 1710 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
6.4 FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USAGE AND POLITICAL TRUST IN REGIME 
PERFORMANCE AND REGIME PRINCIPLES: PHASE 2 
As with Phase 1, most of the correlations in phase 2 are not statistically significant. The 
exceptions included the correlations between regime performance and television (2018) and 
radio (2015) (see Table 6.4). In 2015, radio usage shaped the citizens democratic satisfaction 
positively in South Africa (correlation = 0.062; p-value = 0.003). In addition, television usage 
to gather political news influenced the citizens to be more likely to be satisfied with democracy 
in South Africa (correlation = 0.053; p-value = 0.025). 









the test (n) 
Radio Regime performance 2015 0.062** 2245 
2018 -0.020  1768 
Regime principles 2015 0.002 2286 
2018 0.008 1743 
Television Regime performance 2015 0.040 2245 
2018 0.053* 1770 
Regime principles 2015 0.007 2286 
2018 0.040 1745 
Newspaper Regime performance 2015 -0.016  2243 
2018 -0.010  1761 
Regime principles 2015 0.013 2284 




Internet Regime performance 2015 0.002  2236 
2018 0.031  1738 
Regime principles 2015 -0.011 2277 
2018 0.008 1714 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
Support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy are vital for the survival of a 
democratic political system (Norris, 1999:16-20). While citizen satisfaction with regime 
performance and support for the democratic regime has decreased frequency of media usage to 
gather political news does not appear to have any direct effect on either. The exceptions suggest 
that political news gleaned from radio and television usage promoted democratic satisfaction 
among citizens. Overall, the findings are supportive of Hypothesis 3: that media usage to gather 
political news does not shape demand for democracy. Satisfaction with democracy had mixed 
results, because the findings lent some support to Hypothesis 2, that frequency of media usage 
to source political news influences political trust positively. 
6.6 CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES  
Support for democracy and democratic satisfaction are essential to the survival of a democratic 
political system (Norris 1999:16-20). Both of these are targets of diffuse support. Diffuse 
support is a deep-seated satisfaction with the democratic political system. The decrease in the 
reservoir of deep-seated diffuse support may have negative effects on the political system and 
is essential for tolerating periods where a low amount of specific support exists (Norris, 
1999:26).These targets have both decreased in recent years among the South African citizenry. 
However, the frequency of media usage to gather political news does not appear to be directly 
linked to this decrease. If anything, satisfaction with democracy was shaped positively in 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the association between frequency of exposure to political news via 
various media sources and levels political trust extended towards political actors, political 
institutions, regime performance, and regime principles. The media and political trust have a 
contentious association with one another. Two alternating schools of thought exist that attempt 
to explain how these two variables affect one another. Both the media malaise and the virtuous 
circle schools of thought are supported by evidence set out in global studies.  
The political context of a state not only influences the content of media coverage but also 
shapes levels of political trust among citizens. In South Africa, citizens are widely exposed to 
the political context and political news through frequent exposure to their chosen media 
platforms.  This reasoning lead to the expectation that a high frequency of sourcing (largely 
negative) political news would have a negative association on levels of political trust in various 
political objects such as actors, institutions, and the democratic regime more broadly.  
7.2 A SYNOPSIS OF THE STUDY 
This study began with a rationale and background to explain various factors pertinent to 
exploring the association between gathering political news and political trust. These included 
the complex and yet unclear relationship between media usage and political trust, as well as 
the bias in the literature towards advanced western democracies. South Africa provided a 
developing, non-western context for this research. South African media institutions cover 
political news and citizens are widely exposed to the political landscape which has also been 
tumultuous over recent years with various political scandals and allegations of corruption. 
Political trust has decreased over the years in South Africa. Yet, little is known about the effects 
of exposure media coverage of political news on levels of political trust in South Africa. The 
significance of this study lies in exploring which of the contrasting explanations about the 
influence of the media on trust applies to the South African case. As discussed, the malaise and 
the virtuous circle schools of thought argue that media usage can shape political trust in 
different ways and thus pose different implications for democracy in South Africa. 
If gathering political news negatively shapes political trust, such as stated by the media malaise 
school of thought, this could negatively influence the democratic state in various areas.  A 




and even fear amongst the citizenry (Newton, 1999:579). Furthermore, the political 
disaffection caused by a malaise could reduce political participation and political mobilisation 
by the citizens in the state (Newton, 1999:581-582; Lin & Lim, 2002:26). On the other hand, 
the virtuous circle school of thought states that increased political news gathering would 
positively influence political trust and therefore democracy in the state through various means. 
The citizens gathering a high frequency of political news will become more politically 
knowledgeable which positively shapes the citizens civic engagement and mobilisation which 
in turn enhances democracy in the state (Avery, 2009:412). 
7.3 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The study finds that exposure to political news in South Africa between 2015 and 2018 has a 
complex and unexpected association with political trust. The study started with the hypothesis 
(1) that media malaise would be evident due to the increasingly difficult political context in 
South Africa and related exposure to large amounts of negative news. However, the results 
reveal a more complicated association between the variables.  
Citizens who gathered political news from traditional media platforms were more likely to trust 
political actors and democratic institutions, which lends support to for the virtuous circle 
hypothesis (2). However, citizens who use the internet to gather political news were much more 
likely to distrust the political actors and the political institutions, suggesting a malaise amongst 
the internet users in particular towards actors and institutions. Furthermore, the correlations for 
internet usage were consistently the strongest and produced the most statistically significant 
correlations in this study.   
Moreover, not all political actors and institutions were equally affected. The Political Actors 
Corruption Index was affected more than the Political Actors Trust Index. Corruption therefore 
shapes trust more so than perceptions of actors. In addition, political parties were more 
significant than government institutions. Chapter 5 also revealed an inverse relationship for 
political parties. Trust in the opposition political parties was more likely to be positively 
affected by a high rate of political news gathering, whereas the inverse held for the ANC. 
Furthermore, political trust in the opposition parties was the only trust variable to not be 
negatively influenced by the citizens internet news gathering habits.  
Since political trust in political actors and institutions are not strongly correlated to the 
frequency of gathering political news, the democratic consequences of trust deficits as a result 




to traditional media platforms was more likely to reveal the virtuous circle hypothesis and 
promote political trust which is beneficial to a democratic state. The virtuous circle hypothesis 
suggests that increased gathering of political news would increase political learning and 
knowledge which could enhance democracy in the state. On the other hand, the citizens who 
source their political news from the internet, are less trusting of the political actors and 
institutions. This could potentially negatively influence democracy within a state. The malaise 
hypothesis suggests that the distrust promoted by political news gathering could negatively 
impact the democratic culture in a state and potentially work towards undermining the 
democracy in the state through reducing political participation for example. However, the 
internet is the least used source by South African citizens to gather political news.  
Lastly, satisfaction with the regime performance and support for the regime principles are two 
essential components in a democratic state (Norris, 1999:16-20). Data shows high levels of 
dissatisfaction with democracy and only a moderate amount of regime support in 2015 and 
2018 in South Africa. Yet, satisfaction with, and support for democracy in South Africa has no 
meaningful relationship with the exposure of political news in this study. Therefore, the results 
for these objects are overwhelmingly supportive of Hypothesis 3, the null hypothesis.  
7.3.1 Negative impact of the internet on trust: implications for South Africa  
The association between internet usage to gather political news and political trust is a key 
finding in this study. As discussed above, internet usage to gather political news has a strong, 
inverse relationship with political trust and far more so than gleaning political news from the 
traditional media platforms. 
Some context relating to internet access and usage in South Africa is required. The internet is 
the least utilised platform to gather political news from in South Africa (see table 1.1). 
However, access to the internet has increased amongst the South African citizenry. In 2015, 
53.5% of South African households had at least one member who had access to or used the 
internet either at home, work, place of study, or at internet cafés (Stats SA, 2017:50). In 2018 
this figure grew to 64.7% of South African households (Stats SA, 2020:57). Although, the 
number of households who had access to the internet at home remained similarly around 10% 
in 2015 and 2018 (Stats SA, 2017:50; 2020:57). Therefore, this platform is used by a smaller 
group but growing number of people.  
Moreover, gathering political news on an online platform was also found to be strongly 




The younger and more educated a citizen is, the more likely they will use the internet to gather 
political news. This is similarly true for the race of the respondent, with white people being the 
most likely and black people the least likely to access online sources for political news. 
Consequently, the huge amount of inequality in South Africa that exists largely along racial 
lines is also visible amongst the internet access to gather political news (Trossbach, 2019:111-
113). 
Research on the effects of internet news on political trust is still limited. However, the findings 
of this study between internet usage and trust supports a growing literature on the same (e.g. 
Im et al., 2014; Ceron, 2015; Zhou et al., 2019; Lu et al., 2019; You and Wang, 2020). These 
scholars argue that the way the internet is set up has unique effects on trust, as compared to 
traditional media platforms. Although the online news media platforms can follow the 
traditional ‘top-down’ approach, not all the information that the citizens access on the internet 
follows this format. The role that citizens play on the internet is a two-way street, citizens are 
both receivers and disseminators of information. On the internet users can upload content and 
participate in online discussion forums (Im et al., 2014:743-744; Ceron, 2015:495; Zhou et al., 
2019:2-3; Lu et al., 2019:2; You and Wang, 2020:69). The internet makes it easier for the 
‘wrong’ information to be made public as the lack of a filter can be present causing the citizens 
to be exposed to a larger amount of information (Im et al., 2014:745; Ceron, 2015:494). The 
traditional media platforms can be influenced by the political and economic elites in a state 
(You and Wang, 2020:69-70). The content of the information and the ‘set up’ of platform 
accessed by the citizens on the internet are emphasised factors in determining how this media 
platform influences trust (Ceron, 2015:495). 
The control and the perceived control of the state are also argued to play a role in determining 
how internet usage shapes political trust (Zhou et al., 2019; You and Wang, 2020). The less 
space within a state for various avenues for freedom of expression to take place, the more likely 
political trust would be eroded by the internet (You and Wang, 2020:69). Furthermore, the 
more strictly controlled the traditional media platforms are by the government, the more likely 
the internet will deliver negative information to the citizens that were not covered or covered 
inconsistently by the traditional media platforms, such as corruption scandals for example 
(Zhou et al., 2019:12). 
The South African media environment is not immune to scandals, as previously discussed in 




Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, various political scandals have arisen in the South 
African political landscape. Some citizens may have had access to information on the internet 
that was not reported on by some traditional media platforms which could potentially play a 
role in swaying political trust negatively. 
Furthermore, it is proposed by Zhou et al. (2019:12) that Chinese citizens engaging with the 
internet to gather news are more politically and socially engaged due to the interactive forums 
on the internet. The author also found that the citizens using the internet demonstrated a higher 
demand for political participation and political supervision over various political aspects, such 
as how taxes were spent for example (Zhou et al., 2019:12). Furthermore, citizens who gather 
their news through internet usage were more likely to have higher expectations of their 
government, which, if left unmet, could negatively shape trust (Zhou et al., 2019:12-14). 
Lastly, it was argued by You and Wang (2020:80) that using the internet to gather political 
news caused a rise of critical citizens in democratic states. Critical citizens are citizens that are 
cynical and untrusting towards the political institutions and actors but are overall supportive of 
the democratic state (Norris, 1999:10-12). Critical citizens are emphasised to be formed 
through mass education and tertiary education especially, and from improving the living 
standard of people (You and Wang, 2020:69). It could be suggested that the finding by You 
and Wang (2020), is in existence in the South African context, where citizens who gather 
political news from the internet are more likely to be critical citizens. South African citizens 
who use the internet for political news purposes appear to be more educated and have a higher 
standard of living (Trossbach, 2019:111-113). Furthermore, Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg 
(2016:19-20) found that a large number of critical citizens are in existence in South Africa. 
Although further research of this in in the South African context is required. 
If utilising the internet to gather political news is linked to critical citizens in South Africa, 
such as in the study by You and Wang (2020), this could reveal an important aspect of the 
South African democracy which could potentially grow as internet usage to gather political 
news increases over time. Critical citizens aid in keeping the government accountable and more 
reactive to the demands of the public (Norris, 1999:10-12). 
7.4 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
Various shortcomings in this study can be identified. The first relates to the lack of a content 
analysis of the political news that was covered by the South African media institutions. A 




broadcasted by the various media platforms in greater detail. A content analysis of the media 
would have been beneficial to aid in potentially explaining the effect of political news on 
political trust. A recommendation of future research would be to conduct an in-depth concept 
analysis of the political news that is covered by the South African media institutions.  
As humans are complex beings, and attitudes and behaviours are not shaped by one factor but 
rather a multitude of factors, another identified shortcoming is that the summary statistics in 
this study are simple bivariate correlations. The bivariate correlations only show the measure 
of association between two variables and not between how a variable is affected by a multitude 
of variables. The inclusion of a multiple regression model would have aided in a better 
understanding how political trust is swayed by the different media platforms utilised to gather 
political news.  
Furthermore, this study only examined the correlations between gathering political news and 
trust in political institutions, not regime institutions as Norris (1999) conceptual framework 
identifies. A recommendation for future research would be to expand the conceptualisation to 
trust in regime institutions as well as of political institutions as the political actors and 
institutions were the targets of trust that were influenced by political news gathering habits the 
most.  
As this study was a purely quantitative study, it cannot offer a deeper analysis for the reasons 
why gathering political news shapes political trust in manner found in this study. This study 
can only provide the generalised information how political news affects political trust in the 
years 2015 and 2018. This is especially pertinent with how gathering political news from the 
internet and from the traditional media platforms have such divergent implications on political 
trust of political actors and institutions. A key recommendation for further research would be 
to explore the effect of gathering political news on political trust in a qualitative manner. 
Moreover, the internet is the least used source of political news in South Africa, it would be 
interesting to conduct further research overtime as the internet grows as a more frequently 
accessed news source potentially. It is possible that the malaise associated with internet usage 
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THE APPENDIX: AFROBAROMETER SURVEY QUESTION ITEMS 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The media platforms within the independent variable (Q12 and Q12) 
Media platform Round 6: 2015 Round 7: 2018 
Radio Q12 A Q12 A 
Television Q12 B Q12 B 
Newspapers Q12 C Q12 C 
Internet Q12 D Q12 D 
 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 6 and 7 
12.  How often do you get news from the following sources? [Read out options] 
  
Every day 
A few times 
a week 








A. Radio 4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. Television 4 3 2 1 0 9 
C. Newspapers 4 3 2 1 0 9 
D.  Internet  4 3 2 1 0 9 
E. Social media such as Facebook or 
Twitter 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Political actors and political institutions  
Political Actors Corruption Index question items (Q53 and Q44) 
Political actor  Round 6: 2015 Round 7: 2018 
The President and Officials in his Office  Q53 A Q44 A 
Members of Parliament Q53 B Q44 B 
Government officials Q53 C Q44 C 
Local Government Councillors Q53 D Q44 D 
 
Political Actors Trust Index question items (Q53 and Q44) 
Political actor  Round 6: 2015 Round 7: 2018 
The President  Q52 A Q43 A 
Members of Parliament Q52 C1-SAF Q43 C1-SAF 
 
Political Institutions question items (Q52 and Q43) 
Political institutions Round 6: 2015 Round 7: 2018 
Parliament Q52 B Q43 B 
Your Local Government Council Q52 E Q43 D 
The ruling ANC party  Q52 F Q43 E 






Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 6 
52.  How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? [Read out 
options] 
  Not at all 
Just a 
little 




A. The President  0 1 2 3 9 
B. Parliament 0 1 2 3 9 
C. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 0 1 2 3 9 
C1-SAF.  The Premier of this province 0 1 2 3 9 
D The South African Revenue Service or SARS      
E. Your Local Government Council 0 1 2 3 9 
F. 
The ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
party  
0 1 2 3 9 
G. Opposition Political Parties 0 1 2 3 9 
H. The Police 0 1 2 3 9 
H1-SAF. The Office of the Public Protector 0 1 2 3 9 
H2- 
SAF. 
The National Prosecuting Authority, the NPA 0 1 2 3 9 
H3-SAF. 
The Directorate of Priority Crime 
Investigations, the Hawks 
0 1 2 3 9 
I.  The Army 0 1 2 3 9 
J. Courts of law 0 1 2 3 9 
K. Traditional leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
L. Religious leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
M-SAF. 
Government broadcasting services like, SABC 
TV and radio 
0 1 2 3 9 
N- SAF. 
Independent broadcasting services like E TV, 
Radio 702 and community radio stations 
0 1 2 3 9 
 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 7 
43.  How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? [Read out 
options] 
  Not at all 
Just a 
little 




A. The President  0 1 2 3 9 




C. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 0 1 2 3 9 
C1-SAF.  The Premier of this province 0 1 2 3 9 
D. Your Local Government Council 0 1 2 3 9 
E. 
The ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
party  
0 1 2 3 9 
F. Opposition political parties 0 1 2 3 9 
G. The police 0 1 2 3 9 
H. The army 0 1 2 3 9 
I. Courts of law 0 1 2 3 9 
I1-SAF. Judges 0 1 2 3 9 
I2-SAF.  Magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 
J. Traditional leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
K. Religious leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
L-SAF.  The South African Revenue Service (SARS) 0 1 2 3 9 
M-SAF. The Public Protector 0 1 2 3 9 
N-SAF. 
Government broadcasting services like, SABC 
TV and radio 
0 1 2 3 9 
O-SAF. 
Independent broadcasting services like E TV, 
Radio 702 and community radio stations 
0 1 2 3 9 
 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 6 
53.  How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 






All of them 
Don't know/ Haven’t 
heard [DNR] 
A. 
The President and Officials in his 
Office  
0 1 2 3 9 
B. Members of Parliament 0 1 2 3 9 
C. Government officials 0 1 2 3 9 
D. Local Government Councillors 0 1 2 3 9 
E. Police 0 1 2 3 9 
F. 
Tax Officials, like South African 
Revenue Service officials or 
Local Government tax collectors 
0 1 2 3 9 
G. Judges and Magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 
H. Traditional leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
I. Religious leaders 0 1 2 3 9 





Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 7 
44.  How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 






All of them 
Don't know/ Haven’t 
heard [DNR] 
A. 
The president and officials in his 
office  
0 1 2 3 9 
B. Members of Parliament 0 1 2 3 9 
C. Government officials 0 1 2 3 9 
D. Local Government Councilors 0 1 2 3 9 
E. Police 0 1 2 3 9 
F. Judges and magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 
G. Traditional leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
H. Religious leaders 0 1 2 3 9 
I. Business executives 0 1 2 3 9 
J. Non-governmental organisations 0 1 2 3 9 
K-SAF. 
Tax Officials, like South African 
Revenue Service officials or 
Local Government rates 
collectors 
0 1 2 3 9 
L-SAF Judges 0 1 2 3 9 
M-SAF Magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 
 
Regime performance 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 6 
41.  Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? Are you: [Read out 
options. Only one option to be chosen. Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read 
“democracy” in English. Translate “democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand the 
term in the official language.] 
Very satisfied? 4 
Fairly satisfied? 3 
Not very satisfied?  2 
Not at all satisfied?  1 
South Africa is not a democracy [Do not read] 0 







Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 7 
36.  Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? Are you: [Read out 
options. Only one option to be chosen. Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read 
“democracy” in English. Translate “democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand the 
term in the official language.] 
Very satisfied? 4 
Fairly satisfied? 3 
Not very satisfied?  2 
Not at all satisfied?  1 
South Africa is not a democracy [Do not read] 0 
Don’t know [Do not read]  9 
 
Regime principles 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 6 
30. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? [Read out statements. Only one option to 
be chosen. Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read “democracy” in English. Translate 
“democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand the English term.] 
STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  3 
STATEMENT 2:In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.  2 
STATEMENT 3:For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 1 
Don’t know [Do not read]  9 
 
Afrobarometer survey question item: Round 7 
28. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? [Read out statements. Only one option to 
be chosen. Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read “democracy” in English. Translate 
“democracy” into local language only if respondent does not understand the English term.] 
STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  3 
STATEMENT 2:In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.  2 
STATEMENT 3:For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 1 
Don’t know [Do not read]  9 
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